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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of the war crime of attacking peacekeeping 
missions under international humanitarian law and international criminal law. The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court criminalises “(…) intentionally 
directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved 
in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict”. However, 
the exact scope of application of this war crime is unclear and controversial due to 
the overlap of three different fields of international law: international criminal law, 
international humanitarian law and United Nations law. These distinct bodies of law 
have their own principles, objectives and logic and might not necessarily be in 
perfect harmony with each other at this particular point. Major complexities linked to 
it include the definition of a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, the status of peacekeeping personnel and objects under 
international humanitarian law, and the scope of peacekeepers’ right to self-defence. 
The central research question that this thesis addresses is about the compatibility of 
this war crime with the system of international law. This is answered in the 
affirmative. 
 
The contribution to knowledge that this thesis offers relates to critical studies on 
international criminal law, international humanitarian law and the United Nations 
system. The thesis clarifies the scope of application of the war crime of attacking 
personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter. This is the first comprehensive analysis of the overlap of 
legal regimes with respect to this war crime, which can assist courts in application of 
the rules relating to the protection of peacekeeping missions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but often only a soldier can do it. 
 
Dag Hammarskjold, The Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
 
Since the establishment of the first peacekeeping mission in 1948, United Nations 
peacekeeping has evolved into one of the key tools used by the international 
community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and 
security. Not only has United Nations peacekeeping grown in size but also it has 
become increasingly multi-dimensional and robust.1 The growing complexity of 
these peace operations has been raising troublesome questions concerning their legal, 
political and military aspects including the use of force by peacekeepers, the 
applicability of international humanitarian law or the protection provided to 
personnel in peace operations. The issue of protection has become the object of 
increased international concern in the 1990s, as attacks on United Nations personnel 
have escalated. The adoption of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel in 1994 was a landmark treaty in this regard with its inclusion 
of criminalisation of such attacks and the principle of prosecute or extradite.2 
Subsequent to the Safety Convention (it entered into force in 1999) the Security 
Council has repeatedly condemned attacks on UN and associated personnel and 
called on States to prosecute persons responsible for such attacks and welcomed “the 
inclusion [of such attacks] as a war crime in the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court”.3 Following that, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
adopted an identical provision in its Statute4 and this court was also the first one to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (2008) 6 
<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf> accessed 1 February 2014 
2 O Swaak-Goldman, ‘Peacekeeping Operations and the International Criminal Court’ in G L Beruto 
(ed), Conference Paper: International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations - 
31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 4-6 September 
2008 (The International Institute of Humanitarian Law 2008) 268, 270 
3 Security Council Presidential Statement UN Doc. S/PRST/2000/4 
4 Article 4(b) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the Agreement between 
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone (Freetown, 16 January 2002) 
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apply it.5 Protection of peacekeeping missions is currently at the heart of 
international debate particularly in the context of recent developments in 
international criminal jurisdictions.6 
 
This thesis will focus on the protection provided to UN peacekeeping missions under 
the legal framework of international humanitarian law and international criminal law. 
The semantics of the proposed research title is not incidental. The study will 
primarily be concerned with the anatomy of the war crime of attacking personnel and 
objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations as this crime is coined in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The analysis will therefore entail a detailed examination of this 
offence by resolving it into constitutive elements and scrutinising their 
interdependence in the light of different legal regimes brought into play by the 
drafters of the Statute. Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute 
criminalise in international and non-international armed conflict respectively: 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Judgment Case no. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment (2 March 2009) [hereinafter: RUF Judgment] 
6 The developments include: 1) The adjudicated case before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora (ICTR-98-41-T) Trial Judgment (18 December 
2008), in which the accused was charged, among other crimes, with crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in relation to the killings of Belgian peacekeepers serving under the UN Mission to Rwanda. 
The ICTR Statute does not specifically criminalise ‘intentionally directing attacks’ against 
peacekeepers and the charges covering this offence were brought under other provisions of the 
Statute. 2) The adjudicated RUF case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor v. 
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (SCSL-04-15-T) Trial Judgment (2 March 
2009), in which the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions was applied for the first time. 3) 
Two cases in the situation in Darfur, Sudan before the International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. 
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09) and The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain 
and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus (ICC-02/05-03/09) which concerned the war crimes allegedly 
committed in 2007 during an attack against the African Union Mission in Sudan, a peacekeeping 
mission authorised in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Pre-Trial Chamber I declined to 
confirm the charges in the first case of Mr. Abu Garda (8 February 2010) but subsequently it decided 
unanimously to confirm the charges against Mr Banda and Mr Jerbo (7 March 2011), and committed 
them to trial. Proceedings against Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus were terminated by Trial Chamber 
IV on 4 October 2013 after receiving evidence pointing towards his death. On 11 September 2014, 
Trial Chamber IV issued an arrest warrant against Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and vacated the 
trial date previously scheduled to open on 18 November 2014. 4) Two cases before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karad!i" (IT-95-5/18-I) and 
The Prosecutor v. Radko Mladi" (IT-09-92), in which both accused are charged, inter alia, with 
‘taking hostages, a violation of the laws or customs of war’, which included taking hostage of UN 
peacekeepers. The ICTY Statute does not contain any specific provisions dealing with the 
‘intentionally directing attacks’ against peacekeepers and the attacks against peacekeepers during the 
Balkan conflict have been subsumed under other provisions of the Statute. The trial of Radovan 
Karad!i" commenced on 26 October 2009 and the trial of Radko Mladi" commenced on 16 May 
2012. At the time of writing both are still ongoing. 
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“(…) intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units 
or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict”.7 
 
The central research question to be investigated is whether or not the war crime of 
attacking personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations is compatible with the system of international 
law. In its present form the crime seems to conflate three different fields of public 
international law: the international law of armed conflict (or international 
humanitarian law), international criminal law and UN law.8 These distinct bodies of 
law have their own principles, objectives, logic and dynamic that might not 
necessarily be in perfect harmony to each other at this particular point. Firstly, 
peacekeeping is an area of discourse where semantics are often confusing.9 The same 
terms are used to depict slightly or fundamentally different phenomena as much as 
different terms are applied to the same or closely related activities. There is no single 
universally accepted definition of “peacekeeping”; this concept covers a variety of 
actions and grouping disparate cases under this single header is the best example of a 
phenomenological confusion and conceptual overlap. The Rome Statute itself does 
not provide a definition of a “peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations”, nor do the Elements of Crimes thereto prove helpful in this 
regard. Secondly, the exact scope of this war crime is unclear and controversial. It is 
not settled to what extent and under what conditions personnel and objects involved 
in a peacekeeping mission are entitled to the same protection as civilians and civilian 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See the Elements of Crime to Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii), according to which this offence 
consists of seven elements: (1) The perpetrator directed an attack; (2) the object of the attack was 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; (3) the perpetrator 
intended such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles so involved to be the object of the 
attack; (4) such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to that protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; (5) the perpetrator 
was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protection; (6) the conduct took place in 
the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict; and (7) the perpetrator was 
aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. 
8 UN law includes in particular provisions of the Charter of United Nations relating to jus ad bellum 
and the peacekeeping mandates. 
9 D Daniel, ‘Wandering Out of the Void? Conceptualizing Practicable Peace Enforcement’ in A 
Morrison, D Fraser, J Kiras (eds), Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International 
Conflict Resolution (Brown Book Company Ltd. 1997) 2 
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objects. Firstly, it is not clear why all peacekeepers and peacekeeping objects should 
be given civilian protection in light of the fact that peacekeeping operations usually 
involve military personnel appropriately equipped with weapons and other objects of 
inherently military nature. These characteristics do not seem to match a general 
understanding of the notion of “a civilian”. The reference to the international law of 
armed conflict in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) does not help to resolve this 
issue as the international humanitarian law treaties do not address the situation of an 
armed conflict involving the United Nations, nor have they been specially drafted to 
apply to UN forces.10 Peacekeeping missions do not fit neatly into personal 
categories of international humanitarian law, as this is governed by the primary 
distinction between combatants and civilians11, whereas peacekeeping forces seem to 
possess characteristics of both. Only combatants are allowed to participate in 
hostilities and they themselves can be attacked at any time, whereas civilians are 
entitled to protection from direct attacks “unless and for such time as they take direct 
part in hostilities”.12 It is common knowledge that peacekeepers can use force in self-
defence and in the fulfilment of their mandate; it is contentious though, when and 
how they can use such force before forgoing protection from direct attacks. Using 
force in self-defence does not qualify as direct participation in hostilities, hence it 
does not deprive civilians of the protection from targeting. However, the notion of 
self-defence has been extended under UN law and encompasses not only individual 
self-defence but also “the defence of the mandate”.13 Such understanding of self-
defence is different from its usual meaning under international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law. Which definition should therefore be applied in the 
context under scrutiny? An additional difficulty is the lack of a precise legal 
definition of the notion of direct participation in hostilities and there is much 
controversy concerning the application of this term in practice.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 M Cottier, ‘War Crimes – para. 2(b)(iii)’ in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: observers’ notes, article by article (2nd edition, Beck 2008) 330, 
335 
11 Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Regulations to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention III, Articles 43, 44, 50, 51 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
12 Article 51(3) of AP I. The formal status of a “combatant” applies only to international armed 
conflicts, however the principle of distinction between combatants (understood in generic sense) and 
civilians applies to non-international armed conflicts as well. These issues are extensively explained in 
Chapter 4 
13 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 1) para. 34-35 
14 The issue has been debated at great length by legal experts from military, governmental and 
academic circles, from international organisations and NGOs, all participating in their private 
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Despite the profound importance of the effective protection of peacekeeping 
personnel and the legitimacy of criminal prosecutions of potential offenders, little 
direct attention has been given to the legal and practical ramifications of ambiguities 
surrounding the basic concepts and precepts of this war crime. The difficulties with 
determining a legal status of peacekeeping personnel and qualifications of their 
actions under international humanitarian law, especially those involving the use of 
force, might lead to a situation where such identifications would be dependant on the 
ius ad bellum considerations and lead to extending their protection from direct 
attacks just because they represent the international community and “fight” for the 
right cause. This contradicts the fundamental separation between ius ad bellum (law 
governing the right to use force in international relations) and ius in bello (the law 
governing the conduct of hostilities) and it essentially affects the principle of equality 
of belligerents under the latter regime. The qualification of the conflict and the 
legality and objective of the resort to force shall not affect the application of 
international humanitarian law, nor may it be used to interpret its rules, even in case 
of the global organisation charged with the maintenance of international peace and 
security.15 
 
These are only some of the vexing issues, which although tackled in the literature 
separately, have not been comprehensively dealt with in relation to each other and in 
the context of contemporary warfare and criminalisation of attacks on peacekeeping 
missions. Nor have problems concerning the modalities and conditions associated 
with this war crime emerged in (international) criminal proceedings yet. However, 
not asking questions about tensions intrinsic to this offence does not mean that the 
problems can be altogether avoided. They remain more than just potential and they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!
capacity, convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross. After six years of expert 
discussions and research, the ICRC released in 2009 the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. However, the document does not 
necessarily reflect a unanimous or majority opinion of the participating experts and given the 
modalities of direct participation in hostilities and consequences of such activities, the guidelines 
seem to further complicate the understanding of the notion; see further: N Melzer, Interpretative 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law 
(ICRC 2009) 
15 Many scholars regard the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello as “absolute dogma” – see: L 
Doswald-Beck, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1997) 37 (35) IRRC 53; Y 
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press 2005) 144 
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will have direct and serious implications for criminal litigations against the 
perpetrators before the International Criminal Court or any other court. These are 
critical deficiencies that fly in the face of one of the tenets of criminal law – the 
principle of specificity, which requires that criminal rules prohibiting certain 
conducts shall be detailed and specific in their scope and purpose. Indeterminacy of 
this war crime leaves too much to chance and speculation. A lack of clarity of the 
applicable standards, ambiguity of rules and incongruousness of overlapping legal 
regimes can undermine the legal protection of peacekeeping missions, observance of 
international humanitarian law and legitimacy of criminal prosecutions in this 
context as well as legal security, predictability and respect for international criminal 
law in general. UN forces cannot find themselves in a legal no man’s land trying to 
resolve whether or not their actions undertaken in the fulfilment of the mandate will 
result in a change of their status from that of civilian to that of combatant and 
therefore deprive them of civilian protection. Such decisions must often be taken in a 
hostile environment and stressful conditions. Needless to say, the importance of such 
determination is particularly pressing also for the opposite warring party risking 
criminal responsibility for committing a war crime of attacking civilians. If it indeed 
is a crime to engage in combat with UN forces exercising their “extended” right to 
use force in self-defence, which in circumstances other than peacekeeping would be 
regarded as direct military action, this can have a dramatic impact on belligerents’ 
willingness to respect international humanitarian law principles. “Reciprocity, while 
not a legal requirement, is a practical necessity”.16 
 
The problem of the incongruousness of overlapping international legal regimes 
should be seen in a wider context of fragmentation of international law. 
Fragmentation is a result of “the emergence of specialized and (relatively) 
autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal 
practice.”17 Increasing geographic and functional differentiation has become 
problematic since specialised legal systems develop comparatively independently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 R Murphy, ‘United Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian Law: What Rules 
Apply To Peacekeepers’, (2003) 14 (2) Criminal Law Forum 153, 189 
17 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law (Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission Finalised by Martti Koskenniemi A/CN.4/L.682 13 April 2006) para 7ff 
[hereinafter: ILC, Fragmentation of International Law]; A Fisher-Lescano, G Teubner, ‘Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 999 
! 11 
from each other and often also ignorant of the general principles and practices of 
international law. Fragmentation of law has its substantive as well as institutional 
form and the result, as put in the Report of the International Law Commission 
(known also as Koskenniemi Report after Martti Koskenniemi, the Rapporteur), “is 
conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, 
possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law”.18 The same issue might be 
regulated differently by rules belonging to different specialised regimes as much as 
various institutions might apply the same rules differently owing to the “differences 
in the respective context, object and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and 
travaux preparatoires”.19 The plausibility of such conflicts is intensified given the 
horizontal structure of international law with few hierarchical relations between rules 
and rule-systems and the decentralised nature of international law making. Yet, 
international law is still a legal system and as a system it is not just a random 
collection of norms. There is a presumption against normative conflict and it is a task 
of diplomacy and adjudication to regulate or establish meaningful relationships 
between the norms to make international law a coherent whole.20  
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse critically the substance of the war crime of 
attacking UN peacekeeping missions in its relation to overlapping legal regimes in 
order either to challenge its theoretical underpinning as being incompatible with the 
system of international law or to provide more clarification to axiomatic uncertainties 
related to it. In the course of this analysis, the study examines the tensions between 
different legal rules and principles that arise due to the criminalisation of attacks 
against peacekeeping missions in the Rome Statute. This research looks into what the 
law is and how it ought to be interpreted trying to remove as much of 
unpredictability from the equation as possible. Clear interpretative guidelines are 
needed since confusing law cannot impose an enforceable standard of criminal 
conduct. Effective protection of UN personnel, legitimacy and fairness of criminal 
proceedings in this context require sound legal foundations and accepted, well-
articulated legal standards. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law (n 17) para. 8 
19 Ibid. para. 12 
20 Ibid. para. 37 
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1.1. Research questions 
 
In order to answer the central research question on the compatibility of the war crime 
of attacking personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations with the system of international law, four core 
clusters of research sub-questions will be considered: 
 
(1) What is “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations” in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii)?  
(2) What is the scope of the right to self-defence in the context of peacekeeping? 
When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves and to 
protect their mission and mandate before they forgo the civilian protection? 
(3) What rules of international humanitarian law apply to peacekeeping 
operations? What is the status of personnel and objects involved in a 
peacekeeping mission under international humanitarian law?  
(4) How should the notion of direct participation in hostilities be interpreted in 
the context of peacekeeping operations? What modalities govern the loss of 
protection against direct attack? 
 
The first research sub-question aims at delineating the precise scope of protection in 
Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. Given the lack of definitions 
in the Rome Statute with regard to this war crime and the fact that, as already 
signalled in the introductory section, the concept of peacekeeping is flexible and 
fluid, this study will investigate what “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations” actually denotes. In order to satisfy the 
international criminal law requirement of specificity, it is important to answer this 
question so as to be able to distinguish peacekeeping missions from other missions as 
well as between those which are in accordance with the UN Charter and those which 
are not. The research focuses mostly but not exclusively on United Nations peace 
operations. A structured consideration is given to regional peacekeeping missions 
insofar as they may be captured under the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. 
The reason why the focus is narrowed is because United Nations peacekeeping raises 
questions common also to regional peacekeeping whilst the latter brings additional 
issues such as the relation of the United Nations to regional organisations, which are 
! 13 
beyond the scope of the central research question on the compatibility of the war 
crime with the system of international law. While the focus will be placed on UN 
peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance missions will also be referred to 
where appropriate. 
 
The second research sub-question intends to identify the exact scope of the right to 
self-defence in a peacekeeping context and in relation to the definition of self-
defence in a criminal law context. The third research sub-question concerns the 
applicability of international humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations. Under the 
Rome Statute personnel and objects involved in peacekeeping missions are granted 
the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under the international law of 
armed conflict. It is critical to examine the scope of applicability of IHL to 
peacekeeping operations and to investigate the status of such personnel and objects 
with the aim of explaining whether granting them civilian protection is compatible 
with the basic precepts of that law. Lastly, and in connection with the previous 
questions, the notion of direct participation in hostilities needs to be examined and 
applied to a peacekeeping context.  
 
All these research sub-questions are designed to address the tensions and overlaps of 
different legal regimes involved in the criminalisation of attacks against 
peacekeeping missions under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
with the end goal of either upholding or challenging its compatibility with the system 
of international law.  
 
The study will start by conducting a literature review to identify and evaluate 
existing contributions on the topic. The literature review will provide the background 
and perspective to the thesis and will help to sharpen the focus with regard to 
research sub-questions. 
 
1.2. Literature review 
 
This section on literature review aims to examine the current legal debate concerning 
the war crime of attacking peacekeeping personnel and objects. The ultimate goal is 
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to evaluate critically the major contributions as they apply to the research sub-
questions formulated above, to identify gaps or areas of controversy and flaws in 
methodology, so to demonstrate the need for further research to be conducted with 
the proposed methods.  
 
Although the prohibition of attacks against peacekeepers does not represent a new 
concept, the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions has not yet been 
comprehensively discussed in the literature so to inform present thinking of all the 
modalities it involves. As the preliminary synopsis in the introductory part of the 
dissertation has already revealed, the subject-matter is increasingly complex and 
encompassing such critical points as applicability of international humanitarian law 
to peace operations, the scope of peacekeepers’ right to self-defence, the use of force 
in peace operations, or the notion of direct participation in hostilities as a condition 
striping civilians of protection against targeting. None of these issues appear, in and 
of themselves, to be settled or sufficiently clear, yet they emerge even more 
problematic when combined in the context of criminal prosecutions of the attacks on 
peacekeeping missions. This section does not aim to summarise ample literature on 
the issues like the use of force or self-defence in peace operations separately and in 
isolation, although relevant works will be referred to individually in the course of 
writing. This literature review seeks to synthetize and to evaluate the scholarship that 
attempts to take up all or at least some of these concerns and questions in the context 
of criminalisation of attacks on peacekeeping missions on the premise that, since 
necessarily embroiled together by the conditionality of the crime, these synergies 
present new and different dynamics, which responsively influence meanings and 
sharpen interpretations. It gives an account of what is known and established and 
what entitles to investigate further and with the proposed methods. 
 
The review starts with the studies on the 1994 Convention on the Safety of the United 
Nations and Associated Personnel (referred to hereinafter as “the UN Safety 
Convention” or “the Safety Convention”) and then it moves on to the war crime of 
attacking peacekeeping personnel and objects under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 The war crime of attacking peacekeeping personnel and objects in the Rome Statute of the ICC was 
subsequently repeated in the Statute of the SCSL in exactly the same wording, although its scope of 
! 15 
 
The UN Safety Convention was the first criminal law instrument intended to prevent 
and punish deliberate attacks on United Nations personnel.22 The law of armed 
conflict proved inadequate to protect UN forces performing traditional noncombat 
peacekeeping functions in situations where the UN was not itself a party to the 
conflict. Scholars emphasise this critical gap in international law that the treaty was 
meant to fill.23 The UN Safety Convention also formed a normative basis for the war 
crime of attacking peacekeeping missions in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court24, afterwards repeated in Article 
4(b) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Although the war crime 
bases upon the UN Safety Convention, the relevant articles in the Rome Statute and 
the Statute of the Special Court do not repeat the wording of the provisions of the 
Convention and the scopes of application of these legal instruments necessarily 
differ. In more recent literature on the legal protection of peacekeeping missions, the 
UN Safety Convention and the Rome Statute are often discussed in parallel, yet the 
operational relationship between them has not been given a proper attention. The 
present author believes that such analysis is important precisely because of the 
overlapping, still not coinciding scopes of application. Moreover, the purpose of this 
thesis is to analyse the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions under the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!
application was limited to the specific conflict that occurred in the territory of Sierra Leone. The 
scholarly interpretations of the war crime focus mostly on the Rome Statute as the first and original 
source. 
22 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel was adopted by resolution 
49/59 of the General Assembly dated 9 December 1994. The Convention entered into force on 15 
January 1999, in accordance with article 27 which reads as follows: "1. This Convention shall enter 
into force thirty days after twenty-two instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2. For each State ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."   
Status (as of 30.04.2012):  Signatories: 43; Parties: 89. 
23 C Greenwood, ‘Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime’ (1996) 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., 
185, 186; E Bloom, ‘Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel’ (1995) 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 621; S Lepper, ‘The Legal Status of Military 
Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate’s Analysis’ (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 
359, 370; M Arsanjani, Convention on the Safety of United nations and Associated Personnel, United 
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law  
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/csunap/csunap_e.pdf> accessed 5 May 2012 
24 M Cottier (n 10), 330; K Dorman, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Law. Sources and Commentary (ICRC/Cambridge University Press 2003) 154, 
453; M Bothe, ‘War Crimes’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta, J Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: a commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) 410-412; D Frank, 
‘Article 8(2)(b)(iii) – Attacking Personnel or Objects Involved in A Humanitarian Assistance or 
Peacekeeping Mission’ in R Lee, H Friman (eds), The International Criminal Court: Elements of 
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2001) 145 
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existing normative framework of which the Safety Convention is a part. 
Additionally, the critique of the Convention points at some issues of a more general 
or axiomatic nature, which are equally or at least to a great extent relevant for the 
war crime under the Rome Statute. 
 
1.2.1. The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel 
 
To start with a more general comment, it has been noted that the Convention was 
negotiated within the exceptionally short period of one year, which is unusual for a 
document of “some complexity and political sensitivity”.25 The fast pace at which it 
was adopted might be at least partially explained by the fact that many of its 
provisions are modelled on other international instruments.26 Bouvier suggests that it 
could have also been due to international pressure and because of the haste to 
respond to the increasing fatalities of UN personnel in peace operations, the final text 
is not free from ambiguities as there was simply no time to revise the disputed 
articles.27 The studies on the Convention focus in particular on its scope of 
application and the combatant exception to it, which both proved to be, as the 
legislative history reveals, particularly difficult and controversial object of the 
negotiations from the very outset.28 The scope of legal protection under the 
Convention is relevant from the perspective of comparing it to the protection of 
peacekeeping missions under the Rome Statute. 
 
Operations covered by the UN Safety Convention 
Article 1 provides definitions of “United Nations personnel”, “associated personnel” 
and “United Nations operation” for the purposes of the Convention. The Convention 
does not define peacekeeping per se, only mentions it in the preamble. The treaty is 
applicable only to operations established by the competent organ of the United 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 E Bloom (n 23), 621; see also: A Bouvier, ‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel: Presentation and Analysis’ (1995) 35 (309) IRRC 638 
26 See especially the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents and the 1979 International Convention 
against Taking of Hostages. 
27 A Bouvier (n 25) 638 
28 Ibid, M Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel (1995) 44 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 560, 563; E Bloom (n 23) 622; O Engdahl, ‘Protection of 
Personnel in Peace Operations (2005) 10 International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International 
Peace Operations 408, 413-414 
! 17 
Nations and conducted under its authority and control. This stipulation has been 
subject to different interpretations. Shraga points at the term authority and control 
used instead of “command and control”. Since the former phrase points at the 
political direction rather than operational command, which is normally indicated by 
the latter phrase, she doubts whether two phrases mean exactly the same.29 Also 
Lepper argues that authority and control could be construed to mean political rather 
than operational control.30 Sharp claims the opposite, that the Convention applies to 
operations under command and control of the UN exclusively, which means that the 
protective regime does not cover the operations authorised by the Security Council 
but carried out under the command and control of one or more states. He believes 
this essentially creates a gap in protection of personnel serving the United Nations, 
given that the UN does not have its own armed forces and must rely on military force 
of its Member States who may prefer authorised operations to directed and 
controlled ones.31 Secondly, the Convention covers only certain types of UN 
operations: those established for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security or those declared by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly as exceptionally risky for the safety of their personnel.32 The 
interpretations of this limitation offered by the scholarship vary as to whether only 
Chapter VII or also Chapter VI operations are covered. Bloom and Arsanjani suggest 
that since the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary task of 
the Security Council, all operations authorised by the Security Council under either 
chapter, both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, would automatically be 
covered.33 Operations authorised by the General Assembly exercising its subsidiary 
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security would also be 
covered if explicitly mandated with this purpose.34 Other writers find this view a bit 
problematic. Greenwood rejects such automaticity arguing that unless an operation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 D Shraga, ‘The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 5(2) 
International Peacekeeping 64, 75 
30 S Lepper (n 23) 391 
31 W Sharp, ‘Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Security’ (1996) 7 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 146 
32 See Article 1(c)(i) and (ii) of the Safety Convention. The Secretariat and some States were not 
happy with this restriction on other operations.  They felt that for political reasons, neither the 
Security Council nor the General Assembly would make such a declaration, nor would troop-
contributing States agree, for domestic political reasons, to send their troops to locations and 
operations which the Organization publicly declares as risky; see further: M Arsanjani (n 23) 
33 E Bloom (n 23) 623; M Arsanjani (n 23)  
34 E Bloom (n 23) 623 
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has been established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the purpose to maintain or 
restore international peace and security is not instantly clear from the text of the 
resolution, hence the coverage of the Convention in those cases is questionable and 
could eventually be curtailed.35 Likewise, Sharp claims that the Convention does not 
offer any protection to UN humanitarian operations authorised under Chapter VI 
unless the Security Council or the General Assembly has made a declaration of 
exceptional risk.36 The issue of the exact scope of Article 1(c) remains vague and this 
is problematic given the exclusion clause in Article 2(2) which further limits the 
scope of application of the Convention.  
 
Applicability of international humanitarian law and combatant exclusion clause 
The exclusion clause in Article 2(2) stipulates that the Safety Convention: 
 
“(…) shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the 
personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of 
international armed conflict applies.” 
 
The problem of delimiting the material scope of the Safety Convention through this 
combatant exception is directly related to the question of applicability of 
international humanitarian law to UN forces and operations conducted by them.37 At 
the time when the Convention was negotiated this question was still not resolved and 
subject to opposing interpretations by the ICRC and the UN.38 The prevailing view in 
the scholarship, however, was that the law of armed conflict would apply to situation 
in which UN forces were involved in hostilities as combatants.39 As according to 
Bloom who was personally involved in the negotiations: 
 
“The negotiators realized that it was necessary to have a clear separation between the new legal 
regime under the instrument being drafted and the Geneva Convention, so that UN and associated 
personnel and those who attack them would be covered under one regime or the other, but not both. 
One important reason for this was to avoid undermining the Geneva Conventions, which rely in part 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 C Greenwood (n 23) 196 
36 W Sharp (n 31) 146-147 
37 A Bouvier (n 25) 638; M Bourloyannis-Vrailas (n 28) 566-567 
38 A Bouvier (n 25) 638 
39 See Resolutions of the Institute of International Law on the Conditions of Application of 
Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May Be 
Engaged (1971) 54-II Annuaire de L’Institute de Droit International, reprinted in W Sharp, United 
Nations Peace Operations: collection of primary documents and readings governing the conduct of 
multilateral peace operations (American Heritage Custom Pub. Group 1995) 
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for their effectiveness on all forces being treated equally. It was widely held that the new Convention 
should not criminalize attacks on UN forces engaged as combatants in an international armed conflict, 
as this could (by making the very act of waging war against the United Nations a criminal offense, and 
thus favouring one side over the other) lessen the willingness of opposing forces to adhere to the laws 
of war.”40 
 
Despite these sound declarations of the clear separation of the two regimes, the 
adopted text of the exclusion clause in Article 2(2) is not entirely unambiguous and it 
is criticised in the scholarship precisely for not making the two regimes mutually 
exclusive.41 Further analysis reveals certain obscurities. Shraga points again at the 
term authorised in Article 2(2) as either covering only operations conducted under 
command and control of the UN or all operations authorised by the Security Council 
even if conducted under national command.42 Another issue raised is that not all 
Chapter VII enforcement operations are excluded from the Convention’s coverage 
but only those in which UN forces are acting as combatants against organised armed 
forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.43 Therefore, as 
Bloom concludes, use of force by personnel of Chapter VII enforcement missions 
does not by itself set aside the Convention’s protective regime if an armed 
confrontation is incidental and does not turn into protracted hostilities against 
organised armed forces.44 At the same time, while Chapter VII operations are most 
likely scenarios to involve UN forces in hostilities, such an outcome cannot be 
excluded in cases of operations falling under Chapter VI. Greenwood observes that 
in all “non-Chapter-VII” operations UN personnel can use force in self-defence, 
which has been interpreted very broadly by the United Nations not only to defend 
persons but also property and the mandate, and which might lead to sustained 
fighting that passes the threshold of an armed conflict. If one accepts that the Safety 
Convention covers Chapter VI missions (which brings us back to the definition of 
UN operations covered by the Convention), a simultaneous application of 
international humanitarian law and the Convention would take place.45 Such a result 
would be confusing, dangerous and contrary to the declarations cited above: the act 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 E Bloom (n 23) 625 
41 C Greenwood (n 23) 196; W Sharp (n 31) 148; D Shraga, ‘The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: A Decade Later’ (2009) 39 
Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 357, 358 
42 D Shraga (n 29) 76 
43 M Bourloyannis-Vrailas (n 28) 567-568; E Bloom (n 23) 625 
44 E Bloom (n 23) 625 
45 C Greenwood (n 23) 198 
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of killing UN or associated personnel acting as combatants in course of fighting 
would be a legitimate act of war and a crime under the Safety Convention at the 
same time. Bloom acknowledges the overlap of the two legal regimes in the self-
defence scenario, but surprisingly he does not regard it as a problem. On the 
contrary, he claims that this overlap was intentional so “to ensure that peacekeepers 
do not lose the benefits of the Convention simply because they respond in self-
defence and fighting ensues”.46 He argues that it was done also for the sake of 
domestic courts reviewing such self-defence cases. Having difficulties in deciding 
which regime is applicable the courts might otherwise conclude that such attacks are 
covered by international humanitarian law and not by the Safety Convention.47 In 
response to these arguments Sharp cogently remarks that they are contrary to what 
Bloom has himself declared as the pursued aim of Article 2(2) to safeguard 
application of one regime only. Moreover, Bloom’s arguments acutely indicate the 
lack of clarity of Article 2(2), which might cause confusion and problems with its 
implementation.48  
 
The saving clause in Article 20 seems to even strengthen this plausible overlap as it 
recognises that the operation of the Safety Convention shall not affect the 
applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights standards. There are 
two major implications of this provision. As Bourloyannis-Vrailas notes, it confirms 
that the operation of the Convention does not absolve UN and associated personnel 
from respecting rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law. In 
turn, these two regimes also confer certain rights on UN and associated personnel 
independently from the operation of the Convention.49 If persons protected under the 
Safety Convention find themselves in the area of conflict while performing non-
combatant functions, they are also protected as civilians under international 
humanitarian law.50 Bouvier also notes the overlap of the Convention and 
international humanitarian law and argues that it only strengthens the protection of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 E Bloom (n 23) 626 
47 Ibid 625-626 
48 W Sharp (n 31) 152 
49 M Bourloyannis-Vrailas (n 28) 583 
50 Ibid 
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UN personnel. According to him, the Convention must be seen as belonging to ius ad 
bellum, which absolutely prohibits attacks on UN forces, and not ius in bello.51 
 
A further issue discussed in relation to the exclusion clause in Article 2(2) is the 
stipulation that if any of the personnel of the enforcement action are engaged as 
combatants against organised armed forces and that the law of international armed 
conflict applies to this UN operation, the Convention ceases to operate for all 
personnel of the operation concerned. This includes also those military units, which 
were not anyhow involved in fighting as well as civilian components. While 
discussing the rationale of this provision Bloom refers to the statement of the U.S. 
delegation, which claimed that it would help participants in an operation as much as 
the other warring party to identify a legal regime they fell under so to conform their 
conduct accordingly.52 Engdahl further explains that this solution chosen by the 
drafters is based upon the nature of IHL, which only draws a distinction between 
civilians and combatants and not between the parties to the conflict.53 Lastly, with 
regard to the exclusion clause, Engdahl notes that it will be difficult to decide at what 
point in time personnel of a peacekeeping operation become combatants in armed 
conflict, nor when the Convention becomes operative again.54 Also Lepper points at 
the difficulties with the precise location of the dividing line between non-combat and 
combat in the case of UN forces sent to restore order through the gradual application 
of armed force.55 The exclusion clause of the Convention is very specifically set 
forth and it seems relevant to contrast it with the Rome Statute, as the latter does not 
contain any similar stipulation. The question would be about the consequence of the 
loss of protection of some peacekeepers for the rest of the personnel of the mission. 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 A Bouvier (n 25) 638 
52 U.S. Statement in the UN General Assembly at the adoption of the Convention on 9 December 
1994, UN Doc. A/49/PV.84 at 15 (cited after E Bloom (n 23) 626) 
53 O Engdahl, ‘The legal status of United Nations and associated personnel in peace operations and the 
legal regime protecting them’, in G L Beruto (ed), Conference Paper: International Humanitarian 
Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations - 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International 
Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 4-6 September 2008 (The International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
2008) 126, 129 
54 Ibid; O Engdahl (n 53), 129 
55 S Lepper (n 23), 409 
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Impact on international humanitarian law 
A serious critique of the Safety Convention concerns a negative impact it could have 
on international humanitarian law. It is submitted that the Convention indirectly 
raises the threshold for the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to UN 
operations since this threshold is one of the conditions of the Safety Convention 
ceasing to apply and the natural tendency would be to try to keep its more favourable 
regime in operation as long as possible.56 The borderline is obviously Common 
Article 2(1) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The reference to this article was not 
included in the text of the Safety Convention, despite explicit proposals of some 
delegations, as it was considered dubious in the light of the United Nations not being 
party to the Geneva Conventions. The International Committee of the Red Cross also 
explicitly opposed it.57 Greenwood remarks, that in any case the threshold for the 
applicability of Geneva Conventions and customary norms to UN forces shall 
necessarily be the same as to national forces, especially in the light of the equality of 
all parties to a conflict under international humanitarian law and the saving clause of 
Article 20 of the Convention discussed above.58 In this context Sharp points out 
though that if Common Article 2 represents a customary norm and should apply 
without modifications to UN forces, the absurd result could be that a mere 
declaration of the state of hostilities by organised armed forces would trigger the 
application of international humanitarian law.59 He also adds that the level of 
intensity of the exchange of fire between UN forces and attackers is undefined and it 
does not take into account a defensive nature of the use of force by UN personnel.60 
Paradoxically, the combatant exception clause in Article 2(2) of the Safety 
Convention might encourage potential attackers to apply full force to ensure the 
legality of their actions.61 This discussion of the threshold for the applicability of 
IHL is relevant also from the perspective of the war crime of attacking peacekeeping 
missions under the Rome Statute and the arguments raised above should be given a 
close analytical look in the context of that treaty. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 C Greenwood (n 23) 186, 199ff; W Sharp (n 31) 149-150 
57 A Bouvier (n 25) 638; S Lepper (n 23) 403 
58 C Greenwood (n 23) 202 
59 W Sharp (n 31) 150 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid  
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Self-defence 
Non-use of force except in self-defence is one of the core principles of peacekeeping 
and it distinguishes it from enforcement.62 If force is not used for any other purpose, 
UN personnel do not lose their protected status. There is, however, a debate as to the 
limits of self-defence, which is interpreted very broadly by the UN63 so to include 
defence of the mandate and “resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the 
force from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council”.64 While 
not providing a definition of self-defence, Article 21 of the Safety Convention 
contains a saving clause to the effect that nothing in the Convention “shall be 
construed so as to derogate from the right to act in self-defence”.65 The initial joint 
draft proposal by New Zealand and Ukraine also contained a saving clause on self-
defence but as a right of UN military personnel acting in accordance with relevant 
rules of engagement.66 Other proposals that were not eventually included in the text 
either referred to the concepts of proportionality and abuse of right. Article 21 in its 
final shape does not specify to whom it applies. Lepper openly describes it as 
“extremely unclear”.67 Bourloyannis-Vrailas presumes that it relates to UN and 
associated personnel.68 The alternative understanding of this saving clause, a more 
controversial and – as remarked by Bloom - the one that would have been rejected by 
most delegations, is that the right to self-defence is recognised for all parties to the 
conflict, and it can be exercised also against UN personnel.69 While Bourloyannis-
Vrailas criticises this provision for its vagueness, she admits that in any case UN or 
associated personnel have – as has any individual – the right to self-defence, 
although this right is differently defined for combatants and for civilians.70 Bloom 
also stresses that this saving clause does not in any event run contrary to the basic 
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62 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 1) 31ff 
63 C Greenwood (n 23), 197; D Shraga (n 41), 359 and footnote 4 thereto; D Shraga (n 27), 65 and 
footnote 6 thereto; for a general discussion of the evolution of the use of force in self-defence and 
defense of the mandate see: T Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (SIPRI 
Publications, Oxford University Press 2002) 
64 UN Doc. S/12611; UN Doc. S/24540. 
65 According to Bourloyannis-Vrailas, both the brevity of this provision and the fact that self-defence 
was given a separate article reflects the fact that it was a highly contested issue during negotiations – 
see: M Bourloyannis-Vrailas (n 28), 586 
66 Ibid; S Lepper (n 23), 453 
67 S Lepper (n 23), 440 
68 M Bourloyannis-Vrailas (n 28), 586 
69 E Bloom (n 23), 630 
70 M Bourloyannis-Vrailas (n 28), 586-587 
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legal framework.71 In relation to international humanitarian law, Bloom notes that the 
use of force in self-defence by UN and associated personnel “in isolated cases, 
without sustained fighting” does not turn off the Convention’s coverage, as it does 
not result in engaging UN forces as combatants.72 According to Doria, it was 
understood during the negotiations of the Convention that armed incidents involving 
UN military personnel exercising their right to self-defence could not be considered 
“armed conflict” triggering the application of IHL.73 Doria remarks that the concept 
of self-defence would be difficult to reconcile with the definition of an “armed 
conflict” as stipulated in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions and further 
developed by the ad hoc Tribunals (Tadic Jurisdiction decision).74 Shraga speaks of a 
so-called “double-key” test: the use of force – to quell disturbances, enforce law or in 
self-defence - would only trigger the applicability of IHL if the situation in the area 
of UN forces’ deployment has already been qualified as an armed conflict.75 The 
limits of self-defence in the context of peacekeeping and criminalisation of attacks 
against peacekeeping missions are still open to the debate. The issue necessitates 
more attention and the present research aims at providing more clarification on the 
matter. 
 
Type of armed conflicts covered by the UN Safety Convention 
Another issue debated by scholars in reference to Article 2(2) concerns the plausible 
overlap with IHL with regard to the type of conflicts covered by this article. The 
exclusion clause explicitly talks of the law of international armed conflict. The 
commentators disagree on the interpretation of this provision. Greenwood, Lepper 
and Shraga states that it curtails the scope of application of the Safety Convention 
only in relation to international armed conflict, which necessarily implies that the 
Convention would continue to operate in the situation of internal armed conflict.76 
Lepper explains that the overlap was intentionally created as an exception to the 
general rule of separating the regimes in order to strengthen the level of protection of 
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71 E Bloom (n 23), 630 
72 Ibid 625 
73 J Doria, ‘Attacks on UN and Regional Organisations Peacekeepers: Potential Legal Issues Before 
the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 5 Int’l Stud. J. 59  
74 Ibid 
75 D Shraga (n 41) 359  
76 C Greenwood (n 23) 199; S Lepper (n 23) 395; D Shraga (n 29) 76 
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personnel in internal armed conflicts.77 It was emphasised during the negotiations 
that since there was no POW status in non-international armed conflicts, the legal 
protection of captured UN or associated personnel would be very poor, and for that 
reason the Convention should continue to operate.78 Engdahl also acknowledges the 
overlap; at the same time however, he refers to the Secretary-General’s Report of 
2000 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention79, which is confusing as 
the Report “clearly supported the interpretation that the regime of the Convention 
and that of international humanitarian law are mutually exclusive.”80 In this Report 
the Secretary-General concluded that it was not the nature or character of the conflict 
but the conduct of the members of UN peacekeeping operations which should 
determine the application of the UN Safety Convention or international humanitarian 
law. Engdahl notes that since individuals participating in non-international armed 
conflicts may be prosecuted under national law for acts which under the law of 
international armed conflict would be considered legitimate acts of war, an analogy 
can be drawn between criminalization of attacks on military personnel engaged in 
peace operations and participation in hostilities in a non-international armed 
conflict.81 Bouvier interprets this limitation of Article 2(2) differently submitting that 
if the UN intervenes in an internal armed conflict, it is not to help one of the parties 
but to implement the Security Council resolution in respect to all parties, hence the 
UN forces should be subject to the rules of international humanitarian law applicable 
to international armed conflict.82 In response to this argument Bourloyannis-Vrailas 
notes that there are situations where an enforcement action under Chapter VII is 
directed against a non-State entity and could not be governed by the law of 
international armed conflict. She does not conclude, however, why or why not such 
operation should be included in the Convention.83  
 
Prohibition of attacks and crimes covered by the UN Safety Convention 
Article 7(1) of the Safety Convention prohibits the attacks on UN and associated 
personnel, their equipment and premises, as well as “any action that would prevent 
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77 S Lepper (n 23) 395-396 
78 Ibid 395; O Engdahl (n 53) 130 
79 Report of the Secretary General, Scope of legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of 
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them from discharging their mandate”. Article 9 lists the crimes covered by the 
Convention including murder, kidnapping or attack upon the official premises, as 
well as threats or any attempts to commit these crimes or participate as an 
accomplice. The crimes must be committed intentionally, which excludes negligence 
and also implies the attacker’s awareness of the victim’s association with the United 
Nations.84 It is an interesting question whether the provisions of the Safety 
Convention, more detailed in respect of the attack and prohibited actions, can be used 
to interpret the relevant articles of the Rome Statute.  
 
1.2.2. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
The scholarship on the war crime of attacking peacekeeping personnel and objects 
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is not vast. The 
commentaries to the Rome Statute play a prominent role of standard reference 
sources and they feature in this section.85 Written by eminent legal scholars and 
practitioners in the field of international criminal law, the commentaries give a 
detailed article-by-article analysis and, as far as necessary, an interpretation of the 
Statute and the “Elements of Crimes” in the light of the applicable law mentioned in 
Article 21 of the Statute. Another strength of the commentaries is that they often give 
account of the context in which provisions of the Rome Statute were adopted and in 
the light of the lack of an official record of informal meetings of the Rome 
Conference they prove an invaluable source of information on the drafting process or 
divergences of opinion among the delegations. These insights are complemented by 
journal literature, which tackles the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions in 
the context of recent developments in international criminal jurisdictions. However, 
this review does not include the scholarship on the emerging jurisprudence of the 
SCSL, the ICC or other international criminal tribunals in relation to attacks on 
peacekeeping missions. This is done in the following chapters of the dissertation. 
 
The commentaries are in agreement that Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the 
Rome Statute were inspired by the 1994 UN Safety Convention.86 The 1996 Draft 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 E Bloom (n 23) 628 
85 O Triffterer (n 10); R Lee, H Friman (n 24); K Dorman (n 24); A Cassese, P Gaeta, J Jones (n 24) 
86 M Cottier (n 10) 330; D Frank (n 24) 145; K Dorman (n 24) 154-159, 455; M Bothe (n 24) 410-412 
! 27 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind by the International Law 
Commission is also being mentioned in this context.87 Cottier notes that the 
preparatory committees and the delegations at the Rome Conference initially 
intended to include attacks against peacekeeping missions as a “treaty-based 
crime”.88 The debate over the content of the crime started only towards the end of the 
Conference and resulted in changing its qualification to a war crime. The scope of 
application was then extended to peacekeeping missions established in accordance 
with the UN Charter and humanitarian assistance missions.89 Some commentators 
point out that Article 8(2)(b)(iii) does not criminalise any conduct which would not 
be already covered by the prohibitions of attacks on civilians and civilian objects in 
Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii)90 and therefore it may be questioned whether this 
provision is at all necessary.91 They admit though that it might still be helpful to 
explicitly criminalise attacks against peacekeeping missions as a serious crime of 
international concern, even at risk of detracting attention from the general protection 
of the civilian population and civilian objects.92 It has also been argued that this 
provision embodies customary international law.93 
 
Operations covered by the Rome Statute 
It is noted that the war crime in fact addresses two different kinds of conduct: attacks 
against humanitarian assistance missions and attacks against peacekeeping 
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missions.94 As already remarked, the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes 
thereto do not define these two types of operations. Cottier concludes that the 
negotiators at the Rome Conference apparently relied on the international standards 
and practices of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping developed in the UN 
system.95 In explaining the characteristics of peacekeeping operations the 
commentaries refer to UN publications including official documents such as the UN 
Secretary General’s report Agenda for Peace and a Supplement to it, as well as the 
literature on the topic.96 The core principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality 
and non-use of force except in self-defence are highlighted and on that basis 
traditional peacekeeping is being differentiated from enforcement.97 The 
commentators note the practice of “robust” or “wider” peacekeeping missions but 
they do not proceed with the analysis as to whether personnel and objects of such 
peacekeeping missions are subsumed under the term “peacekeeping” in the Rome 
Statute.98 With regard to the phrase “involved in [mission] in accordance with the 
Charter of United Nations” Cottier emphasises that it was intended to limit the scope 
of personal application to persons taking part in or otherwise associated with a 
mission in question, and not just present in the area or associated with the sending 
organisation.99 By reference to the preparatory works he concludes that the 
negotiations at the Rome Conference concentrated on UN missions exclusively.100 
This all seems insufficient to precisely define the personal scope of protection of 
Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii). Firstly, the operational relationship between the 
UN Safety Convention and the Rome Statute has not been properly addressed, 
especially as to whether the Convention’s definitions can be used to interpret “a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. To this 
end it would be useful to examine the preparatory works to investigate the 
circumstances in which the link to “treaty crime” was removed from the text of the 
Statute. Secondly, the commentators unorthodoxly focus on UN “traditional” 
peacekeeping operations while the question whether or not the provisions of the ICC 
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Statute cover also “robust” peacekeeping missions with the extended mandates on 
the use of force is still open to the debate. The present author considers it a major gap 
in the literature, which needs to be addressed. Lastly, the phrase “in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations” has not been properly analysed. It is not clear 
whether it should be interpreted in line with the UN Safety Convention and limit the 
scope of protection under the Rome Statute to peacekeeping missions established by 
a competent organ of the United Nations or cover also peacekeeping missions 
established by regional organisations. 
 
Applicability of international humanitarian law and combatant exception 
According to the commentaries to the Rome Statute the reference to the international 
law of armed conflict was made to address such situations where a peacekeeping 
mission becomes embroiled in an armed conflict and its personnel engage as 
combatants.101 When that happens, they lose protection against direct attacks. The 
commentators link this general condition to Article 2(2) of the UN Safety 
Convention, which in similar manner limits the scope of application of the 
Convention.102 Similarly to the Safety Convention, the problem of delimiting the 
material scope of the combatant exception under in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 
8(2)(e)(iii) is related to the question of applicability of international humanitarian law 
to United Nations forces. This seems to be a reoccurring and still not completely 
settled theme despite the issuing of the Secretary-General's Bulletin on Observance 
by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law.103 Cottier notes that, 
while it may be assumed that if personnel of a peacekeeping mission engage as 
combatants they cannot benefit from a civilian protection, there is no equally simple 
inference of the entitlement to such civilian protection from non-involvement of UN 
peacekeeping forces in hostilities. Peace operations are relatively recent phenomenon 
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and UN forces do not fit neatly in the categories of international humanitarian law, 
which was drafted without taking into account the peculiarities of peacekeeping 
missions.104 Shraga explicitly speaks of a dual character of military members of UN 
operations, being both “civilians” and “combatants” depending on the 
circumstances.105 Having pointed at the challenges to the status of peacekeepers 
under IHL, Cottier still justifies granting them the rights and privileges of civilians 
by reference to the Karad!i"/Mladi" Indictment by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which affirmed that peacekeeping personnel 
enjoyed the status of protected persons under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.106 Why 
this indictment should form such a strong argument in favour of the civilian status 
Cottier does not explain.107 Although the attempts to define the status of 
peacekeeping personnel are welcome, they have not exhausted the topic, which 
necessitates a further and more thorough analysis. As to the status of objects 
involved in peacekeeping operations, regrettably, none of the commentators discuss 
the conditions for granting them the protection of civilian objects. The present study 
intends to remedy these deficiencies. 
 
Self-defence 
Although peacekeeping missions are not authorised to use offensive force, they are 
still entitled to use force in self-defence. As already mentioned, self-defence is 
interpreted very broadly by the United Nations. Peacekeeping personnel can use 
force in individual self-defence and in defence of the mandate108 and that varies 
depending on the tasks being included. The commentaries to the Rome Statute do not 
provide any actual guidance as to the impact the expansion of self-defence has on the 
scope of application of Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii). Similarly to the Safety 
Convention such identification is crucial for the issue of direct participation in 
hostilities and the loss of protection from direct attacks.109 According to Cottier any 
determination of the entitlement of peacekeepers to the protection will largely 
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depend on the circumstances of the use of force.110 However, such “I know when I 
see it” approach is far from being either adequate or satisfactory. Furthermore, the 
conditions of self-defence as delineated for relief and medical missions in the 
humanitarian law treaties differ from those applied to peacekeeping missions under 
UN law. Covering these two types of operations – humanitarian assistance and 
peacekeeping missions - by one and the same provision could mean that the 
standards for the entitlement to protection shall somehow be equated. If this is not 
the case, the particularly pressing question, which the commentaries do not tackle is 
how to explain unequal treatment of both types of missions and somehow disparate 
standards of civilian protection not justified by international humanitarian law. 
 
Another issue tackled in the literature concerns measures that may be taken in self-
defence. Cottier suggests that if a peacekeeping mission uses force in self-defence 
but to a degree that essentially equates to the offensive force, it would forgo the 
civilian protection.111 He does not, however, discuss the threshold of such offensive 
force or the point in time when civilians become combatants. Doria also dwells on 
the issue of measures taken in self-defence and inquires whether under certain 
circumstances they may pass the boundaries of legitimate self-defence and make 
peacekeepers lawful targets.112 He dismisses the intensity and the type of weapons 
used as criteria invalidating the protected status of UN forces or justifying the second 
right of self-defence of the initial attackers, provided that the conditions of 
proportionality and imminence are met.113 Although self-defence of medical or civil 
defence personnel is limited in the IHL treaties to the use of light weapons, the 1999 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin allows for the individual as well as collective self-
defence of peacekeepers, which according to Doria is plausible to entail non-light 
weapons. In Doria’s opinion, a collective self-defence has already been accepted as a 
right under ius in bello and the fact of being forced to use non-light weapons to 
exercise self-defence and defence of those under the responsibility of peacekeepers 
should not deprive the latter of the protected status. Killing UN peacekeepers in such 
circumstances would qualify as an unlawful attack.114 Doria starts his analysis of 
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self-defence from the perspective of the Safety Convention and finishes with the 
reference to Article 31(1)(c) of the ICC Statute. Under this article of the Rome 
Statute, if reasonably exercised “against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a 
manner proportionate to the degree of danger” to defend oneself, another person, or 
property essential for survival or for accomplishing of a military mission, self-
defence is one of the grounds excluding criminality.115 The disparity between limits 
of self-defence in the civilian and military contexts as well as under UN law and 
criminal law is signalled but not really addressed. In particular it is not discussed 
which definition of self-defence shall apply to peacekeepers. 
 
Other commentators hesitate whether the defence of the mission’s mandate still 
amounts to self-defence under IHL.116 As an argument against equating the two 
concepts Gadler refers to the ICRC Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law which gives as an 
example of legitimate self-defence not constituting direct participation in hostilities 
“the use of force by civilians to defend themselves against unlawful attack or looting, 
rape, and murder by marauding soldiers.”117 Such understanding of self-defence does 
not depart from its usual meaning under criminal law. Regrettably, the author does 
not discuss the ICRC Guidelines on direct participation in hostilities in any more 
detail, although it would be most relevant for delineating the scope of protection of 
peacekeepers as civilians.  
 
Direct participation in hostilities 
The use of force in self-defence by peacekeepers ties in with the paradigm of taking 
direct part in hostilities. Their civilian protection against direct attacks would 
definitely cease “for such time as they take direct part in hostilities”.118 Dorman 
basically repeats this phrase, which seems simple and sufficiently straightforward but 
in fact it does not envisage anything concrete. There is no precise legal definition of 
the notion of direct participation in hostilities and there is much controversy 
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concerning application of this term in practice.119 Only one of the commentaries to 
the Rome Statute explicitly points at this grey area without, however, any further 
elaboration on the problem.120 Although it is not expected that the commentators 
would come with a viable solution to the question of direct participation in hostilities 
as obiter dicta, it would be welcome if they at least try to locate the issue in a 
peacekeeping context, especially as it conditions the scope of protection of 
peacekeeping missions under the Rome Statute. Although it is likely to be the nub of 
the concern how to make the limitation in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) 
workable in practice, there is regrettably almost no mention in the commentaries121 
of the heated debate concerning clarifying the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities. Similarly unresolved is the issue whether or not all personnel and objects 
involved in a peacekeeping mission would lose protection or only those factually 
involved in hostilities. This issue has been raised already in the preceding section on 
the UN Safety Convention. The need for clear standards as to the qualification of 
peacekeepers’ actions in fulfilment of their mandate appears imperative and this 
thesis aspires to investigate it further. 
 
Type of armed conflicts covered by the Rome Statute 
The twin Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute prohibit 
intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the UN Charter in international and non-international armed 
conflicts respectively. This comprehensive application in both types of armed 
conflict silences the discussion raised in relation to the UN Safety Convention. Both 
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articles are formulated in exact the same way and there is no indication in the ICC 
Statute that this crime has different special constituent elements in an international or 
non-international armed conflict.122  
 
Meaning of the attack 
The term “attack” is not defined in the Rome Statute or the Elements of Crimes but 
the commentators do not differ much in their interpretations. Dorman and 
Bourloyannis-Vrailas refer to Article 49(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, which defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or defence”123. The concept of attack denotes the use 
of armed force to carry out a military operation during the course of armed conflict, 
hence the meaning of the terms “offence” and “defence” is independent from the one 
under the UN Charter and recourse to force.124 Cottier also prefers a “strict Hague 
law interpretation” and argues that attacks against the person or liberty of civilians 
(including peacekeepers) can further be charged as grave breaches under Article 
8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.125 If, however, the meaning of attack should go beyond 
this strict interpretation, it would still be preferable to limit it to certain specific 
offences as it is done in the case of the UN Safety Convention.126 Werle favours this 
broader interpretation of the attack although still in line with the API.127 Bothe refers 
to Article 9 of the UN Safety Convention arguing that since the word “attack” is used 
there in similar context, the war crime in the Rome Statute could be co-extensive to 
the list of offences in Article 9.128 Referring to the preparatory works Dorman 
stresses that the Preparatory Committee refused to require that the attack must have a 
particular result as in the case of Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii).129 Bangura 
similarly concludes that a mere interference with the mission’s activities through any 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 K Dorman (n 24) 454; A Zimmermann, ‘War Crimes – para. 2(e)(iii)’ in O Triffterer (ed), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observers’ notes, article by 
article (2nd edition, Beck 2008) 494 
123 M Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘Crimes Against United Nations and Associated Personnel’ in K 
McDonald, O Swaak-Goldman (eds), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal 
Law: Commentary (Kluwer Law International 2000) 363 
124 K Dorman (n 24) 156 
125 M Cottier (n 10) 337 
126 Ibid 337-338 
127 G Werle (n 93) 382 
128 M Bothe (n 24) 410 
129 K Dorman (n24) 153-154 
! 35 
act of violence, irrespective of its consequences, is punishable.130 The attack against 
personnel and objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission 
has to be carried out intentionally.131 This element of crime of attacking 
peacekeeping missions seems to be the least controversial. The bottom line of 
interpreting the notion of “attack” is the meaning given to this term under the 1977 
Additional Protocol I and without the requirement of any material result or harmful 
impact.  
 
Summary 
The Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel was 
welcomed as the new criminal law document specially tailored to protect 
peacekeeping personnel. It has also prepared ground for the war crime of attacking 
peacekeeping missions under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
The protection of the UN Safety Convention is selective though and the treaty is not 
considered totally flawless in the eyes of the commentators. There are many 
questions raised in connection to its personal, material and temporal scope of 
application and only few answered. The war crime under the Rome Statute did not 
bring much clarification on these matters as it came with its own phrasing, 
conditionality and the scope of application, which all require interpretation. 
 
The review of academic contributions about the criminalization of attacks on 
peacekeeping missions reveals that none of the research sub-questions has so far 
been properly addressed. Firstly, the personal scope of legal protection provided by 
Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute still needs to be analysed. In 
particular, the concept of “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” requires a comprehensive interpretation especially in respect to 
“robust” peacekeeping missions and missions established by regional organisations. 
Secondly, the precise scope of peacekeepers right to use force in self-defence needs 
to be examined as one of the defining characteristics of peacekeeping (non-use of 
force except in self-defence) that distinguishes it from enforcement but also as a 
condition of their civilian protection. In this connection the scope of applicability of 
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the international law of armed conflict to peacekeeping operations and in particular 
the status of peacekeeping personnel and objects as well as qualification of “the 
defence of the mandate” under this legal regime call for a thorough analysis.  
 
Most contributions presented in this section are notable for their formal theoretical 
approach, which might be justified in the light of a relative newness of the war crime 
of attacking peacekeeping missions and scarceness of case law. The overlap of legal 
regimes is noted, but not examined. The commentators either subject substantive 
matters to conflicting interpretations or simply abandon them as controversial and 
leave to practitioners and judges to test. As apparent from the literature review, many 
concepts do not have fixed or monolithic meanings; they can be interpreted 
differently with different outcomes. Language is by its very nature ambiguous and its 
interpretation depends on a textual context. The normative context also impacts on 
the interpretation of concepts and rules, while the final application of law depends on 
factual circumstances. All the above necessitates the analysis of law to be done with 
care and on many levels. An exercise of spotting examples of certain concepts in 
different legal regimes is pointless if not accompanied by an in-depth systemic legal 
analysis and contextual sensitivity. Moreover, the concepts often are interrelated (e.g. 
use of force in self-defence v. direct participation in hostilities), hence a particular 
understanding of one issue necessarily influences an interpretation of another. It is 
also important to keep in mind that law as well as case law are constantly evolving. 
 
Based on the presented background, the definition of the problem and the literature 
review, the present study will now move on to proposing a methodology for the 
study. 
 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
“Methods are not simply techniques that can be used in obtaining facts about the social world, but are 
always used as part of a commitment to a theoretical perspective, even if this is not discussed 
explicitly in a research project.”132 
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This section performs two main functions. First, it aims at providing a theoretical 
framework that will guide the research and connect all its aspects. Second, it explains 
the research methods chosen to best answer the research questions through the 
proposed framework.  
 
1.3.1. Theoretical framework 
 
The broad theoretical perspective has already been implicated in the introductory part 
of this chapter at the level of problem statement and description of a normative 
background. Since the problem is always a function of its framework, it can be 
understood if its basic system is well articulated and understood. Theoretical 
framework adopted for this research builds upon the concepts of modern legal 
positivism and international legal process. 
 
Legal Positivism 
Legal positivism is a theory of law stemming originally from English jurists Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin. Its principal postulate is that the existence and content of 
law depends on social facts and not on its merits, thereby advocating for a strict 
separation of issues of legal validity from questions of morality. Austin’s command 
theory viewed law as commands from a sovereign, backed by a threat of sanction. 
This primary thesis on the criteria of legal validity has been modified over time. 
Most prominent philosophers of revisited positivism are Hans Kelsen and Herbert 
L.A. Hart. They regarded law as a normative and hierarchical system of rules and 
both contributed to the development of the rule-based approach to law.133 Kelsen’s 
most important input is his “pure theory of law” with the idea of “basic norm” 
(Grundnorm). Hart’s theory builds upon a critique of his predecessors. Diverting 
from Austin’s command theory, influenced by Kelsen, though rejecting several 
tenets of his theory too, Hart introduced the principle of rules of recognition.134 Legal 
positivism has taken a variety of forms, yet the classic strand can roughly be 
recapitulated as constituted by three theoretical commitments: (i) the Social Fact 
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Thesis, (ii) the Conventionality Thesis, and (iii) the Separability Thesis.135 Legal 
positivism postulates that the existence of law is a social fact independent from its 
merits. It emphasises the conventional nature of law, that it is a matter of what has 
been posited i.e. ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc. (the word "positivism" 
itself derives from the Latin root positus which means to posit, postulate). Law is 
synonymous with positive norms that are norms made by the legislator or considered 
as common law or case law. Legal positivism sets up criteria for legal validity, which 
is the particular mode of existence of norms and includes provisions for making, 
changing and adjudicating law, i.e. law becomes valid through a social practice of 
recognition.136 Rules derived from recognised sources and duly enacted are an 
“objective reality” which has to be distinguished from extra-legal arguments such as 
moral principles and political ideologies. Law is judged by the way in which it has 
been created. There is no inherent or necessary correlation between the validity 
conditions of law and ethics or morality. There is a clear distinction between the law 
“as it is” and the law “as it should be”, lex lata and lex ferenda.137 
 
The crime of attacking peacekeeping missions has been presented in the introductory 
section as a theoretical construct conflating different branches of public international 
law and thereby rising troublesome questions as to its compatibility with the system 
of international law as a whole. Such formulation of the problem reflects certain 
theoretical presuppositions as to the nature and structure of international law. 
International law has been presented within a paradigm of a legal positivism as a 
social construct, which existence and content depends on social facts or processes, 
which has its acknowledged sources and participating subjects. International rules 
derive from either treaties or custom and are an emanation/embodiment of states’ 
will.138 The international legal system is relatively harmonized despite being 
composed of geographically and functionally specialized rule-complexes. A 
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fragmented structure of international law has already been brought into perspective 
of this study in the introductory part.  
 
Fragmentation of international law was under consideration of the United Nations 
International Law Commission, which aimed at preparing a study on specific aspects 
of this phenomenon “to assist international judges and practitioners in coping with 
the consequences of the diversification of international law”.139 In 2006 the 
Commission completed its work and adopted the report containing 42 conclusions140 
and the analytical study on which these conclusions were based.141 As noted in the 
study, fragmentation of international law in itself is not a new occurrence. The 
geographic and functional differentiation is a characteristic of international 
modernity and globalisation. Paradoxically, increasing uniformization of social life 
has resulted in its increasing specialisation and fragmentation of social action and 
structure, which finds its reflection also in law on both national as well as 
international levels. New types of specialized law emerge to meet new technical and 
functional demands and they reflect the differing pursuits and preferences of actors 
in a pluralistic global society.142 As the International Law Commission remarks, 
functional fragmentation is “an incident of the diversity of the international social 
world - a quality that has always marked the international system, contrasting it to 
the (relatively) more homogenous domestic context” and although it presents new 
features and intensity now, “[it] is not too different from traditional fragmentation 
into more or less autonomous territorial regimes called ‘national legal systems’.”143 
For that reason, the Commission turned to the well-known legal interpretative 
techniques for dealing with normative collisions. A conceptual framework for 
analysis was provided by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) on the premises that most of the new regimes claim their binding force from 
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and are understood by practitioners to be covered by the law of treaties,144 and that 
international law’s traditional “fragmentation” had already equipped practitioners 
with tools to manage normative clashes.145 
 
The present study notes the perspective taken by the International Law Commission 
on the issue of fragmentation of international law and it also applies the traditional 
legal reasoning and techniques throughout the research and analysis of the 
overlapping regimes. This is where legal positivism has its relevance for the study 
providing the overarching theoretical framework with three benefits to it. Firstly, it 
links separate legal regimes within a coherent system of public international law. 
Secondly, it offers an accurate account of the actual state of international law by 
separating legal norms from non-legal arguments, values and policies. Separating 
“hard law” from “soft law” is not an easy task given a fluid nature of international 
customary law. A norm has to undergo a process of crystallisation before reaching 
rank of customary law, and that happens not without controversies. Positivist 
approach can help to identify such not yet fully-fledged norms as well as factors 
facilitating or hampering the process of solidification of customary law. It also notes 
the distinction between actual sources of law on the one hand, and practices which 
only afford the evidence of the existence of rules on the other, such as academic 
writings, treaty-contracts or some judicial decisions. Lastly, legal positivism offers 
traditional interpretative legal tools to determine law and to approach normative 
conflicts if they arise between rules or rule-systems. The recognition of the 
distinctive normative character of law, the use of positivism’s formal method for 
stocktaking of current state of international law on the subject matter and the 
application of traditional legal reasoning for determining the content and the 
relationships between the rules are good starting points of the inquiry. They might 
not, however, be sufficient to respond to the developments on the international scene, 
nor provides a satisfactory explanation of how the content of rules is determined and 
how international law is actually applied. Evolving dynamics of international law, 
the range of new actors and new forms of state participation call for broadening of 
the repertoire of legal methods and interpretative techniques. The International Law 
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Commission itself highlights both the continuing relevance of traditional techniques 
of legal reasoning and their limits in the resolution of conflicts produced in a 
situation of economic and technological complexity.146 All branches of international 
law, all new legal regimes come with their own highly specialized objectives, ethos, 
principles and they are institutionally “programmed” to prioritize particular concerns 
over others.147 In order to capture all these occurrences it might be necessary to adopt 
a different angle and look at the law in its context, examine “the environment” in 
which rules operate. While still distinguishing between norms and extra-legal facets 
such as values and policies, this research recognises that law does not operate in 
socio-political vacuum. Legal discourses, reflecting factors internally constructed by 
law, and social discourses, expressing institutional factors external to law, are 
interdependent and this interaction of practices and processes creates the context of 
legal decision-making.148 
 
With these remarks in mind the theoretical framework expands the positivistic 
perspective to accommodate the classic foundations with contemporary 
developments. As noted in the scholarship, modern legal positivism may cohabit 
with a range of other perspectives towards law.149 Political or sociological 
approaches to law do not involve a denial of its distinctive normative character. As 
remarked by Schachter “[t]hey do recognize that law is not wholly autonomous; that 
it has causes and consequences; that it involves power and values; that it is an aspect 
of a larger social and political process.”150 To this extent the positivistic paradigm 
adopted for the research is enriched with the perspective of the International Legal 
Process, which addresses the contextual concerns of legal-decision-making. 
 
International Legal Process 
International Legal Process views international law not as a mere rigid body of rules 
but as a process of decision-making. It has been best described as “a study of 
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international law in its actual operation”.151 Its main architects Abram Chayes, 
Thomas Ehrlich and Andreas F. Lowenfeld published in 1968 a series of case studies 
entitled International Legal Process: Materials for an Introductory Course, in which 
they sought to exemplify the role of law in the process of international policy 
decisions.152 They drew heavily upon the American Legal Process approach as Henry 
Hart and Albert Sacks had elaborated it in their unpublished at the time domestic 
casebook The Legal Process.153 
 
American Legal Process was developed not as a theory but rather as “a method of 
understanding, using and improving upon positivism.”154 It tried to chart a middle 
course between legal formalism and legal realism, by emphasizing active role of 
legal institutions such as courts. It contested the formalist view that law could simply 
be mechanically applied by pointing out that any act of applying a rule would 
necessarily involve interpretation, clarification or addition. At the same time, 
however, the legal process approach eschewed advocated by legal realists conviction 
in the indeterminacy of law by postulating that law making in courts must be 
consistent with purposes of law and values of democratic society. Judicial decisions 
should be constrained by “reasoned elaboration” of principles and policies and 
thereby accessible to scrutiny by others.155 In addition, American Legal Process drew 
attention to agency decisions as complementing legal backdrop of legislation and 
jurisprudence.156 American Legal Process has been revisited in recent years and new 
postulates have been added in response to criticism about its normative deficit.157 
New Legal Process, known also as “new public law”, has been described by scholars 
as “continuing old legal process’s faith in institutions and the need for institutional 
decision makers to be purposive in decision making”158 which should encompass 
“dynamic” interpretation based on normative content of the law.159 
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Starting from the premises of its domestic predecessor International Legal Process 
focuses primarily on the operation of international legal system and actual workings 
of international legal processes without taking a normative stand.160 It has been less 
interested in the substantive complexity of international rules or society values as in 
how international law is actually used by the makers of foreign policy. Within this 
limited methodology International Legal Process theorists seek to elucidate formal 
and informal institutional decision-making processes taking place in a dynamic 
political environment.161 “How and how far do law, lawyers and legal institutions 
operate to affect the course of international affairs? What is the legal process by 
which interests are adjusted and decisions are reached on the international scene?” 
asks Chayes in the foreword to the case-materials on International Legal Process.162 
Legal rules, rules of conduct are important elements of this process but there is much 
more left to complete it.163 The term “process” suggests an ongoing interaction and 
continual change. Law does not exist on paper independent of human involvements. 
The authors emphasised also the role of international institutional context: “concepts 
are not self-defining. For adequate understanding of the norm we need to see also by 
what institutions and procedures it is brought to bear in particular cases.”164 
International Legal Process is regarded as an adjunct method to positivism due to its 
endeavours to clarify the role of positive norms in international affairs.165 However, 
it breaks from the formalistic approach of limiting the analysis to the substantive 
rules alone by recognising the critical importance of context that includes 
institutions, legal actors and processes.  
 
Towards a pluralistic methodological approach 
As stated in the introduction, this research seeks to analyse critically the substance of 
the war crime of attacking UN peacekeeping missions with the intention to clarify 
ambiguities surrounding its scope and basis concepts. To achieve this it has begun 
with establishing a working conceptual framework in international legal theory. 
While the legal positivism maintains primary importance throughout the remainder 
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of writing, it is supplemented with an additional theoretical perspective of 
International Legal Process, which fleshes out the importance of context and legal 
processes. Process methodology supplies a proper segue to proceed from the formal 
analysis of the content of norms (linguistic, logical) and their sources to the analysis 
of law in its actual operation in a socio-political context. It also brings the legal 
agents and institutions into focus, which is helpful in addressing the issue of inherent 
indeterminacy of law. Law is not self-defining166 nor is there a single legislative will 
behind it, instead definitions and meanings are open to debate and bargaining. 
“Where the boundary of the law is to be drawn and how the content of legal rules are 
to be determined in order to decide a case is a matter of negotiation in legal 
practice.”167 In particular, it is the role of judiciary to give substance to the rules and 
often implicitly fill normative gaps or manage conflicts. As recognised already by 
positivists, law application and law creation are continuous activities for every legal 
decision is partly determined by law and partly underdetermined168:  
 
“The higher norm cannot bind in every direction the act by which it is applied. There must always be 
more or less room for discretion, so that the higher norm in relation to the lower one can only have the 
character of a frame to be filled by this act”.169 
 
Legal positivism seeks to restrain judicial discretion by promoting interpretative 
tools such as those codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties170 
or prescribed by legal principles such as lex posterior derogate legi priori or lex 
specialis derogate legi generali. The process methodology advances a more dynamic 
interpretation of norms and a more active search for meaning asserting that 
contextual considerations are properly operative in some legal decisions next to 
logical and linguistic ones. This research adopts a holistic interpretative approach 
according to which text, drafting history, context and participants of legal process, all 
provide the guideposts for a critical analysis of the war crime in question. In 
particular, this research turns to the international legal institutions, including 
international courts to contextualise the written law and assist answering the research 
questions in the situation when answers provided by the documentary research would 
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prove unsatisfactory. According to the list of sources in Article 38 of the Statute of 
International Court of Justice decisions of international courts are only counted as 
“subsidiary means for the determinations of the rules of law”;171 nevertheless, their 
pronouncements as to the scope and content of law are highly appreciated.172 
 
The theoretical framework adopted for this research justifies turning to social science 
methods for data gathering. The inquiry employs qualitative techniques and 
addresses legal agents in the institutional settings. The respondents include legal 
officers of international courts and tribunals whose understanding of the substance of 
the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions is critical for operation of this 
norm in criminal proceedings. The United Nations agencies shaping the 
peacekeeping mandates and administering peacekeeping missions are also 
considered since it is these practitioners’ perception of “what is law” that forms the 
basis for peacekeeping policies reflected in the Security Council mandates and rules 
of engagement that guide missions in the field. 
 
1.3.2. Methods of data collection 
 
The theoretical framework conditions the choice of research methods and enables to 
explain and understand the findings, “make sense” of the data and study a 
phenomenon in a systematic way. It plays an orientating and sensitising function in 
data collection.173 The choice of methods presented in this chapter corresponds to the 
theoretical framework adopted in the study. The research is divided into two types: 
doctrinal or theoretical and empirical.  
 
Doctrinal research 
Doctrinal research provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a 
particular legal category and the relationship between them. It fosters a more 
complete understanding of the conceptual basis of legal principles and of the 
combined effect of a range of rules and procedures that touch on a particular area of 
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activity.174 Methods of doctrinal research are primarily targeted at “black-letter law” 
systematising and clarifying law by a distinctive mode of analysis to authoritative 
texts.175 One of the assumptions of a doctrinal research is that “the character of legal 
scholarship is derived from law itself”.176 
 
The positivistic approach guides the doctrinal research, which covers a documentary 
analysis of primary sources - legislation and jurisprudence, and secondary sources 
such as commentaries on the legislation and on case law, books and journal articles. 
The primary and secondary sources of the existing normative framework relating to 
peacekeeping and to the protection afforded to peacekeeping missions include 
international treaties, statutes and their travaux préparatoires, UN Security Council 
resolutions (mandates) and Secretary-General’s reports clarifying the mandates, 
reports of the Preparatory Committees of the Rome Conference, reports of the 
International Law Commission, national legislation, national military manuals, 
international and national jurisprudence, policy papers and scholarship on the 
subject. International Legal Process additionally informs to choice of the secondary 
sources. Emphasising the importance of the institutional context in which 
international law actually operates, it requires that attention be paid to the practice of 
the United Nations involving resolutions of its organs, policy documents on 
peacekeeping such as guidelines, handbooks and bulletins. Such non-binding 
instruments or documents belong to the special category called “soft law”, and 
although not “law” of themselves, they are important within the general framework 
of international legal development.177 In the context under scrutiny they form a 
critical background for decision-making and legal processes concerning peace 
operations. 
 
The doctrinal research gives a necessary point of reference for a field research and 
helps to identify those areas where law is not clear, scholarship divided and where 
certain issues will have to be settled in practice. In this sense, both types of research 
are complementary. 
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Empirical research 
 
“Empirical study has the potential to illuminate the workings of the legal system, to reveal its 
shortcomings, problems, successes, and illusions, in a way that no amount of library research or subtle 
thinking can match”178 
 
Empirical research approach consists in studying law in the broader social and 
political context with the use of a range of methods from other disciplines like social 
sciences and humanities.179 The methods employed, either quantitative or qualitative, 
are capable to produce empirical evidence to answer research questions, decipher 
workings of legal and social processes and fill the gab between ‘law in books’ and 
‘law in action’.180 This study utilises one of the qualitative techniques for data-
collection, an interview. 
 
Interviewing in legal research is helpful to find out about the practical application of 
certain rules of law, or the internal structure of an institution, or for the purpose of 
learning the views of experts in respect to certain legislation.181 Semi-structured 
research interview, employed in this study, is not directed towards quantifying the 
issues being researched but rather towards providing new insights and awareness of 
the subject under discussion. It utilises specified questions but these questions do not 
restrict it. Clarification and elaboration on the answer given can be asked from a 
respondent, which is prejudicial to standardization and comparability, yet it allows 
sharpening the focus on specific matters.182 The outcomes often cannot be reduced to 
valid statistical compilation or be generalised, however, this is not the idea that 
underpin the qualitative research methodology. Instead it acknowledges that there is 
not one overriding reality, but that reality is situational and personal, and may vary 
between individuals and between situations.183 It describes reality as experienced by 
the respondents, gives an insider-view of situation.184 
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Since finding solutions to vague interpretation of Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has been left by the drafters 
of this treaty to the practitioners, this study intends to go beyond legal documentary 
analysis and it extends to empirical field research to analyse law in situ, functioning 
and being interpreted in different contexts by different legal actors. The fieldwork 
undertaken in the course of this research consisted in conducting interviews with 
different participants of the legal process to uncover how they actually understand 
law and reconcile inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps if any. The empirical field 
research included: 
 
- interviews with policy and legal officers of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) 
and the  Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United 
Nations Headquarters (New York); 
- interviews with the prosecutors and legal officers of the International 
Criminal Court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (The Hague)  
 
The first part of the field research was conducted during the internship in the Office 
of Legal Affairs, United Nations Headquarter in New York, which the author of this 
thesis undertook between October 2011 and March 2012. The second part of the field 
research was conducted during a two-weeks research trip to The Hague in November 
2012. 
 
The format of interviews had been approved in advance by the University of 
Westminster Research Ethics sub-Committee. The respondents were given a 
participant information sheet, which described the purpose of the research, and a 
consent form to sign. The responses were anonymous and given in private capacity. 
In sum 18 interviews with the legal practitioners were conducted, 15 of which were 
audio recorded. The interviews were semi-structured but the set of questions was 
prepared to start off the conversation and they largely corresponded, but were not 
limited, to the research sub-questions of this thesis. The interviews are referred to by 
number, the name of the institution and the date (month, year) they were conducted. 
It has to be noted though that due to the vast amount of material that was examined 
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in the process of thesis writing, not all interviews are explicitly referenced. 
Nevertheless, the fieldwork maintains its relevance for this study as it helped to 
sharpen the focus, guided further doctrinal research and very often upholds remarks 
and conclusions without being specifically mentioned. 
 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the fieldwork undertaken, especially the 
UN internship, provided the unique opportunity to access internal resources of the 
UN legal database and the library, and helped to understand the institutional and 
political context, which provided a necessary backdrop to the overall research. 
  
1.4. Disposition of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters and is structured in the following way described 
below. The first chapter includes the introduction, literature review and methodology 
adopted for this research. The introductory component provides the background, 
defines the problem, the overall objective and the scope of the research and ends by 
formulating the research questions. The introduction is followed by a literature 
review, which examines existing scholarship on the subject matter and demonstrates 
the gaps that the proposed research is intended to fill. It provides a critical review of 
related work and its relevancy to the proposed research. The last section of Chapter 1 
covers methodology and describes the frame of reference in terms of the theoretical 
and philosophical underpinnings of the research as well as the methods of data 
collection. It also deals with the ethics of empirical research. The main findings of 
the research undertaken (both doctrinal and empirical) are then presented in the next 
chapters, together with analysis of the significance of the results in terms of the thesis 
argument. Chapters 2-4 correspond to the legal issues covered by the research sub-
questions. They overlap as the questions are interrelated: Chapter 2 discusses 
peacekeeping; Chapter 3 considers self-defence and the use of force in peace 
operations; Chapter 4 details the applicability of IHL to peacekeeping operations, the 
status of personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission and the issue of 
direct participation in hostilities. The last Chapter 5 summarises the thesis and the 
research results and provides conclusions.  
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2. Peacekeeping 
 
 
This chapter addresses the personal scope of legal protection under Articles 
8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
and it investigates what “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” actually denotes by applying the customary rules on treaty 
interpretation codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). 
 
This chapter is divided into three major parts. The first part outlines the Vienna rules 
on treaty interpretation. The second part gives background on peacekeeping practices 
as it looks for an “ordinary meaning” or a definition of the term “peacekeeping 
mission”. For reasons explained in the introduction, the focus is narrowed to UN 
peacekeeping and the attention is given primarily, but not exclusively, to 
peacekeeping operations undertaken by or in co-operation with the United Nations 
since the end of the Second World War. The account of peacekeeping is only partly 
chronological. The study does not appraise every single UN peace operation 
deployed so far, instead it discusses the changing nature of these operations, the 
emergence and development of basic norms governing peacekeeping and it reviews 
some legal, political and military difficulties that the application of these norms has 
encountered. Based on the conclusions of the second part, the third section of the 
chapter provides an analysis of the full phrase “a peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. It investigates whether this 
phrase should be interpreted as covering UN peacekeeping missions exclusively or 
also regional peacekeeping missions. 
 
The chapter concludes that although there is no single agreed definition of 
peacekeeping and that it has to be viewed as a generic term, with its precise content 
changing over time, there is a common understanding as to what it denotes by 
reference to the constitutional principles of peacekeeping. With regard to the phrase 
“in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, this should be understood as 
the compatibility with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations in general, 
not just narrowly defined conformity with the specified powers or procedures. Thus a 
! 51 
peacekeeping mission established and run by a regional organisation would be 
covered by the protective regime of the Rome Statute provided that the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN Charter are respected and the conditions set out in its Chapter 
VIII are met.  
 
2.1. Applying the rules on interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties to the Rome Statute 
 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute on applicable law 
The Rome Statute does not contain a separate provision on the rules of legal 
interpretation that should be followed with regard to its text. However, it does 
contain Article 21 on applicable law, which outlines the legal sources to be applied 
by the Court and to some extent it tackles the interpretation of these sources: 
 
Article 21 Applicable law 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds 
such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
 
The specification of legal sources upon which the Court may draw trying to resolve 
legal issues before it implies that the Statute itself may not always provide all 
answers. It directs the judges where to seek guidance and in what sequence.1 They 
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must first apply the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. The Elements of Crimes should be read alongside Article 9 of the Statute, 
which stipulates that they are to “assist the Court in the interpretation and 
application” of articles 6, 7 and 8. Besides the hierarchy of formal sources in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 21, its paragraph 3 seems to introduce a substantial 
hierarchy of norms, which should further guide the application and interpretation of 
law.2 As an international treaty the Rome Statute comes within the remit of the rules 
on interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which has been confirmed by the ICC Appeals Chamber in 
recent case law. According to the Appeals Chamber’s ruling, the interpretation of the 
Statute of the Court should be guided by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.3 
 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
The Convention was adopted on 22 May 1969 and opened for signature on 23 May 
1969 by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties in Vienna.4 The text 
of the Convention based on the draft articles prepared by the International Law 
Commission.5 The Convention entered into force on 27 January 1980, in accordance 
with its Article 84(1). As of January 2014 it has been ratified by 113 states.6  
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2 A Cassese, P Gaeta, J R W D Jones (n 1) 1079-1080 
3 See e.g. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04), Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, 13 July 2006, para. 33 ff; see also W Schabas, An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court (4th ed. Cambridge University Press 2010) 206-212. 
4 The Conference was convened pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 2166 (XXI) 1 of 5 
December 1966 and 2287 (XXII) 2of 6 December 1967. The Conference held two sessions, both at 
the Neue Hofburg in Vienna, the first session from 26 March to 24 May 1968 and the second session 
from 9 April to 22 May 1969 
5 The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
in 1947 in accordance with Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations to fulfil its mandate “to 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of (…) encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification”. Hence, Article 1(1) of the ILC Statute 
provides that the “Commission shall have for its object the promotion of the progressive development 
of international law and its codification.” The Commission is composed of legal experts from different 
legal systems throughout the world. The main work on the draft articles on treaty interpretation was 
undertaken at two sessions in 1964 and 1966 although research and preparations had started much 
earlier. James Brierly, Hersch Lauterpacht, Gerald Fitzmaurice and Humphrey Waldock were the four 
special rapporteurs on the topic 
6 http://treaties.un.org 
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The 1969 VCLT rules of interpretation are regarded as general customary law and its 
application by the International Court of Justice is “virtually axiomatic”.7 The ICJ is 
not the only international court which applies them; they are also applied, for 
instance, in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR)8 as well as by arbitral bodies established under the auspices 
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, and also those set up under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.9 Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT dealing with the general rule of 
interpretation and supplementary means of interpretation are of relevance from the 
point of view of the present analysis. They read as follows: 
 
Article 31 General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of the treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including preamble and annexes: 
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
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7 R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2008) 15-16; see for example: Avena 
and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) [2004] ICJ Reports 37-38, para. 
83: “ The Court now addresses the question of the proper interpretation of the expression ‘without 
delay’ in the light of the arguments put to it by the Parties. The Court begins by noting that the precise 
meaning of ‘without delay’, as it is to be understood in Article 36, paragraph 1(b), is not defined in the 
Convention [on Consular Relations]. This phrase therefore requires interpretation according to the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.” [emphasis added] 
8 The application of the VCLT rules by the ECtHR is sometimes controversial as the Court has 
developed a doctrine of dynamic treaty interpretation which does not always follow the classical rules 
on interpretation; see on this subject G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2007) and M Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic Interpretation’ 
(2008) The Hague Yearbook of International Law 
9 R Gardiner (n 7) 18 
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Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
The successive paragraphs of Article 31 seem to be laying down a hierarchical order 
for the application of the various elements of interpretation in this article. However, 
as explained by the International Law Commission in its Commentary on the draft 
articles, a set of rules on interpretation provided in Article 31 is not necessarily to be 
applied as a step-by-step formula in every case, nor should these rules be taken to 
bits and examined in isolation:  
 
“The Commission, by heading the article "General rule of interpretation" in the singular and by 
underlining the connexion between paragraphs 1 and 2 and again between paragraph 3 and the two 
previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application of the means of interpretation in the 
article would be a single combined operation. All the various elements, as they were present in any 
given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant 
interpretation. Thus, article 27 is entitled “General rule of interpretation” in the singular, not “General 
rules” in the plural, because the Commission desired to emphasize that the process of interpretation is 
a unity and that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule.”10  
 
This “crucible” approach allows or even advises certain flexibility in application of 
the rules. Although they are arranged to an inherent sequential logic, they are not 
meant to be purely mechanically employed in all cases and always consecutively. 
Instead, these rules instruct interpreters what elements to take into account (text, 
preamble, annexes, related agreements, preparatory work, etc.) and to a certain extent 
how to handle these materials.11  
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10 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: Official Records: Documents of the Conference, 
A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Yearbook of the International Law Commission. Documents of the second part 
of the seventeenth session and of the eighteenth session including the reports of the Commission to the 
General Assembly A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 vol. II, 219-20, para. 8. The Commentary 
supplemented the draft articles considered at the Vienna Conference in 1969 as a staring point for 
preparation and adoption of the Vienna Convention. Draft article 27 in the above-cited fragment 
became later Article 31 in the Convention. (see: R Gardiner (n 7) footnote 16 at 9) 
11 R Gardiner (n 7) 9 
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The first principle to be applied while interpreting a treaty is the principle of “good 
faith and ordinary meaning”. While the text of the treaty takes primacy as the 
authentic expression of the agreement of the parties, the treaty has to be read as a 
whole. The ordinary meaning should, therefore, be construed in the context of the 
whole treaty and in the light of its object and purpose.12 Article 31 points at the 
context of the treaty, which covers the text of the treaty itself, its preamble and 
annexes, and any agreement or instrument relating to the treaty and drafted in 
connection with its conclusion. Additionally, any subsequent agreement concerning 
the interpretation of the treaty or any subsequent practice, “which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” shall be considered together 
with the context. Article 32 provides supplementary means of interpretation to 
corroborate the meaning established through application of Article 31 or if the latter 
proved insufficient, to determine such meaning. The language of Article 32 is not 
mandatory stating that supplementary means of interpretation are the ones to which 
recourse “may” be had, nor are they listed exclusively. The role of Article 32 is 
supportive, yet as the Commission explained in its Commentary on the final version 
of the draft articles, Articles 31 and 32 (draft articles 27 and 28) should operate in 
conjunction if necessary: 
 
“Accordingly, the Commission was of the opinion that the distinction made in articles 27 and 28 
between authentic and supplementary means of interpretation is both justified and desirable. At the 
same time, it pointed out that the provisions of article 28 by no means have the effect of drawing a 
rigid line between the “supplementary” means of interpretation and the means included in article 27. 
The fact that article 28 admits recourse to the supplementary means for the purpose of “confirming” 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 27 establishes a general link between the two 
articles and maintains the unity of the process of interpretation.”13 
 
A legal operation of treaty interpretation should combine various elements and 
means of interpretation as they may be present in the case and evaluate them 
together, while refraining from drawing a firm conclusion based on particular 
elements before the process has been completed.14 As remarked by one scholar, “the 
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12 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 633 
13 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: Official Records: Documents of the Conference, 
A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Yearbook of the International Law Commission. Documents of the second part 
of the seventeenth session and of the eighteenth session including the reports of the Commission to the 
General Assembly A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 vol. II, 220, para.10 
14 R Gardiner (n 7) 30 
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interpretation may require going round the circle more than once if a factor presents 
itself under an element of the rules later in the list and which appears to outweigh 
one already taken up”.15 
 
Application of the rules on treaty interpretation 
In applying the Vienna rules to interpret the phrase “a peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” this study will first look at the 
language of the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and ordinary meanings of the 
terms in their context; it will seek any definitions (special meanings); examine the 
legislative history of the provisions and check subsequent practice for accepted 
interpretations. Bearing in mind the unity of the process of interpretation, no definite 
conclusion should be reached before the process has been completed.  
 
As already discussed in the literature review, the Rome Statute does not mention “a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” in any 
other provision than Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) while these articles do not 
define it. Neither can this term be found in any other legal texts of the International 
Criminal Court, such as Elements of Crimes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Regulations of the Court and Regulations of the Registry, which according to Article 
31(2) of the VCLT would constitute “the context” for the purpose of the 
interpretation of the treaty. A reading of the phrase “a peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” should be made by reference to 
the “ordinary meaning” of the terms used. Particular words and phrases should be 
given their normal and natural meaning in the context in which they occur. The next 
section examines UN peacekeeping practice to date in order to determine the 
“ordinary meaning” of a “peacekeeping mission”. 
 
2.2. The origins of peacekeeping and its evolution 
 
Peacekeeping is not a post-Second-War phenomenon or a unique invention of the 
United Nations although it is now commonly associated with the UN system of 
international peace and security. Collective actions at the international level designed 
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to contain conflicts and to keep peace were commenced long before the United 
Nations was established.16 Some authors trace the historical origins of peace 
operations back to the conference and congress systems of nineteenth century, as 
well as the collective security activities of the League of Nations.17 “Peacekeeping” 
undertaken by the League of Nations included the supervision of the international 
administration of the Germany’s Saarland, establishing of the League’s protection 
over the free city of Danzig, the supervision of the variety of post-war plebiscites as 
well as international mediation.18 The United Nations was created after the Second 
World War from the ashes of the League of Nations and with the firm resolution to 
perform better. The “emphasis on the change rather than continuity with what had 
gone before” is one of the reasons why peacekeeping has been commonly seen as a 
post-1945 mechanism established to regulate the international security system, and 
qualitatively different from previous endeavours.19 
 
United Nations peacekeeping was developed during the Cold War when due to the 
ideological differences the Security Council was unable to perform collective 
security actions.20 Peacekeeping became therefore an alternative to the collective 
security.21 UN peacekeeping history is officially said to have begun in 1948 with the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East22 although some 
authors23 point at even earlier UN attempts, which were in line with the League of 
Nations’ peace observation and inquiry experience - a fact-finding mission in Greece 
in 194724 and a truce-observation mission in Indonesia in the same year25. The first 
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16 N MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (Routledge 2006) viii; P F Diehl, Peace 
Operations (Polity Press 2008) 28ff 
17 A J Bellamy, P D Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd ed., Polity Press 2010) 7  
18 Ibid 79-80 
19 N MacQueen (n 16) viii; Diehl P F (n 16) 12 
20 M Bothe, ‘Peace-keeping’ in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd 
edn. Oxford University Press 2002) 661; C Peck, The United National as a Dispute Settlement 
System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict (Kluwer Law 
International 1996) 2; N MacQueen, (n 16) 12 
21 H McCoubrey, N D White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations (Darthmouth Pub. 1996) 2-3, 11-12; J F Murphy, ‘Force and Arms’ in O Schachter, C C 
Joyner (eds), United Nations Legal Order (Cambridge University Press 1995) 292 
22 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/ 
23 P F Diehl P F (n 16) 40-41 
24 United Nations Commission for the Investigation of Greek Frontier Incidents was established on 19 
December 1946 to conduct an investigation in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to discover 
the causes and nature of alleged border violations. The Commission was terminated on 15 September 
1947. See: The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/commissions_and_investigations.shtml> 
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missions were composed of unarmed military observers tasked to monitor the 
ceasefire and report violations.26 
 
The first armed peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Emergency Force, was 
established in 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis.  The mission was formed under 
the authority of the General Assembly and tasked to “secure and supervise the 
cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel 
and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve 
as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial 
supervision of the ceasefire.”27 The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and 
Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson played prominent roles in developing 
plans for and organisation of the UNEF.28 As a result of the Anglo-French veto in the 
Security Council the discussion on the urgency of establishing an international force 
to manage the Suez crisis was moved to the General Assembly Emergency Session, 
which adopted a resolution in favour of such force.29 The UN Secretary-General 
elaborated on the characteristics of the UNEF in his Report of 1956 preceding the 
deployment of the Force and in the 1958 Summary Study of the experience derived 
from the establishment and operation of the Force, which consequently became the 
defining legal principles of UN peacekeeping in the coming decades.30 The 
Emergency International United Nations Force was set up “on the basis of principles 
reflected in the constitution of the United Nations itself”;31 it was of a temporary 
nature and the length of its assignment was to be determined by the needs arising out 
of the conflict.32 The operation did not constitute an enforcement action against a UN 
Member State and there was no invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. What 
followed from this was that such operation could only be carried out with the consent 
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25 UN Consular Commission in Batavia (now Jakarta) was established on 1 September 1947 to report 
on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia and observing of the ceasefire between armed forces of 
the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Commission ceased to function after 14 March 1951. See: The 
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/commissions_and_investigations.shtml> 
26 See UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 
27 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1mandate.html 
28 N MacQueen (n 16) viii; Diehl P F (n 16) 71-72 
29 Uniting for Peace Procedure 
30 N MacQueen (n 16) viii; Diehl P F (n 16) 75 
31 Second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United 
Nations force requested in resolution 998 (ES-I), adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 
1956 (6 Novenber 1956) UN Doc. A/3302 paras. 4a, 5 [hereinafter: Second and final report of the 
Secretary-General 1956] 
32 Ibid para. 8 
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and the cooperation of the parties to the conflict and that peacekeepers, although 
armed, could only use force in self-defence and not to pursue any military objectives 
or to control the territory in which they were stationed.33 The Secretary-General 
advocated the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force and drew a 
clear distinction between self-defence and offensive action.34 The Force was 
supposed to have freedom of movement within its area of operations and only such 
rights which were necessary for the fulfilment of its functions in cooperation with 
local authorities.35 As also stressed by the Secretary-General, there was no intent in 
the establishment of the Force to influence the military and political balance in the 
conflict or to enforce any specific political solution. In line with these principles, 
which could be subsumed under the captions of voluntarism, neutrality and non-
enforcement, the UNEF I was pulled out in May-June 1967 after the Egyptian 
Government withdrew its consent.  
 
Basing on first peacekeeping experiences the Secretary-General advised that a 
United Nations operation must be separate and distinct from the activities undertaken 
by local authorities, which precluded any competitive or joint operations with the 
host government. That was justified by the need to avoid a risk of getting involved in 
differences with local authorities or in internal conflicts. Non-involvement in 
situations of an essentially internal nature was backed by a reference to the Charter 
principle of non-interference.36 
 
The first significant departure from the UNEF norms came pretty soon during the 
UN Operation in Congo (ONUC). It began in 1960 and lasted till 1964.37 ONUC was 
established to help the newly independent Congo, a former Belgian colony, to ensure 
the political independence and territorial integrity, to restore and maintain law and 
order throughout the country, and to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian forces. The 
United Nations Operation in the Congo differed from other peacekeeping operations 
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33 Reports to the General Assembly by the Secretary General (4 November 1956) UN Doc. A/3289 
and Second and final report of the Secretary-General 1956 (n 31); Report of the Secretary General: 
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34 Report of the Secretary General: Summary Study 1958 (n 33) para. 179 
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36 Report of the Secretary General: Summary Study 1958 (n 33) para. 165 
37 P F Diehl (n 16) 45, 80; N MacQueen (n 16) viii 
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launched during the Cold War in terms of complex responsibilities that it had to 
assume, the vast area of deployment and the big number of troops involved.38 
Another difference related to the circumstances in which it was dispatched – in the 
middle of a civil war with no ceasefire agreement to rely upon. ONUC set a 
precedent that United Nations forces could intervene in intrastate conflict and could 
be mandated with more complex tasks than ceasefire monitoring but it also subverted 
a clear division between peacekeeping and enforcement.39 
 
Apart from setting precedents, both UNEF I and ONUC brought about a major 
financial and constitutional crisis in the United Nations. It was assumed that the costs 
of peacekeeping forces constituted the expenses of the Organization within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the UN Charter and therefore they should be covered by 
obligatory contributions from Member States. The General Assembly did not include 
these costs in the regular budget but it established a different financing procedure 
with a different apportioning key.40 This was heavily criticised on both legal and 
political grounds. Certain states refused to pay their contributions justifying that the 
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and in the Congo were established by a 
wrong organ of the United Nations and in violation of the provisions of the Charter, 
and therefore, the costs incurred were not legitimate expenses of the Organization.41 
Unable to resolve the dispute the General Assembly asked the International Court of 
Justice to advise on the matter. The Court’s Advisory Opinion delivered in 1962 
proved to be particularly important as it clarified few legal issues related to 
peacekeeping, including its legal basis, which is discussed below. 
 
2.2.1. The legal basis of peacekeeping 
 
Peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the United Nations Charter, however, the 
broad mandate of Article 1, which states the purposes of the Organization, seems to 
provide the constitutional basis for peacekeeping operations. The Article 1 reads as 
follows: 
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39 P F Diehl (n 16)  46-47, 92; N MacQueen (n 16)  viii 
40 M Bothe (n 20) 689 
41 J F Hogg, ‘Peace-keeping Costs and Charter Obligations - Implications of the International Court of 
Justice Decision on Certain Expenses of the United Nations’ (1962), 62 Columbia Law Review, 1230 
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1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
 
In the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations the International 
Court of Justice confirmed the constitutionality of the UN peacekeeping operations 
UNEF I and ONUC, which were, according to the Court’s majority, launched in 
execution of the purposes of the United Nations. It ruled that: 
 
“ (…) when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the 
fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such an action 
is not ultra vires of the Organization”42 
 
The Court also considered the alleged exclusive authority of the Security Council in 
matters of maintenance of international peace and security. It first referred to Article 
24, which states that the Security Council has primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security without indicating, however, that it 
is of an exclusive character. Next, according to Article 14 and in line with language 
of Article 10 the General Assembly has the power to recommend measures in the 
area of maintenance of international peace and security. Based on these 
considerations, the Court took the position that unless there was a specific 
prohibition, the General Assembly was authorised to undertake any measures with 
respect to maintaining peace. Such prohibition was found in Article 12, which states 
that the General Assembly could not make recommendations concerning any dispute 
or situation in relation to which the Security Council was exercising its functions, 
unless at the request from the Security Council. Similarly, Article 11(2) requires that 
the General Assembly should refer to the Security Council whenever “such action as 
is solely within the province of the Security Council” is needed. The Court 
interpreted such actions to be enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. It then found that the UNEF and ONUC operations were not Chapter VII 
enforcement actions within the meaning of that definition, as they were not directed 
against any Member State, there was therefore no prohibition for the General 
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Assembly to act.43 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the cost of the ONUC and 
UNEF operations constituted the expenses of the United Nations, which the General 
Assembly was entitled to apportion among Member States in line with Article 17(2) 
of the UN Charter. 
 
Taking the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the UN Charter as a main point of reference, 
the constitutional framework of peacekeeping can be described in more detail. The 
Court did not specify articles of the Charter that could provide the legal basis for 
peacekeeping operations, yet such basis can be found in powers implied in Chapters 
VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. It is commonly said that peacekeeping operations 
fall between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of dispute) and VII (enforcement) of 
the Charter and therefore the term “Chapter VI and a Half” is being used.44 Chapter 
VI confers powers on the Security Council to investigate and mediate disputes 
between states, especially those likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Chapter VII authorises the Security Council to take action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. It 
empowers the Council to use measures “not involving the use of armed force” like 
economic or diplomatic sanctions and if they fall short, also measures involving use 
of armed force. Chapter VIII discusses regional arrangements for dealing with 
matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security either through pacific 
settlements of dispute or enforcement action under the authority of the Security 
Council. This chapter can be seen as the legal basis for regional peacekeeping and 
involvement of regional arrangements and agencies on condition that such activities 
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
 
The Trial Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone also pointed at Chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter as providing the legal basis for peacekeeping; it noted 
though that since peacekeeping missions are deployed with the consent of the parties 
their legitimacy is of no practical significance.45  
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According to the United Nations itself, its peacekeeping operations have traditionally 
been associated with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, although it has never been 
invoked.46 The United Nations Operations Principles and Guidelines, an internal 
publication of Department of Peacekeeping Operation and Department of Field 
Support, so called Capstone Doctrine, states that while the Security Council does not 
need to refer to a specific chapter of the UN Charter when passing a resolution 
authorising the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, it has adopted the practice 
of invoking Chapter VII when setting up peacekeeping operations in volatile 
(dangerous and unstable) post-conflict settings.47 What distinguishes such 
peacekeeping operation with Chapter VII elements from an enforcement action 
authorised under Chapter VII is that the former is not directed against a state which 
the Security Council, under Article 39, determined to have committed an act of 
aggression or to have breached the peace. This is a clear demarcation line drawn by 
the ICJ in Certain Expenses of the United Nations Advisory Opinion referred above. 
Robustness of a peacekeeping operation seems to be a secondary issue as long as 
such operation respects the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. An 
enforcement action is a legitimate and recognised exception to these principles.48 The 
Court failed to differentiate from the perspective of the use of coercive force between 
the two forms of peacekeeping operations under review. It stressed that both 
operations were of a consensual nature hence they did not amount to enforcement.  
 
As already said, peacekeeping operations are usually created by a resolution of the 
Security Council exercising its primary responsibility to maintain international peace 
and security. As happened in the past, peacekeeping missions might also be 
established by the General Assembly assuming a secondary role in the area of 
international peace and security. In line with powers specified in the UN Charter, the 
Security Council or the General Assembly can establish a subsidiary organ necessary 
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for the performance of its functions. 49 Accordingly, a UN peacekeeping mission is 
considered to be such a subsidiary organ of the United Nations.50 The Secretary 
General is also entrusted by the UN Charter with functions in the area of 
maintenance of international peace and security, and as the chief administrative 
officer of the Organization he is responsible for a proper functioning of a 
peacekeeping operation.51 
 
2.2.2. Peacekeeping – conceptualisation and typologies 
 
Since its inception United Nations peacekeeping has evolved significantly. There 
have been many valuable contributions in the literature documenting the history of 
peacekeeping, case studies, as well as many attempts to systematise different types of 
peace operations focusing on theoretical as well as practical aspects.  
 
Chronological approach 
Some commentators consider peacekeeping from a historical perspective and 
categorise peace operations chronologically distinguishing several phases of their 
evolution or so-called “generations” or “periods” of peacekeeping.52 Similarly, the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) breaks the history 
of peacekeeping into three chronological phases following the changes in the 
political landscape: “The early years”, “Post Cold-War surge” and “The present”.53 
The initial phase covered the Cold War period and included as diverse operations as 
the first missions ever deployed and composed of unarmed military observers simply 
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monitoring ceasefires54, the earliest armed peacekeeping operation UNEF I, or the 
large-scale robust and controversial operation of the UN in the Congo (ONUC).55 
The second phase started with the end of the Cold War and the change in the global 
strategic context. United Nations peacekeeping needed to adjust to the new political 
environment and changing nature of conflicts. It expanded the spectrum of its 
activities beyond monitoring of implementation of peace agreements between states 
and evolved into multidimensional enterprises addressing conflicts within states. The 
new tasks entrusted in peacekeepers included humanitarian assistance, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, de-mining, security and 
justice sectors reforms, electoral assistance, human rights monitoring etc. The DPKO 
points at the three characteristics of the post-Cold War period: a rapid increase in the 
number of peacekeeping operations, followed by failures of three high-profile 
missions in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, and the process of 
reassessment, self-reflection and reform triggered by these setbacks.56 The third 
phase encompasses the last few years and is described as a “consolidation phase” in 
which the UN peacekeeping continues to face high expectations and pursue a broad 
range of complex operational tasks both military, such as protection of civilians, and 
non-military involving civilian experts in the rule of law, human rights or gender.57 
The name of this phase is qualitatively different from the two previous phases, yet 
the DPKO does not pursue any further analysis but approaches it rather descriptively. 
 
This chronological categorisation as a way to conceptualise peacekeeping is a bit 
confusing since each of these three chronological phase witnessed different, often 
quite dissimilar types of peace operations and the phases do not coincide with 
functional typology e.g. unarmed or lightly armed military observer missions 
characteristic for the “first generation of peacekeeping” have continued to be 
deployed later on.58 Situating peacekeeping against a background of global politics 
can be helpful though as it points at the close relationship between the peacekeeping 
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practice and processes in the international system.59 Transformation of this system 
has brought about the changes in peacekeeping aims and functions. 
 
Functional approach 
Another approach to conceptualising peacekeeping, commonly taken in UN 
publications, is to situate peacekeeping among a broader spectrum of mechanisms of 
maintaining international peace and security60 and to list tasks that peacekeepers can 
be mandated to fulfil.61 This tactic is applied in the already mentioned Capstone 
Doctrine. The document focuses primarily on peacekeeping but it also discusses 
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. It remarks 
that peace operations undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors 
to maintain international peace and security usually encompass more than one type 
of activity and the boundaries between them have become blurred.62 They are 
mutually reinforcing and if carried out in combination, they can provide a 
comprehensive response to the root causes of crises that have threatened international 
peace and security.63 Capstone Doctrine notes that the range of tasks assigned to 
United Nations peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly since the 
beginning of peacekeeping practice and based on the categorisation of tasks and 
responsibilities it differentiates between “traditional observer missions” or 
“traditional peacekeeping” and “multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions”.64 
Importantly, Capstone Doctrine analyses also the reasons of this differentiation 
taking account of shifting patterns of conflict, changes in political and strategic 
context and different goals of these two types of peacekeeping operations. Despite 
different settings, goals and functions that “traditional” and “multi-dimensional” 
peacekeeping missions are supposed to fulfil, Capstone Doctrine still adheres to 
three basic principles that characterised the first “traditional” peacekeeping missions 
and continue to serve United Nations peacekeeping.  
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Quite a few peacekeeping typologies have been proposed by scholars based on 
different variables including changing functions and tasks of deployed missions, the 
use of force, or participating actors. Numerous theoretical approaches and a lack of 
scholarly agreement regarding the conceptualisation of peacekeeping mirror its fluid 
and adaptive nature. By way of example, an early analysis by Wiseman divides 
peacekeeping operations into two general types based on different functions 
assigned: peace observation operations tasked to observe, investigate and report on 
the compliance of the parties to a cease-fire; and force-level missions (called by the 
author “peacekeeping itself”) constituting “the interposition of military forces 
between belligerents to ensure the maintenance of a cease-fire and such other matters 
as detailed in a mandate”.65 Also Goulding proposes a functional taxonomy of 
peacekeeping but much more expanded: preventive deployment, traditional 
peacekeeping, operations supporting implementation of a comprehensive settlement, 
operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and the last two 
types arguably not peacekeeping at all as they are likely to involve enforcement and 
peacemaking - operations deployed in failed states and ceasefire enforcement.66 
Durch on the other hand reduces peace operations (he uses this general term) to four 
basic types noting the descending consent and the ascending amount and intensity of 
force required by each subsequent type: traditional peacekeeping, multi-dimensional 
peace operations, humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement.67 Findlay also 
employs an umbrella term “peace operations” and he explains that it covers all UN 
missions involving military personnel. He then groups such missions into three main 
categories with consent and use of force as main variables: peacekeeping (with two 
sub-groups of traditional and expanded peacekeeping), peace enforcement and 
enforcement.68 Bellamy and Williams propose as many as seven different types of 
peace operations based on different goals or “intended ends” that these operations 
hope to achieve rather than the means that they employ: preventive deployments, 
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traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting 
transitions, transitional administrations and peace support operations.69 
 
Common denominator – “traditional peacekeeping” 
What most such typologies as the ones listed above share in common is the category 
of traditional peacekeeping, which seems to be a starting point for all other types of 
peace operations. Although there is no agreement as to a definition of traditional 
peacekeeping or its constitutive activities, the historic origins and underlying 
assumptions and principles are rather undisputable.70 As already mentioned, the UN 
Emergency Force (UNEF I) contributed most significantly to the articulation of the 
key concepts of UN (traditional) peacekeeping which are premised on consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence.71 The so-called “holy 
trinity” provides a conceptual point of departure for all peacekeeping operations. At 
the same time, however, changing realities on the ground and new political 
requirements reveal its limitations and question its utility as a constitutional basis for 
peacekeeping.72 Different conditions with which peacekeepers were confronted made 
it difficult to stick to the three principles in their original form, which is discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
2.2.3. A quest for an official United Nations definition of peacekeeping 
 
Defining “peacekeeping” is not an easy task since the concept was not conceived as a 
part of a well-considered theoretical framework or a coherent doctrine. Peacekeeping 
was born in practice or rather the term “peacekeeping” was invented after the 
practice had already begun.73 As apparent from the preceding section, peacekeeping 
history is very much case driven and therefore defying a simple definition as it 
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“developed too many variations for the one term to retain a conceptual clarity”.74 
This is additionally complicated by the fact that peacekeeping or peace operations 
are not mentioned in the UN Charter and the Organization itself was for years 
disinclined to define them probably because “to define peace-keeping was to impose 
a strait-jacket on a concept whose flexibility made it the most pragmatic instrument 
at the disposal of the world organization”.75 Definitions are powerful and 
consequential as they include and legitimize certain activities or behaviour while 
excluding and rejecting other, hence it is not surprising that the world political 
organisation has been avoiding such “politically charged question” as the one of 
defining peacekeeping. Additional difficulty arises when definitions involve 
negotiations and the agreement is to be reached by many actors/participants having 
different interests, values and expectations, which is true for a global organisation as 
diverse as the United Nations.  
 
The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
The first such effort was made in 1965 when the UN General Assembly established 
the intergovernmental Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations “to undertake 
as soon as possible a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping 
operations in all their aspects”.76 In 1977 the Committee produced Draft articles of 
guidelines for further United Nations peace-keeping operations under the authority 
of the Security Council and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.77 
The final version has never been adopted due to political disagreement in the Special 
Committee regarding the question of the distribution of powers between the Security 
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Council and the Secretary-General.78 Apart from discussing the authority of the 
Security Council and responsibilities of the Secretary-General, the guidelines contain 
other general rules for institutional set-up and composition of UN peacekeeping 
forces, freedom of movement and financial matters. Although there is no definition 
of peacekeeping in the draft guidelines, Article 9 describes most basic principles 
which should govern the forces’ conducts, and these are: a full co-operation with the 
parties concerned, especially a host government, and a complete objectivity. 
 
Even though no progress has been made regarding the official codification of 
guidelines for all future cases, the Committee remains the only United Nations 
mandated forum to review comprehensively the issue of peacekeeping operations 
and make recommendations. It continues its efforts for such a review; it examines the 
implementation of its proposals and considers any new proposals so as to enhance 
the capacity of the United Nations to fulfil its responsibilities in this field.79 It has 
achieved consensus on the number of principles such as the strict observance of the 
Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter, the respect for the principles of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states and non-
intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.80 The Special 
Committee always emphasises in its reports that the basic principles of 
peacekeeping, consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-
defence (with a later addition of the defence of a mandate), are essential to its 
success.81 
 
Parallel to the work of the Committee the Secretary-General has also been involved 
in the process of providing general guidance for peacekeeping operations and 
contributed with a draft model status of forces agreement, a draft model agreement 
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with participating states, training manuals and standard operating procedures for 
peacekeeping missions.82  
 
An Agenda for Peace and the Supplement 
The first official UN document that attempted to define peacekeeping was a report 
written in 1992 by the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.83 An Agenda for 
Peace was produced at a request of the UN Security Council for an “analysis and 
recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the 
framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for 
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.”84 Part II of An 
Agenda for Peace provides definitions of the core and integrally related activities of 
the United Nations in the field of maintenance of the international peace and 
security: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is 
thus defined as: 
 
“(…) the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the 
parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace.”85 
 
The significance of this definition lies in the conceptualisation of peacekeeping as 
one of the ways in which a third party, the UN, may play a role in resolving 
conflicts.86 It shows the flexibility of the concept, but also its ambiguity.87 Elsewhere 
in the Report we read that through peacekeeping the Organization is able to assist in 
implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers after the fighting as been 
halted.88 This stipulation reflects the realities of that time – peacekeeping missions 
were deployed when the hostilities ceased and their main purpose was to help the 
parties to keep the ceasefire. The Report calls peacekeeping the invention of the 
United Nations that brought stability to many regions in the world.89 It admits that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 M Bothe (n 20) 662 
83 Agenda for Peace (17 June 1992) UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 
84 Statement of the Security Council of 31 January 1992, UN Doc. S/23500 
85 Agenda for Peace (n 83), para. 20 
86 A J Bellamy, P D Williams (n 17) 17 
87 M Katayanagi, Human Rights Functions of United Peacekeeping Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2002) 49 
88 Agenda for Peace (n 83), para. 15 
89 Ibid para. 46 
! 72 
the nature of peacekeeping evolved rapidly in recent years and that its established 
principles and practices as well as the composition of the peacekeeping operations 
had to be adapted to new demands.90 The Report does not proceed into a discussion 
about the principles underpinning peacekeeping though. Only consent is briefly 
pointed out in the definition citied above and preceded with the word “hitherto” 
which suggests that the condition of obtaining the consent of the parties might not be 
a prerequisite anymore. This implication could have been, again, influenced by the 
realities of that time. The United Nations became involved in intra-state conflicts 
where there was often no legitimate government to obtain a consent from, 
negotiations with leaders of factions could have been regarded as an act of their 
recognition and were therefore avoided and even if consent was eventually obtained, 
the consenting parties did not have enough control to make it effective.91 Impartiality 
is mentioned in An Agenda for Peace but only in the context of humanitarian 
assistance92 and the Organization reacting impartially in crisis situations.93 The use 
of force is discussed in relation to the collective security measures and measures 
provided in Chapter VII. Thus, it might be assumed that the peacekeeping principles 
were not called into question at the time of issuing An Agenda for Peace and there 
was no need yet to give a careful consideration to their precise meaning. Such a need 
arose 3 year later.  
 
In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, which was issued in 1995, the Secretary 
General elaborated more on the principles of United Nations peacekeeping. He 
admitted that due the developments in global politics peacekeeping underwent major 
quantitative and qualitative changes; it became more complex, involving the whole 
range of military and civilian matters, more expensive and dangerous.94 He 
acknowledged that United Nations peacekeeping started being practiced in wholly 
new conditions of ongoing hostilities in intra-state conflicts, where there was no 
agreement between the warring parties on which a peacekeeping mandate could be 
based. Peacekeeping forces were often confronted not by regular armies but by little 
disciplined and hardly structured militias in the situation of humanitarian emergency, 
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the collapse of state institutions and a breakdown of law and order.95 The Secretary 
General stressed that such new operations remained “neutral and impartial between 
the warring parties” and their humanitarian mandate was strengthened by the Chapter 
VII authorisation to use force for limited and local purposes only and not “to stop the 
aggressor” or “to impose a cessation of hostilities”.96 The Supplement explicitly 
spells out the basic principles on which these new peacekeeping operations remained 
to be based97:  the consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in 
self-defence; at the same time, however, it highlights few aspects of peacekeeping 
mandates that made it difficult for peacekeeping operations to stick to these 
principles. Protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare or 
protecting civilian populations in safe areas required the use of force and much 
stronger military capabilities that were made available, and which could not be 
reconciled with existing mandates based the consent of the parties, impartiality and 
non-use of force.98 With regard to the last principle, the Supplement emphasises that 
“peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as 
alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum permitting easy 
transition from one to the other”99, which can be interpreted us upholding a 
demarcation line between peacekeeping and enforcement. Importantly, the validity of 
the consent requirement was reaffirmed even before the Supplement, in the report of 
the Secretary General to the 48th session of the General Assembly on 14 March 1994 
the definition of peacekeeping from An Agenda for Peace was repeated but without 
the word “hitherto”.100 
 
The Brahimi Report 
Following these two documents a comprehensive evaluation of peacekeeping 
practice was made in 2000 in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, commonly called the Brahimi Report after the chairman of the panel 
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Lakhdar Brahimi.101 The panel was convened by the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan ahead of the upcoming Millennium Summit in 2000 and tasked with 
reviewing of United Nations peace and security activities and recommending 
improvements. The Brahimi Report introduced a new terminology of “peace 
operations” and described them as entailing three principal activities namely: conflict 
prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building.102 It defines 
peacekeeping as: 
 
“(...) a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily 
military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a 
complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the 
dangerous aftermath of civil wars.”103 
 
This characterisation notes the evolution of peacekeeping and the new practice of 
much more complex peacekeeping operations being established in response to the 
new type of conflicts. It highlights their mixed military-civilian composition and a 
peace-building dimension. The Report sustains that peacekeeping remained based on 
“bedrock principles” of consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force 
only in self-defence104 but calls for a robust doctrine and realistic mandates. The 
three principles are discussed in context of modern peace operations dealing with 
civil strife, intra-state or transnational conflicts, which reveals a modified 
understanding of what they entail. It is noted that consent might be manipulated by 
local parties or the local factions might split into new formations not contemplated in 
the peace agreement to which consent was given.105 As regards the use of force, the 
Report stresses that once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to 
carry out their mandate professionally and successfully, which means that: 
 
“(…) United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission 
components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-
for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is 
directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly 
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dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their 
attackers.”106 
 
This represents a qualitative change in the understanding of what the principle of 
“non-use of force except in self-defence” is supposed to denote. If we look back at 
the 1958 Summary Study of UNEF, it advises that the right to personal self-defence 
should be exercised only under strictly defined conditions and never on 
peacekeepers’ own initiative.107 According to the Brahimi Report, self-defence 
apparently comprises personal self-defence, the defence of mission components 
(presumably units, vehicles, equipment etc.) and the defence of the mandate. The 
third component is a novelty but it is not explained any further. The argument could 
be made that such formulation gives peacekeeping forces a sort of a carte blanche to 
use force “to defend the mandate” disregarding of what is being stipulated in the 
mandate. The cited fragment also advocates taking over the initiative to pro-actively 
use force and in a sufficient enough manner to quell the attack directed at United 
Nations troops or at people under their protection, the latter case supposedly being 
subsumed under “the defence of the mandate” header.  
 
Having discussed the challenges that the consent and the use of force have 
encountered, the Report moves on to the impartiality requirement. It states that for 
the new type of operations that are discussed the impartiality must mean: 
 
“(…) adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in 
those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all 
parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local 
parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not 
only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.”108 
 
This fragment represents a reconceptualization of the principle of impartiality, which 
was triggered by the UN’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica. The new approach 
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makes a clear distinction between impartiality and neutrality and condemns the latter. 
The limits of impartiality are to be defined by reference to moral considerations and 
the ability to distinguish a victim from an aggressor. It is a major departure from the 
meaning of impartiality as understood in the beginning of peacekeeping practice, 
which advocated the equal treatment of all parties based on the assumption that the 
belligerents have the political will to resolve the conflict (peacefully). As stipulated 
in the context of the UNEF I experience, peacekeepers would not favour any party in 
the conflict and their deployment should not be militarily advantageous or 
disadvantageous to any side.109 If now missions are tasked to protect civilians, to 
explicitly or implicitly support government forces over rebel groups, such actions 
undoubtedly influence a politico-military power balance in the conflict.  
 
These three policy papers were written to review the current practice in the field of 
international peace and security and to offer a comprehensive and persuasive 
argument justifying the policy recommendations. They were intended to serve as a 
decision-making tool informing the target audience, that is the decision-making 
organs of the UN especially the Security Council, and calling for action. They 
describe the reality but also try to generate one. It is important to understand their 
applied nature and value-driven arguments that differentiate them from traditional 
academia which focuses on building knowledge on specific topics but is not driven to 
search for practical and implementable outcomes of undertaken analyses. Policy 
papers also differ from other publications or non-papers on peacekeeping released by 
various UN departments and agencies as they do not necessarily share the same 
problem-solution perspective. Many such publications serve informative purposes of 
providing an overview or a general background to certain issues relating to 
peacekeeping or a specific analysis of causes and patterns, but they do not suggest 
any course of action to address identified problems. Since they are produced in a 
highly politicised environment their data presentation and analysis might be 
influenced by the political context. 
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Capstone Doctrine 
One of such UN publications is the already mentioned Capstone Doctrine (United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines), an internal 
DPKO/DFS document, which represents “the highest-level of the current doctrine 
framework for United Nations peacekeeping”.110 Drawing on the past sixty years of 
United Nations peacekeeping practice, landmark reports of the Secretary-General, 
legislative responses, the Brahimi Report as well as resolutions and statements of the 
principal organs of the United Nations, Capstone Doctrine contemplates the 
contemporary UN peacekeeping operations, their basic principles, advantages and 
limitations. It intends to help guide the planning and conduct of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations and any materials issued by DPKO/DFS should be in 
conformity with the principles and concepts referred to in this guidance document.111 
Capstone Doctrine describes peacekeeping as:  
 
“a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to 
assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has 
evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after 
inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – 
working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”112  
 
The first sentence of this definition is very broad and hypothetically it could cover 
any type of action undertaken to assist in implementing peace agreements, provided 
that hostilities have stopped. The history of peacekeeping operations proves, 
however, that the requirement of the cessation of hostilities has not always been met. 
In the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali noted the fact of deploying peacekeeping missions in the situation of ongoing 
hostilities.113 The second part of the definition points at the evolution that 
peacekeeping has undergone over the years to become a “complex model of many 
elements”, which in itself does not conceptualise much. Since Capstone Doctrine 
provides definitions of other four “peace and security activities”, it could be possible 
to state what peacekeeping is not rather than what it is. Yet, it might still be of little 
guidance as these activities are said to overlap, they rarely occur in a linear sequence 
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and the boundaries between them have become increasingly blurred.114 One 
problematic instance of such grey areas concerns the blurring boundaries between 
“robust” peacekeeping and peace enforcement especially regarding the use of force, 
although as stressed by the DPKO there are still important differences between the 
two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level, this 
happens with the consent of the host state and/or the main parties to the conflict. 
Peace enforcement, on the contrary, involves the use of force at the strategic or 
international level to restore international peace and security in situations where the 
Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression. Such use of force authorised by the Security 
Council is an exception to the prohibition under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.115   
 
Capstone Doctrine discusses also the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping and 
their interdependence. It acknowledges the evolution of peacekeeping practice and 
maintains the continuous relevance of the traditional principles, albeit it their 
modified understanding as introduced in the Brahimi Report. United Nations 
operations are always deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict, 
which is necessary to carry out their mandated tasks and prevents them from being 
drawn towards enforcement. They are impartial in their dealings with the parties and 
must implement the mandate without favour or prejudice to any of them. Impartiality 
is critical for maintaining the consent and cooperation, but the even-handedness 
towards the parties must not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. The principle 
of non-use of force except in self-defence has been extended to include defence of 
the mandate, but as explained above the use of force is allowed only at the tactical 
level and does not make peacekeeping an enforcement tool.116  
 
As the review of the UN documents above shows, the Organization has not endorsed 
one single and authoritative definition of peacekeeping. What can authoritatively be 
concluded, however, is that peacekeeping must be distinguished from enforcement 
action or peace enforcement depending on a nomenclature used. This distinction was 
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stressed early on by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations. Peacekeeping is NOT (peace) enforcement because it does not 
involve “preventive or enforcement measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
against a state with the aim of overcoming its will. Even if robust force is used at the 
tactical level in self-defence and defence of the mandate, it is not the primary aim of 
the peacekeeping mission but only incidental thereto.117 Peacekeeping should strictly 
observe the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter that is the principles of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states and non-
intervention in matters that are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.118 The 
peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-
defence and defence of the mandate secure that the Charter’s Purposes and Principles 
are respected and that peacekeeping is distinguished from (peace) enforcement.  
 
At this juncture, a comment should be made about the relationship between neutrality 
and impartiality. The shift from neutrality to impartiality understood as operational 
terms has been documented in the analysis above. At the operational level, 
peacekeeping operations are not neutral because they can use force in self-defence 
and defence of the mandate, but this is allowed only in the execution of the mandate 
and without favour or prejudice to any of the parties. In that sense, peacekeeping 
missions are impartial in their dealings with the parties as they treat them equally in 
material terms and in relation to the operation’s mandate. Given that peacekeeping 
operations do not aim to impose a political solution against states’ will or enforce 
peace they are apolitical or neutral in character. This is not to say that they have no 
political agenda. This agenda, however, is informed by values and principles shared 
by the whole international community such as respect for rule of law, human rights, 
peace and self-determination.119  
 
By way of contrast, (peace) enforcement is an exception to the prohibition on the use 
of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. It does not require consent of any state 
and it designates a state culpable for a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an 
act of aggression. (Peace) enforcement is neither neutral nor impartial and it uses 
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force against a culpable state to impose a political solution or enforce peace.120  
Neutrality is incompatible with the concept of collective security. All UN Member 
States have to comply with the decisions of the Security Council exercising its 
collective security functions and assist it in carrying out its decisions.121 
 
2.3. “A peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations” 
 
The proceeding part of this chapter has provided an overview of the historical 
development of peacekeeping, evolution of different types of peace operations, 
various attempts to conceptualise and define peacekeeping and its relationship to 
global politics. It has demonstrated that peace operations do not constitute a 
homogenous category nor is there any official definition of the phenomenon. There 
is, however, a universal agreement that peacekeeping has to be distinguished from 
(peace) enforcement and that the constitutional principles of consent of the parties to 
a conflict, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence and defence of the 
mandate are critical to making this distinction.122 
 
With these conclusions in mind, the study will now proceed with the analysis of the 
phrase “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations” as stipulated in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. 
 
2.3.1. The General Rule – Ordinary meaning and Context 
 
Ordinary meaning 
A reading of the phrase “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” by reference to the “ordinary meaning” might prove a bit 
problematic. As the introductory part of this chapter has demonstrated, it is difficult 
to identify one ordinary meaning of peacekeeping given the number of concepts and 
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respondents and virtually all of them confirmed the continuing relevance of consent, impartiality and 
non-use of force except in self-defence as characteristics that distinguish peacekeeping for 
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! 81 
classifications that have been used so far to explain it. Should UN documents and 
publications, ordinary dictionaries, or scholarship on the subject matter be primary 
sources in search for the “ordinary meaning”? Different types of peace operations 
have been identified based on theoretical and practical developments in the UN-
peacekeeping machinery and no official definition of peacekeeping has been 
proposed by the Organization yet. The United Nations seems disinclined to take far-
reaching fundamental decisions of drawing up precise parameters for all-future cases 
of peacekeeping missions given how evolutionary and revolutionary the 
peacekeeping practice has proved to be. The landmark reports issued by the 
Secretaries-General or commissioned by them confirm an evolutionary and fluid 
nature of peacekeeping. Other UN publications, especially internal documents like 
Capstone Doctrine, raise questions as to their own legal status and a binding force 
before raising concerns about the utility of the definitions they provide. Choosing 
one definition from those proposed by scholarship or dictionaries would be arbitrary 
and based on individual preferences. By way of example, three leading English 
dictionaries define peacekeeping as: 
- the active maintenance of a truce between nations or communities, especially 
by an international military force (Oxford Dictionary) 
- the activity of preventing war and violence, especially using armed forces not 
involved in a disagreement to prevent fighting (Cambridge dictionary) 
- the preserving of peace; especially: international enforcement and supervision 
of a truce between hostile states or communities. (Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary). 
 
Based on the preceding section on the history of peacekeeping it is difficult to admit 
that these definitions grasp the nature of peacekeeping. None of them distinguishes 
peacekeeping unequivocally and unambiguously from enforcement action, and one 
seems to even link the two (international enforcement).  
 
Functional meaning 
The unsuitability of these exemplary dictionary definitions might suggest that there is 
no single “ordinary” meaning of “peacekeeping”, but rather its meaning is 
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“functional” in a sense of a meaning being appropriate to the subject matter123, public 
international law or UN law more specifically. Such assumption would warrant 
relying first on more specialist sources like UN documents while searching for a 
meaning of “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations”. Additionally, the degree of specialism in the term being interpreted would 
presuppose that the meaning must be ordinary for someone reasonably 
knowledgeable in that subject (international lawyer, diplomat, international law 
scholar etc.).124 The “functional” meaning is not to be equated with the “special 
meaning” to which Article 31(4) of the VCLT refers. The former is the meaning 
ascribed to a term in a particular field of human activity, it is ordinary or common in 
a particular context. The latter is the meaning agreed by the parties which differs 
from a common, ordinary meaning of a term. Assigning a special meaning requires 
an apparent indication that the term is to be construed differently from what would 
normally be expected.125 Neither the Rome Statute nor any related documents 
contain any indication that the term “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations” should be assigned a special meaning. 
 
A generic term? 
As has already been remarked, UN peacekeeping practice has changed over time and 
so have the definitions of it. Peacekeeping keeps evolving in response to the 
changing political conditions and humanitarian needs on the ground. Such 
characterisation suggests that “peacekeeping” might be a “generic term” which, as 
explained by the ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey 1978) case, 
is a term being continuously applied and keeping pace with the development of law. 
In that case the Court had to decide whether the term “territorial status” used in a 
Greek reservation in its accession to the 1928 General Act for Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, which would be applicable to the dispute in question, would 
extend over continental shelf given that the treaty was concluded before the concept 
of continental shelf had become known. The Court ruled that a “territorial status” 
was a “generic term” which content would change through time:  
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“Once it is established that the expression “the territorial status of Greece” was used in Greece’s 
instrument of accession as a generic term denoting any matters properly to be considered as comprised 
within the concept of territorial status under general international law, the presumption necessarily 
arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the 
meaning attached to expression by the law in force at any given time.”126 
 
Admitting that peacekeeping is a generic term would mean that the determination of 
its content needs to be made on a case-by-case basis against the background of the 
current state of international law and peacekeeping practice. 
 
Contextual assessment  
The term “peacekeeping mission” forms only a part of the phrase under scrutiny 
hence reading it in its immediate surrounding is the first contextual assessment to be 
made. A “peacekeeping mission” is qualified by its immediate modifier “in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. This provides a direct link to the 
United Nations system and excludes any such mission that is not “in accordance 
with” the UN Charter. Some controversies might, however, arise with regard to the 
interpretation of this qualifier. Does it relate to substantive or procedural conditions 
(or both) in the UN Charter for the establishment and/or functioning of a 
peacekeeping mission? Does the Rome Statute cover United Nations peacekeeping 
missions only, i.e. peacekeeping missions established by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly and operating under United Nations command and control or also 
other peacekeeping missions established and run by regional organisations? 
Depending on a reading of the phrase “in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations” the latter type of missions can either be included or excluded from the 
protection of the ICC Statute. 
 
An ordinary reading of the phrase does not (immediately) suggest that the qualifier 
relates to United Nations peacekeeping missions exclusively. It rather requires some 
kind of compatibility with the UN Charter. Although not foreseen by the drafters of 
the Charter, peacekeeping has become one of the tools used by the United Nations in 
the fulfilment of its primary mission of maintaining international peace and security, 
and as such it must be in conformity with the UN Charter. As the history of 
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peacekeeping illustrates, there has been no single procedure for establishing 
peacekeeping missions; they have been set up by both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly and they have operated under their authority and control.127 At the 
same time, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for the possibility of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, which implies that the establishment of a 
peacekeeping operation is not necessarily confined to the United Nations so long as 
the caveats in Chapter VIII are met. The authority of the Security Council over such 
regional arrangements and agencies is required only if it decides to utilize them for 
enforcement action. A contrario, since peacekeeping operations are distinct from 
enforcement actions, they could operate under the authority and control of regional 
organisations. 
 
The context of the treaty can provide more guidance as to the exact scope of the 
phrase “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. The Vienna rules 
define “context” broadly as encompassing the whole text of the treaty, preamble, 
annexes and related documents. This directs the interpreter to look outside the 
immediate setting of surrounding provisions and search for other provisions on 
similar matters or using similar wording. The use of the wider context provides also a 
link to the further element in the first paragraph of the general rule in Article 31, “the 
object and purpose” as they are more apparent if the broader perspective is used.128 
Neither the text of the Rome Statute nor any related document as specified in Article 
31(2) of the VCLT contemplates the phrase “in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations” in any more detail. Nor is this qualifier in any of these documents 
repeated. There is only one instance of a similar phrase used in the Rome Statute in 
Article 5, which lists crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.129 Since no 
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1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
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provision defining the crime of aggression and setting out the conditions for the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction was agreed at the time of adoption of the Statute, 
paragraph 2 of Article 5 requires that once such provision is adopted it must be 
“consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”. The 
Statute does not specify which provisions of the UN Charter are meant here, but they 
should naturally relate to the role of the Security Council as regards the crime of 
aggression. The relationship between the ICC and the Security Council in this 
connection needs to be clarified.130 
 
The relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations 
Although the clause indicating the accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
does not appear anywhere else in the Statute, there are other mentions of the Charter 
of the United Nations or the United Nations itself. It is important to examine those 
instances as they evidence the relation of the Rome Statute to the United Nations 
system, which might aid the process of interpretation.  
 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute reaffirms the Purposes and Principles of the UN 
Charter and it emphasises the relationship of the International Criminal Court with 
the United Nations system.131 This relationship is one of the constitutional 
characteristics of the Court since its function is intrinsically linked to the purposes of 
the United Nations, especially to the maintenance and restoration of international 
peace and security. Commentators point at the preventive role of the Court in this 
regard - the establishment of the Court can deter potential criminals from committing 
crimes that threaten “the peace, security and the well-being of the world”;132 and a 
more direct role – trying and punishing those who committed such crimes will 
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contribute to the process of reconciliation and restoration of peace.133 The ICC 
Statute recognises distinctive roles for the UN principal organs to be exercised in this 
process, with the most important power of the UN Security Council to refer potential 
prosecutions to the Court in situations outside the Court’s treaty-based territorial and 
nationality jurisdiction.134 In 2004 the ICC and the UN concluded the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement in accordance with Article 2 of the Statute and the General 
Assembly Resolution 58/79 of 9 December 2003. The Agreement affirms the 
independence of the Court while establishing the legal foundation for cooperation 
within the respective mandates of the ICC and the UN and regulating the working 
relationship between these two organisations.135 The Preamble of the Agreement also 
refers to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recalls 
that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reaffirms them as well. 
 
It should be stressed, however, that the International Criminal Court is organically 
(institutionally, formally) separated from the United Nations. It is not formally bound 
by the rules of the Charter, although as stated in its Preamble it “reaffirms the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter”. It is not institutionally connected to the 
principal organs of the UN or financed from the regular budget of the Organization 
(although funds may be provided by the UN on the basis of the Article 115 of the 
ICC Statute). The election of the members of the Court’s organs is an exclusive 
prerogative of the State Parties.136 
 
This account of the relationship of the Court with the United Nations system entails 
that the provisions of the Rome Statute must be consistent with the substantive norms 
of the Charter including its Principles and Purposes. Therefore, the UN Charter 
might be helpful in interpreting the Statute’s provisions including Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) 
and 8(2)(e)(iii), which is discussed further below. 
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2.3.2. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and “systemic integration” 
 
Looking beyond the immediate context of the Statute, a similar clause “in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations” can also be found in few other international 
treaties including the UN Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
and the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.137 
Giving references to similar clauses from outside the context of the treaty moves the 
interpretation into the ambit of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which requires the 
interpreter to take into account together with the context “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. As a part of the 
“general rule” recourse to relevant international law is a mandatory part of the 
process of interpretation and may perform following functions: 
1) resolve time issues; 
2) fill lacuna in the treaty by reference to general international law; 
3) draw guidance from parallel treaties; 
4) resolve conflicting obligations under different treaties ; 
5) take account of the development of international law.138  
 
“Drawing guidance” on the meaning of the clause “in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” could justify the reference to other international law instruments 
including the UN Charter. The UN Charter would seem especially relevant in this 
respect given the ICC’s support to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations 
as discussed above. What needs to be analysed first, however, is the scope of 
application of Article 31(3)(c). 
 
The formulation of Article 31(3)(c) raises three issues concerning its 
operationalization. The first one relates to the meaning of the phrase “any relevant 
rules of international law” with the key questions what is “relevant”: the same 
subject matter or applicability to the situation in question; and what is meant by 
“rules of international law”: customary law, general principles and/or treaties? The 
second issue concerns the scope of limitation in Article 31(3)(c) to rules applicable in 
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the relations between “the parties”, which could be differently construed as denoting 
only the parties to the dispute or all parties to the multilateral treaty being interpreted. 
The third consideration which arises in the particular context of this sub-paragraph of 
Article 31 is linked to what is commonly characterized as “inter-temporal law”: what 
is the critical date for the rules to be taken into account - the date of the conclusion of 
the treaty or the date on which the dispute arises? 
 
The International Law Commission has been criticized that the formulation of Article 
31(3)(c) provides little guidance on how it is to be used.139 Academic studies have 
analysed this sub-paragraph using the very Vienna rules on treaty interpretation of 
which it is a part. The textual and contextual examinations have lead to several 
conclusions: 
1) the provision refers to “rules” of international law firmly established as rules 
and not just broader principles or “soft law”; 
2) “relevant rules” are those which can assist the interpretation and direct the 
quest for the meaning of a treaty provision and not necessarily those which 
generally apply to the circumstances of the dispute; 
3) the provision applies to “international law” in general and that includes all 
acknowledged sources of international law with Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice providing one of the most widely used 
reference in this context; 
4) it is not instantly clear which “parties” are covered by the provision, however, 
practice and academic writing tend to read it as referring to all the parties to 
the treaty, so that any subsequent interpretation of the treaty’s provisions 
would put consistent obligations on all the parties to it; 
5) the sub-paragraph does not tackle the issue of inter-temporality.140 
 
With regard to the last point the lack of any reference to inter-temporal law is 
conspicuous given that some rules were already pronounced in judicial practice at the 
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time. Preparatory work shows that inter-temporality was in fact discussed by the 
ILC. The first draft was based on the well-established rule articulated in the Island of 
Palmas case141 and accordingly it included two provisions relating to interpretation 
and application of a treaty. It proposed that a treaty should be interpreted “in the light 
of the law in force at the time when the treaty was drawn up” and its application 
should be governed “by the rules of international law in force at the time when the 
treaty is applied”.142 After much debate the draft was amended and all references to 
time factors were deleted. As explained by the Commission the correct application of 
the temporal element should instead be covered by interpretation “in good faith”.143 
 
The International Law Commission has returned to the subject of treaty interpretation 
on few occasions, recently when dealing with two other related topics 
“Fragmentation of international law” and “Treaties over time”.144 As the organ that 
once prepared the VCLT, it has been in a privileged position to further elaborate on 
the Vienna rules taking account of subsequent practice and development of 
international law and indeed it has offered more guidance on the application of 
custom, general principles of law and other treaty rules as well as the issue of inter-
temporality.145 Article 31(3)(c) has also been considered by the ILC as embodying 
the principle of “systemic integration” which states that international obligations 
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should be interpreted by reference to their normative environment (“system”).146 The 
Commission stressed that the importance of taking account of the normative context 
under Article 31(3)(c) in the interpretation process “lies in its performance of a 
systemic function in the international legal order, linking specialized parts to each 
other and to universal principles”.147 The Commission remarked that certain rules 
might appear to be compatible or in conflict depending on the way they are 
interpreted. Normative conflicts can be resolved through interpretation or, on the 
contrary, they are likely to emerge as a result of it.148 It follows that while searching 
for meaning of the interpreted terms it seems appropriate to refer to their normative 
environment that should include materials relevant from the perspective of their 
contribution to a more general objective of the “systemic coherence”.149 
 
Judicial practice both on national as well as on international level proves that using 
provisions of treaties other than the one being applied to assist treaty interpretation is 
so common and accepted that hardly ever a justification by reference to the VCLT is 
given.150 The same or similar terms may help to identify the ordinary meaning of the 
term or word in question by reference to its use in another treaty context. It should be 
kept in mind though that the interpretation of identical or similar provisions of 
different treaties might not be the same outside their own treaty context given other 
elements of the general rule of interpretation, inter alia, context, object and purpose 
or subsequent practice. Therefore, the treaty interpretation by reference to other 
“relevant rules” should not mean transferring the provisions under consideration 
within the scope and context of these other rules.151 
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Given that neither the Rome Statute nor any related documents provide guidance on 
the meaning of the phrase “peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations”, recourse can be made to relevant treaty law in line with Article 
21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute and Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Accordingly, the 
study turns to the Charter of the United Nations to seek guidance on the 
interpretation of the phrase in issue. In the light of the relationship between the ICC 
and the UN system and the fact that virtually all states are parties to the UN Charter 
this recourse promises to satisfy the systemic requirement of coherence and 
meaningfulness. 
 
The Charter of the United Nations 
There are several provisions in the Charter of the United Nations which contain 
similar clauses, for example: “in accordance with the present Charter” in Articles 
2(2), 2(5), 7(2) and 25, “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations” in Article 24(2) or “in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United 
Nations” in Article 62(4). These formulations slightly differ among themselves, 
which invites the question whether they all mean exactly the same. Examining the 
practice of the Organization in relation to the articles containing these qualifying 
clauses can throw light on issues of application and interpretation which have arisen 
in practice. A survey of such practice can be found in the Repertory of Practice of 
United Nations Organs, “a legal publication containing analytical studies of the 
decisions of the principal organs of the United Nations under each of the Articles of 
the Charter of the United Nations”.152  
 
The analysis starts with Article 2 of the UN Charter. It lists the Principles, which the 
Organization and its Members should follow in pursuit of the Purposes stated in 
Article 1. The United Nations organs have been relying either on the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter as a whole, or on particular provisions from Article 1 or 
Article 2 as a basis for dealing with a wide variety of issues. The general features of 
that practice prove that the functions of the principal organs of the United Nations 
are explicitly related to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.  
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Article 2(2) provides that Members are to “fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter”. The importance of this 
principle is underscored by the fact that it is also enshrined in the Preamble to the 
Charter of the United Nations.153 The decisions of the UN organs in relation to this 
provision have focused on the principle of good faith, rather than on a precise scope 
of the phrase “obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter”, 
i.e. whether the obligations are those explicitly mentioned in the Charter or more 
generally those likely to arose in relations to the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.154 In this context, the commentators invoke Article 26 of the VCLT 
which confirms the customary rule of pacta sunt servanda as the fundamental 
principle of the law of treaties, and which has been interpreted as clearly ordering to 
perform a treaty not only in accordance with its letter but also its object and 
purpose.155 The principle of good faith has been repeated in Article 31 of the VCLT 
in the context of treaty interpretation. In the same vein the text of Article 2(2) of the 
UN Charter is open to a broad purpose-oriented interpretation so to cover all 
obligations under international law including those not explicitly mentioned in the 
Charter but otherwise compatible with it and serving the community objectives 
agreed by Member States.156 Theoretically, the interpretation could be pushed even 
further to encompass “the whole of public international law, in so far as it is not 
amended by the UN Charter”.157 
 
Article 7 concerns the principal organs of the United Nations. Paragraph 2 of this 
Article gives general authority to establish subsidiary organs “in accordance with the 
present Charter”. It does not stipulate, however, who is specifically authorised to 
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create such subsidiary organs. More guidance is provided in other articles of the 
Charter: Article 22 grants the General Assembly an express authority to set up “such 
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”, while 
Article 29 grants identical powers to the Security Council. In the light of this further 
specification, the phrase “in accordance with the present Charter” in Article 7 refers 
to the express powers granted by other provisions of the Charter. It can be argued 
though that the meaning of the clause is not exhausted by these specific powers to 
establish subsidiary organs stipulated elsewhere in the Charter. Creating such organs 
and endowing them with certain functions should rather be generally governed by the 
law of the Charter and be oriented towards facilitating the fulfilment of the goals of 
the Organization.  
 
Article 24 deals with functions and powers of the Security Council and it defines the 
limits of these powers. By virtue of this Article, UN Members “confer” their 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security 
Council and agree that in carrying out these duties the Council “acts on their behalf”. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 24 stipulates that in discharging its duties the Security Council 
must act “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” and 
that the specific powers granted to it for the discharge of these duties are laid down 
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. The mention of specific powers triggered a 
discussion whether the Council’s powers are limited to those in the enumerated 
Chapters only or also such other powers which are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN Charter and necessary for fulfilment of the Council’s duties.158 
The analytical summary of UN practice in the Repertory and its Supplements 
suggests that the broader interpretation has been generally accepted and Article 24 is 
viewed as endowing the Security Council also with implied powers going beyond 
those specifically listed.159 Similarly, the International Court of Justice in its 
Advisory Opinion on Namibia ruled that the reference in Article 24(2) to the specific 
powers of the Council under certain Chapters of the UN Charter did not exclude the 
existence of general powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1 
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of that Article.160 Nonetheless, the powers of the Security Council are not unlimited 
as they are controlled by the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The 
clause used in Article 24(2) is slightly different as it refers to specific stipulations in 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, not the Charter in general. Yet, this specific reference 
to the Purposes and Principles still allows a liberal interpretation of the clause that 
would be in line with the theory of implied powers explained above. Acting “in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” does not need to 
be confined to specific powers and activities included in the Charter and may well 
cover such powers and actions not envisaged by the drafters of the Charter but 
otherwise consistent with Articles 1 and 2.  
 
Next in line Article 25 states that the Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. It 
should be read in conjunction with Article 24 and Article 2(5). The obligations taken 
on by Member States under Article 25 are the consequence of the authority conferred 
by them on the Security Council by virtue of the preceding Article 24 and in line 
with two complementary principles in Article 2(5). The last article requests Member 
States to assist the United Nations in implementation of any action taken “in 
accordance with the present Charter” and to refrain from giving assistance to a state, 
against which the United Nations takes preventive measures. In practice “any action” 
in Article 2(5) has been given a broad application not limited to an “action” in 
Article 11(2) or preventive or enforcement measures in Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the 
Charter. The text of Article 25 contains no indication of the type of decisions to 
which it relates; however, the leading broad interpretation based on practice 
indicated in the Repertory is that under Article 25 the Council might take various 
decisions of a binding nature, either in the exercise of its general or specific functions 
and powers. In the Advisory Opinion on Namibia the ICJ dismissed the contention 
that Article 25 applied only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter and stressed that it applied to all decisions of the Security Council 
adopted “in accordance with the Charter”. The Court analysed the Security Council 
resolutions concerning Namibia and ruled that they “were adopted in conformity 
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with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 
and 25” and consequently “binding on all States Members of the United Nations, 
which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out.”161 This ruling clarifies 
also the clause “in accordance with the present Charter”. On the face of the 
formulation of Article 25, one could argue that the phrase “in accordance with the 
present Charter” relates either to the manner in which Members States should accept 
and carry out decisions of the Security Council or the manner in which the Council 
should make such decisions. The Dumbarton Oaks draft article contained the same 
clause but it was slightly differently phrased, which fuelled discussions at the San 
Francisco Conference about the intended meaning of the clause. Article 25 was then 
redrafted so “to make it clear that the Members were obligated to carry only those 
decisions of the Council that were legally mandatory”.162 The International Court of 
Justice confirmed this interpretation adding that “accordance with the Charter” 
involves the “conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter”.163 The 
leading commentary of the UN Charter draws attention to the potential perils of this 
interpretation arguing that it could weaken the general obligation of UN Members 
under Articles 2(5) and 25 to comply with the decision of the Security Council. If the 
phrase “in accordance with the present Charter” relates to the decisions of the 
Council, it could implicitly give Member States a discretionary right to examine such 
decisions and comply only with those, which they find to be in conformity with the 
Charter. Such an ultimate right to review the Security Council’s decisions by each 
Member State would undoubtedly undermine the Council’s authority. If, however, 
the clause “in accordance with the present Charter” is still to be understood as linked 
to the Security Council’s decisions, it should be read in a formal sense as implying 
conformity with the procedures of decision-making provided for in the Charter rather 
than a conformity with the substantial law of the Charter which is worded in an open 
language and necessarily involves making value-judgments.164 This is a very narrow 
reading of the clause in question, which is not corroborated by the practice of the UN 
organs nor judicial decisions in respect to the interpretation of the Charter. 
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The Statute of the International Court of Justice 
The phrase “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” appears also in 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is a principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations. The Statute of the Court forms an integral part of the UN Charter 
and all Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the 
ICJ.165 Article 96 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter authorises the General Assembly 
and the Security Council to request from the Court an advisory opinion on any legal 
question. According to paragraph 2 of this Article other UN organs and specialized 
agencies may also ask the Court to give an advisory opinion on legal questions 
arising within the ambit of their activities if they are at any time so authorised by the 
General Assembly. In line with this, Article 65(1) of the Statute of the Court 
explicitly provides for its advisory jurisdiction: 
 
Article 65 
1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever 
body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make 
such a request. 
 
It is important to note that this article differentiates between authorisation “by the 
Charter” and “in accordance” with it, which follows the distinction made in Article 
96 of the Charter. Based on these provisions authority to request advisory opinions 
from the Court can be either direct or indirect. The Security Council and the General 
Assembly are directly and expressly authorised “by the Charter”, which is the narrow 
interpretation of the condition of conformity with the Charter, while other organs and 
agencies may be authorised by the General Assembly “in accordance with the 
Charter”. Neither the Charter nor the Statute specify further which organs and 
agencies can apply for the authorisation leaving this matter to be clarified in practice 
of the Organization. Thus “in accordance with the Charter” also in this case has a 
broader meaning not limited to specific provisions of the Charter but requiring the 
consistency with the law of the Charter as a whole. 
 
Based on the analyses of the relevant articles of the UN Charter a conclusion can be 
drawn that the clause “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” has 
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been interpreted and applied by UN organs and the International Court of Justice 
broadly as requiring conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations enshrined in the Charter, and not only conformity with the specific powers 
or procedures specified in the Charter. The “Purposes” are binding on the 
Organization, all its principal and subsidiary organs and agencies. They direct the 
activities of the Organization as well as indicate limitations within which these 
activities should proceed. The “Principles” impose direct legal obligations on 
Member States and the Organization itself, some of which are further developed in 
other provisions of the UN Charter. The systemic reading of the clause “in 
accordance with the Charter” suggests that, unless done by more concrete provisions 
of the Charter, actions or obligations qualified by this clause must be interpreted in 
the light of the Purposes and Principles stated in Article 1 and 2. The interpretation 
of this clause should also allow the inclusion of the new tasks and procedures as a 
result of changing circumstances to which the United Nations must adapt in order to 
fulfil its mission.166 Although not foreseen by the drafters of the Charter, 
peacekeeping has become one of the tools used by the United Nations in the 
fulfilment of its primary mission of maintaining international peace and security, and 
as such it must be in conformity with the Principles and Purposes of the Organization 
and also with powers and procedures expressly provided for in the Charter. At the 
same time, however, the establishment or performance of peacekeeping operations 
does not need to be limited to these powers or procedures specifically stipulated in 
the Charter as long as they are compatible with the law of the Charter in general. 
This conclusion justifies including in the category of peacekeeping missions “in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” also regional peacekeeping 
operations provided that they and their activities “are consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations” as stipulated in Article 52 of Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter. This Article also states that Members should utilise regional 
arrangements and agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance 
of international peace and security as appropriate for regional action and that they 
should make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such 
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regional action before referring them to the Security Council.167 Accordingly, 
regional peacekeeping does not require an authorisation from the Security Council if 
it meets the above conditions. On the contrary and as stipulated in the following 
Article 53, any enforcement action under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies must be authorised by the Security Council.168 
 
Another document reviewed in this section The Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations contains the same clause “in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” in its very title. The Declaration 
on Principles of International Law is a good example of a development of principles 
found in the UN Charter.169 The President of the General Assembly at the time 
described the adoption of the Declaration as “the culmination of many years of effort 
for the progressive development and codification of the concepts from which basic 
principles of the Charter are derived.”170 The Declaration is regarded not only as an 
authoritative interpretation of the Principles in Article 2 of the Charter, but also as 
their extension and further development, which proves that the law of the Charter 
should be interpreted broadly.171 
 
The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel also 
seems a “relevant” source that could provide some interpretative guidance on the 
meaning of the phrase “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations” since it deals with the same subject matter as the war crime of 
attacking peacekeeping missions under the Rome Statute.172 The Convention uses a 
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similar formulation twice, in the Preamble and in Article 1 that deals with the 
definitions. The Preamble recognises that “United Nations operations are conducted 
in the common interest of the international community and in accordance with the 
Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations”. This paragraph 
acknowledges a community-oriented nature of United Nations operations and the 
way they are conducted which is consistent with the Principles and Purposes of the 
Organization. It speaks about the UN operations broadly as it does not limit them to 
peacekeeping operations. It should be assumed though that they are covered by the 
term since elsewhere the Preamble refers to peacekeeping among other types of UN 
operations: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding, humanitarian and 
other operations. 
 
Article 1(c) provides a more precise definition of the “United Nations operation”, yet 
again not “a peacekeeping operation” per se. For the purpose of the Convention, the 
“United Nations operation” means “an operation established by the competent organ 
of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
conducted under United Nations authority and control”. On the face of this 
formulation the clause “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” seems 
to be linked to the establishment of the operation and not to the condition that the 
operation must be conducted under UN authority and control. The stipulation in this 
paragraph excludes regional (peacekeeping) operations from the protective scope of 
the Convention since only those established by “the competent organ of the United 
Nations” and conducted under UN authority and control are covered. As it can be 
deduced from further specifications in paragraphs 1(c)(i) and 1(c)(ii) the Security 
Council and the General Assembly are competent to establish United Nations 
operation.173 In the context of the establishment of UN operations a reference could 
be made to Article 7(2) of the UN Charter and the establishment of subsidiary organs 
by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The requirement of the 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations could be read similarly to the 
identical clause in that Article as denoting not only specific powers to establish such 
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operations but more generally as the compliance with the law of the Charter and 
orientation towards the fulfilment of the goals of the Organization. 
 
This itemized reading of the UN Safety Convention confirms the broad interpretation 
of the clause “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” suggested by 
the analysis of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. If, however, the 
Convention was used more generally to guide the interpretation of the personal scope 
of protection of Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute, the 
conclusions drawn would be quite different. As already mentioned, the Convention is 
considered to have inspired the inclusion of the criminalisation of attacks against 
peacekeeping missions in the Rome Statute. As also already explained, the 
Convention is applicable only to operations established by the Security Council or 
the General Assembly and conducted under their authority and control. The 
provisions of the Rome Statute are not that comprehensive and speak only of “a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. 
Whether the war crime under the Rome Statute should be read alongside more 
detailed provisions of the Convention can be answered by a reference to the 
preparatory work on the Statute. 
 
2.3.3. Preparatory work 
 
According to Article 32 of the VCLT the preparatory work and the circumstances of 
the conclusion of the treaty are supplementary means of the treaty interpretation. 
Recourse to supplementary means is not mandatory; yet invoking the preparatory 
work is frequently and quite naturally used to aid the interpretative process. The rule 
in Article 32 is in itself very flexible as it is based on a subjective consideration 
whether the meaning arrived at by the application of the general rule is clear enough 
or still ambiguous. 
 
Recourse to preparatory work of the Rome Statute is helpful in this part of the 
analysis in order to establish links between Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the 
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Statute and the UN Safety Convention and discover the meaning the Rome 
Conference was intended to give to the war crime under the Statute.174 
 
Drafting of the Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 following a month of negotiations at 
the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court. The drafting history of the Statute is, however, much 
longer than that; it spans for a half a century and is closely associated with the 
workings of the International Law Commission. The Commission worked 
simultaneously on the draft statute of the international criminal court and the draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, both of which played an 
important role in the preparation of the Rome Statute of the ICC.175 In 1994 the 
United Nations General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc Committee to review the major 
substantive and procedural issues arising out of the draft statute prepared by the ILC 
and to continue working towards the establishment of an international criminal court. 
These efforts were later taken over by the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of the ICC, which was tasked with preparing a consolidated draft text 
of the statute.176 The General Assembly, in its resolution 51/207 of 17 December 
1996, decided to hold a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries in 1998 with a 
view to finalising and adopting a convention on the establishment of an international 
criminal court. Between 1996 and 1998 the UN Preparatory Committee held several 
sessions and informal inter-sessional meetings. A consolidated draft, which was 
prepared during one of such meetings in Zutphen in the Netherlands in the beginning 
of 1998177 and then reworked during the final session of the Preparatory Committee, 
served as a basis for negotiations at the Rome Conference. The Rome Conference 
took place from 15 June to 17 July 1998 in Rome, Italy, with 160 national 
delegations participating in the negotiations and a range of international and non-
governmental organisations contributing to these discussions. After a month of 
intense negotiations, the Rome Statute was adopted with 120 states voting in favour 
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of it, 21 abstentions and with seven states voting against the treaty (including the 
United States, Israel, China and Iraq). The treaty entered into force on 1 July 2002 
after being ratified by 60 states.178  
 
The starting point for deliberations at the Conference was the draft statute 
transmitted by the Preparatory Committee.179 The draft contained crimes against 
United Nations and associated personnel, crimes of terrorism and crimes involving 
the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, all three listed 
separately from “core crimes” and referred to in the following discussions as “treaty 
crimes”. This section of the draft statute was accompanied by a note stating that the 
Court's jurisdiction with regard to these crimes would only apply to States-parties to 
the Statute which have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to those 
crimes, and a footnote explaining that: 
 
“The Preparatory Committee considered the following three crimes (crimes of terrorism, crimes 
against United Nations and associated personnel and crimes involving the illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances) without prejudice to a final decision on their inclusion in the 
Statute. The Preparatory Committee also discussed these three crimes only in a general manner and 
did not have time to examine them as thoroughly as the other crimes.” 
 
With the above caveats in mind the crime against United Nations and associated 
personnel was given a following definition: 
 
The crime against United Nations and associated personnel 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, “crimes against United Nations and associated 
personnel” mean any of the following acts [when committed intentionally and in a systematic 
manner or on a large scale against United Nations and associated personnel involved in a 
United Nations operation with a view of preventing or impeding that operation from 
fulfilling its mandate]: 
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(a) murder, kidnapping or any attack upon the person or liberty of any such personnel; 
(b) violent attack upon the official premise, the private accommodation or the means of 
transportation of any such personnel likely to endanger his or her person or liberty. 
2. This article shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council 
as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which 
any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which 
the law of international armed conflict applies. 
 
The title and formulation of this draft article follow the provisions of the UN Safety 
Convention, especially the draft paragraph 2 repeats the exact wording of the 
exclusion clause from Article 2(2) of the Convention. Although the Convention itself 
is not referred to, in contrast to two other “treaty crimes” which explicitly mention 
other international law instruments on the subject matter, the normative basis it 
provided was implied and accepted. The representative of the UN Secretary-General 
commenting on the threshold in this draft article noted that “making the 
criminalisation of attacks against United Nations personnel conditional on their 
systematic character and large-scale occurrence would be inconsistent with the 
definition of the crime established in the 1994 Convention, and hardly ever 
appropriate in the circumstances of peacekeeping”.180 His statement suggests that the 
Convention was the main point of reference, at least in the beginning of the 
Conference. 
 
In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, which were adopted at the 1st plenary 
meeting on 15 June 1998, the Conference established the Committee of the Whole 
and entrusted it with considering the draft statute prepared by the Preparatory 
Committee.181 The Conference established also the Drafting Committee and assigned 
it with coordination and refining of the drafting of all texts referred to it (without 
reopening substantive discussion on any matter or altering the substance) and 
reporting to the Conference or to the Committee of the Whole as appropriate.182 The 
negotiations were intense and conducted under time-pressure. There was little careful 
examination of individual words and their exact meanings with more of an overall 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
180 8th Plenary meeting, 18 June 1998 A/CONF.183/SR.8, para. 88 at 120 
181 Rules of Procedure (Doc. A/CONF. 183/6) were adopted by the Conference at its 1st plenary 
meeting, on 15 June 1998. Rule 48. Committee of the Whole: 
The Conference shall establish a Committee of the Whole. Its Bureau shall consist of a Chairman, 
three Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur 
182 See Rules of Procedure of the Conference: Rule 49 on Drafting Committee 
! 104 
approach.183 With regard to the definition of the crime against United Nations and 
associated personnel the issue was fundamentally one of principle between those 
delegates who wanted a treaty-based crime and those who did not.184 For the former 
group, the wish was to cover operations within the definition of Article 1(c) of the 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. However, 
there was in the background the question of the relationship with the United Nations 
and in particular the Security Council. If the exact wording of Article 1(c) was 
followed, this would require the mission to be “established by the competent organ 
of the United Nations”. The intention therefore was to widen the scope to 
peacekeeping (and humanitarian assistance) missions established by other bodies, but 
still “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” in the words of Article 
1(c). The key words, “conducted under United Nations authority and control”, were 
omitted already at the stage of the final draft of the Preparatory Committee.185 
 
The earliest proposal to change the wording and qualification of the crime against 
United Nations and associated personnel was made by the Spanish delegation in the 
first days of the Conference. It was proposed to move the crime to the part entitled 
“War crimes” by inserting in the appropriate place in sections dealing with “other 
serious violations of the laws and custom” applicable in international and non-
international armed conflict respectively the following provision: 
 
“Intentionally directing attacks against United Nations or associated personnel or against United 
Nations installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter.”186 
 
The Spanish proposal of the draft article was much shorter and it did not contain any 
threshold or a combatant exclusion clause. With regard to the lack of the threshold it 
might be explained by a parallel discussion on a general threshold to be established 
for all war crimes. The proposal merged the attacks upon the person of UN and 
associated personnel and the attacks upon their equipment into a single paragraph. It 
kept the wording “United Nations and associated personnel”, which left the question 
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open whether it should be interpreted in line with the UN Safety Convention; at the 
same time however, it replaced “United Nations operation” with “a humanitarian 
assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter”, which widened 
the scope of protection. 
 
At the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, Spain commented on its proposal that 
it aimed at expanding the number of persons legally protected against attacks, while 
at the same time it was important to comply with the terms of the Geneva 
Conventions and with customary law as it emerged, inter alia, from certain 
provisions of Additional Protocol I.187 
 
“By proposing to expand the scope of protection to attacks against United Nations or associated 
personnel or against United Nations installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, Spain was proposing to expand what might be described in modern humanitarian law as the 
“protection of protectors”. Such protection should be provided in relation to both international and 
non-international armed conflict.”188 
 
This clearly articulated intention to widen the scope of protection was questioned by 
the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which 
pointed out that “the proposal might have the effect of diverting protection already 
given under the Geneva Conventions to United Nations personnel, who would not be 
party to a conflict and would therefore be protected persons”.189 Another question 
that arose was whether protection should be limited to United Nations personnel 
only.190 While prone to create tensions with international humanitarian law, the 
change of legal qualification of the attacks on UN personnel from a treaty-crime to a 
war crime could help to avert other problems. The delegation of New Zealand 
remarked that the inclusion of a treaty-based crime would require the establishment 
of a special regime for treaty-based crimes, whereas the Spanish proposal of 
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including the provision on attacks against United Nations personnel in the war 
crimes section would avoid that problem.191 
 
The Spanish proposal was taken into account in the documents submitted by the 
Bureau of the Committee of the Whole. The Bureau’s discussion paper contained 
different options of Article 5 on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.192 The 
delegations could opt either for the inclusion of the treaty crimes against United 
Nations and associated personnel, or alternatively for the inclusion of a war crime of 
intentionally directing attacks on United Nations personnel in international and non-
international armed conflicts. In both cases no text of the article was proposed and 
drafting of the crime was subject to further discussion. It is interesting to note that 
the optional war crime of attacks against UN personnel was inserted immediately 
after the provision on intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using, in conformity with international 
law, the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions as its paragraph bis. This 
immediate context might suggest the type of (special) protection that UN personnel 
were considered to be entitled to.  
 
During the debate that followed the Bureau’s discussion paper some delegations 
opposed the inclusion of treaty crimes (including the crimes against UN personnel) at 
all or at least at that point in time leaving the question open for a future review 
conference. They drew attention to a different character of treaty crimes, which could 
not be equated with the fundamental nature of core crimes, and pointed at major 
complications that might arise in defining jurisdiction over them.193 With regard to 
the second option of covering attacks on UN personnel by the war crimes regime, 
one delegation (China) opposed assimilating of the attacks on UN personnel to a war 
crime. It argued that since peacekeeping personnel could be regarded as combatants 
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and other personnel as civilians, the Statute already covered both groups and the 
paragraph on United Nations personnel could therefore be deleted.194 
 
The second document of the Bureau, the Proposal, was based on the above 
mentioned discussion paper but adjusted in the light of discussions (also informal) 
that followed.195 It still contained different options of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court and certain provisions required further drafting. It stated that the crime 
of aggression and one or more of treaty crimes (terrorism, drug trafficking and the 
crimes against United Nations personnel) might be inserted in the draft Statute if 
generally accepted provisions were developed by interested delegations; otherwise 
the Bureau proposed that the interest in addressing these crimes be reflected in some 
other manner, for example, by a Protocol or a review conference. In the part on war 
crimes, in the sections on “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict (or in armed conflicts not of an 
international character), within the established framework of international law”, the 
Proposal included: 
 
“Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in 
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the 
law of armed conflict.”196 
 
This draft article, although still substantially based on the Spanish proposal, 
underwent significant redrafting. The words “United Nations and associated 
personnel” were replaced by “personnel (…) involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” and 
thereby the last indirect reference to the UN Safety Convention was removed. The 
new addition is a combatant exception in the second part of the article, which also 
differs from the one in the UN Safety Convention. Personnel and objects involved in 
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission must not be attacked “as long as 
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the law 
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of armed conflict”. The reference to civilian protection is backed up by locating this 
provision after the prohibition of attacks against “the civilian population as such or 
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” and against civilian 
objects which are not military objectives, as a sub-paragraph to this prohibition. 
There is no consistency in this approach in the case of armed conflicts not of an 
international character though. The identical provision on humanitarian assistance 
and peacekeeping missions in this section comes as a sub-paragraph bis to the 
prohibition of “intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical 
units and transport, and personnel using, in conformity with international law, the 
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions” and not the prohibition of attacks 
against the civilian population. 
 
The inclusion of crimes against peacekeeping missions in the war crime section was 
explicitly welcomed by few delegations. The Spanish delegation noted that, “the 
current wording was broad enough to cover humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
missions organised in a regional context in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations”.197 This remark on the wider scope of protection was not questioned or 
contradicted in the course of discussion by any delegation. These two provisions 
were repeated in the final draft by the Committee of the Whole198 and then in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted by the Conference on 17 July 
1998.199 
 
On the basis of all these preparatory materials the conclusion can be drawn that the 
changes which the treaty crime against United Nations and associated personnel 
underwent in the course of negotiations and which distanced it from the wording and 
scope of the UN Safety Convention and transformed into the war crime of attacking 
personnel and objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission 
were intentional. It was a result of a growing understanding of the nature of the 
offence and of a growing consensus as to the extent of protection that the drafters of 
the Rome Statute wanted to give to humanitarian and international peacekeeping 
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personnel. It can be concluded that the intention was to widen the scope of protection 
beyond the coverage of the UN Safety Convention so to include humanitarian 
assistance and peacekeeping missions organised in a regional context. 
 
2.3.4. Judicial Practice 
 
In line with Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT this section moves on to the practice in the 
application of the rules in question and will analyse the jurisprudence of the 
international courts on the issue of attacks against peacekeeping missions. 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The first jurisprudence on the war crime of attacking personnel and objects involved 
in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission comes from the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone. The case before the Court, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, 
Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao dealt with crimes committed during the Sierra 
Leone Civil War, including the attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers that took 
place in 2000.200 In the part of the judgment dealing with the applicable law, the 
Chamber specifically addressed the nature and scope of this offence. It noted the lack 
of jurisprudence defining a “peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” or any reference to peacekeeping missions in the Charter itself. 
It acknowledged that the concept of peacekeeping developed through practice as a 
means of achieving the goals of maintenance of international peace and security and 
that it was used by the United Nations for 60 years.201 It discussed how peacekeeping 
missions were created and what their legal basis was. In this context the Chamber 
pointed at the resolutions of the Security Council formally establishing such missions 
and expressed the view that the legal basis for their establishment should fall either 
within Chapter VI or Chapter VI in conjunction with Chapter VII. It did not mention 
Chapter VIII, which leaves the question open whether in the view of this Court 
regional peacekeeping operations would come within the remit of “a peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. In relation to Chapter 
VII the Chamber recognised peacekeeping missions with robust mandates deployed 
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in difficult and unstable situations of internal armed conflicts and multidimensional 
operations with extremely broad mandates including civilian administration.202 It is 
not clear whether these two types are mutually exclusive. Next, the Chamber quoted 
two definitions from UN publications as being illustrative of the way in which the 
matter was approached by the United Nations over the years, without however 
discussing these definitions.203 It then moved on to the basic principles of consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, 
and by reference to UN publications and scholarship it described them as “widely 
understood as the necessary foundation for a peacekeeping operation”.204 
Importantly, the Chamber dwelled a bit on the content of these principles.  
 
With regard to the consent, the Chamber noted the practice of deploying a 
peacekeeping force with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. In non-
international armed conflicts the consent was supposed to be sought from the warring 
parties not to meet the legal requirement for it but to ensure the effectiveness of the 
operation.205 Concerning the impartiality principle, the Chamber seems to have 
acknowledged the redefinition of this principle as it noted that impartiality should not 
be confused with neutrality. The reference is given to the Brahimi Report and its 
stipulation that the impartiality must involve “the adherence to the principles of the 
Charter and the objectives of a mandate”, and to Capstone Doctrine which further 
explains that the mission “should not condone actions by the parties that violate the 
undertakings of the peace process or international norms and principles”.206 Apart 
from citing these UN sources the Chamber did not clarify its understanding of what 
the developments concerning the impartiality principle would necessarily entail, e.g. 
whether robust mandates have any bearing on impartiality or how peacekeeping 
forces should react to the violations of peace agreements or international norms. 
These two questions seem especially relevant if considered in the light of the third 
principle of non-use of force except in self-defence. This principle will be discussed 
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in more detail in the following chapter, it is important though to take notice of the 
addition to this principle, the defence of a mandate, as acknowledged by the Court. 
 
Next, the Court referred to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel. It noted that the Convention does not define a peacekeeping 
mission, but rather a “United Nations operation” and quoted this definition.207 Since 
the Court did not comment on this reference in any way, it is not clear how this 
definition should relate to “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” under the Statute. Interestingly though, while applying law to 
the facts of the case, the Chamber ruled: 
 
“The Chamber is satisfied, recalling the establishment of the UNAMSIL mission by the Security 
Council, that it was a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”208 
 
This short paragraph seems to confine the condition of “accordance with the UN 
Charter” to the circumstances of the establishment of a peacekeeping mission and 
implies that the requirement is a formalistic one of being lawfully established by the 
competent organ of the UN.209 This suggests that the Court might have relied on the 
UN Safety Convention to interpret this element of the crime in a way that would 
exclude regional operations not established by the competent organ of the UN from 
the protective regime of Article 4(b) of its Statute. As mentioned above, the Court 
pointed at Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter, but not Chapter VIII, as a legal 
basis for the establishment of peacekeeping missions. Additionally, in the part VI of 
the Judgment, Factual and Legal Findings, Section 11 on attacks on UNAMSIL 
personnel, in a passage relating to the attacks on the ZAMBATT forces forming 
UNAMSIL mission, the Chamber provided a short explanation in the footnote 3455 
which seems to limit the scope of protection of Article 4(b) to UN peacekeeping 
missions only. In this footnote the Court mentioned the fact that the attacked 
ZAMBATT peacekeepers were fighting together with a unit of NIBATT troops, few 
of which were killed in the incident. However, the Chamber made no findings in 
relation to the attacks on NIBATT since in its view it was not established that these 
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NIBATT forces had in fact been members of the UNAMSIL mission. The Chamber 
noted that ECOMOG forces had remained deployed in Sierra Leone until May 2000 
and certain ECOMOG units had been transferred or seconded to UNAMSIL.210 It 
remarked: 
 
“As the status of personnel as members of a peacekeeping mission established in accordance with the 
UN Charter is an element of the offence under Count 15, the Chamber finds that there is reasonable 
doubt as to whether this element is proven in respect of the NIBATT troops.”211 
 
This short passage seems to suggest that the condition of being “in accordance with 
the UN Charter” is only met by peacekeeping missions established by the UN and 
not by a regional organisation. However, the language used by the Chamber is not 
explicit, hence it cannot be categorically assumed that it meant to restrict the scope of 
protection under Article 4(b) of the Statute.  
 
The last general issue raised by the Chamber in relation to the defining features of 
peacekeeping missions is that it “should be understood as distinct from enforcement 
actions authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII.”212 In contrast to 
peacekeeping, the consent of the states concerned is not required for enforcement 
actions since they are based on the Council’s binding authority granted to it by 
Article 42 of the Charter. The Court also noted the type of peacekeeping missions 
with robust mandates and established under Chapter VII, and acknowledged that the 
right of self-defence for peacekeeping missions nowadays includes defence of the 
mandate.  
 
Having identified the criteria of what constitutes a peacekeeping mission protected 
under the Statute, the Chamber applied them to the facts of the case. As already 
mentioned, it ruled that the UNAMSIL mission established by the Security Council 
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was “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations”.213 It recalled the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 between the Government 
of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front that stipulated the creation of “a 
neutral peacekeeping force” to i.a. disarm all fighters belonging to other paramilitary 
groups and the subsequent cooperation of UNAMSIL with the Government and the 
RUF in the fulfilment of its mandate. Pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in 
the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL was authorised to “take the necessary action 
to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its 
capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence”214 and to perform other additional duties.215 UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers were only lightly armed and they did not, according to the Court, 
possess the military capacity to cause significant damage to the RUF in open combat. 
They were also instructed to use minimum force and only in order to protect their 
own lives when threatened.216 Regrettably, the Court did not contrast or discuss the 
instructions on the minimum use of force with the authorisation to “take the 
necessary action to (…) afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence”, the latter one likely to involve the use of force beyond personal 
self-defence. 
 
The International Criminal Court 
The case against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda was the first case before the International 
Criminal Court in relation to the crime of attacking peacekeeping personnel and 
objects.217 Abu Garda was charged with three war crimes – murder, attacks against a 
peacekeeping mission and pillaging – allegedly committed when rebels under his 
command attacked on 29 September 2007 the Haskanita camp in South Darfur, 
Sudan, where the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMIS) was stationing. The 
attack took place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict not of international 
character. While the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber refused to confirm the charges for the 
lack of evidence and thus the case did not go to trial, the Confirmation of Charges 
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Decision discussed the scope of application of the war crime.218 The legal 
interpretation of the elements of the crime provided in this Decision was later 
reiterated by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the case against Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus concerning the same attack on AMIS 
peacekeeping mission in Haskanita, which is committed to trial.219 
 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber observed, similarly to the SCSL, that the UN Charter 
does not define “peacekeeping” or anyhow refers to it and that peacekeeping 
developed out of practical experience.220 It noted the conceptual and operational 
evolution of peacekeeping, which “defies simple definition” and which continues to 
evolve to meet new challenges and political realities.221 In contrast to the SCSL, the 
ICC Chamber did not point at either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter as 
a legal basis of peacekeeping, which however should not be read as a denial of the 
existence of such a basis but rather the absence of a specific one in the Charter. 
Having acknowledged that peacekeeping missions are not static and that their 
features may vary depending on the context, the Chamber focused on three basic 
principles that would determine whether a given mission constitutes a peacekeeping 
mission: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-
defence.222 The ICC Chamber discussed these principles in a manner similar to the 
Special Court and by reference to the RUF jurisprudence. It also referred a lot to 
“soft law” on peacekeeping, the UN reports such as the Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace or the Brahimi Report, or UN publications like Capstone Doctrine. Based on 
these sources the Chamber noted that the consent must be obtained from the Host-
state, as this stems from Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and it should be sought also 
from other warring parties in a non-international armed conflict so to facilitate the 
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mission.223 The impartiality must not be confused with the neutrality or inactivity.224 
Lastly, using force only in self-defence distinguishes peacekeeping from peace-
enforcement missions authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII to use 
force beyond self-defence in order to achieve their objectives. In this context the 
Chamber referred also to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel and its combatant exclusion clause to back up this 
distinction.225 It is worth noting that the Chamber did not mention the defence of the 
mandate, in contrast to the Special Court. As regards the phrase “in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations”, the Chamber stated that this is not equal to a 
requirement that a peacekeeping mission is established by the United Nations only, 
which diverts from the jurisprudence of the SCSL as discussed in the preceding 
section. The ICC Chamber explained that the phrase should rather be understood “to 
encompass also missions that are otherwise foreseen by the UN Charter”226 and 
based this conclusion on Article 52(1) of the UN Charter, which allows the existence 
of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. By reference to the Commentary to 
the Charter of the United Nations the Chamber explained the term “arrangements or 
agencies” as meaning “a union of States or an international organization based upon 
a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security 
under the control and within the framework of the United Nations.”227 The activities 
of such regional arrangements or agencies must be consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations and they must not involve enforcement unless with 
the authorisation of the Security Council.228 
 
In making an assessment whether AMIS was a peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations the Chamber was guided by the three 
principles of peacekeeping as explained above. It considered the agreement with the 
Government of Sudan and two militias active in the conflict and was satisfied that 
the consent of the parties as to the deployment of the mission had been obtained. It 
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analysed the mandate of the mission and other evidence so to conclude that the 
requirements on impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence had been 
met. Based on these considerations it ruled that AMIS was a peacekeeping mission. 
It then moved on to the qualification of “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations”. The Chamber noted that the African Union is a 
regional agency within the meaning of Article 52 of the UN Charter and that its 
mission AMIS was in compliance with the provisions of Chapter VIII.229 The AMIS 
mandate was a peacekeeping mandate and despite provisions on civilian protection, 
it did not extend to peace-enforcement or disarmament. Furthermore, the Chamber 
noted that the African Union’s mission in Darfur was endorsed by the UN Security 
Council, notably in resolutions 1556 and 1564 (2004).230 Given this specification on 
disarmament it could be argued that missions with mandates containing such 
provisions would not fall within the meaning of “a peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the UN Charter”. That would contradict the ruling of the SCSL, 
which considered the UNAMSIL to be a peacekeeping mission despite it being 
mandated to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. 
 
The above analysis of the first jurisprudence in relation to the phrase “a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” as 
stipulated in Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute allow to draw 
the following conclusions. Firstly, both the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
International Criminal Court were in agreement that a definition of a peacekeeping 
mission has to be construed by reference to the traditional principles of consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence. These characteristics clearly 
distinguish peacekeeping from (peace) enforcement which is governed by different 
rules. The content of peacekeeping principles has evolved over time in response to 
the changing nature of conflicts and different roles assigned to peacekeepers. 
Accordingly, the category of peacekeeping operations encompasses different types of 
missions nowadays: traditional monitoring missions, multidimensional as well as 
“robust” operations where use of force is allowed to defend a peacekeeping mandate. 
What the Courts seem to disagree on is whether “a peacekeeping mission in 
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accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” covers also regional 
peacekeeping operations. The SCSL appears to limit the protection to missions 
established by the United Nations whilst the ICC firmly extends the protective 
regime of Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) over regional arrangements which are 
in accordance with the Purposes and Principle of the UN Charter.  
 
The third remark concerns the sources that both the SCSL and the ICC relied on 
when arriving to the above conclusions. It has to be noted that both Courts drew 
upon a range of non-binding instruments such as UN publications, reports of the UN 
Secretary-General as well as academic writings, to assist them in defining the 
elements of the crime. The reliance on “soft law” principles, especially those 
articulated in UN documents, proves the importance of the institutional context and 
processes in which legal rules operate. Despite their political provenance UN 
guidelines on peacekeeping have been used to define normative standards of 
behaviour and to assess conformity with international law. By reference to the 
adopted methodological perspective of International Legal Process it can be argued 
that international law now comprises a complex blend of customary, positive, and 
soft law and that judicial decision-makers not always abide by the positivist, binary 
(in a sense of legal and non-legal) approach to the sources of international law. 
Instead, they utilise variety of instruments across the continuum of formal legality to 
present the full picture of expectations of appropriate behaviour.231 
 
2.4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The primary aim of this chapter was to analyse the personal scope of legal protection 
under Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute to investigate what 
kind of missions are covered by the phrase “a peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations” and to provide some interpretative 
guideposts. The question that could be asked at the very outset is whether the concept 
of a peacekeeping mission indeed needs to be precisely defined. The background 
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section on peacekeeping discussed numerous typologies and conceptualisations of 
the phenomenon to prove the dynamic and evolving nature of peacekeeping. 
International jurisprudence has accepted the existence of generic terms with their 
contents changing over time and responding to the continuous application and 
development of law. Therefore, the functional meaning of peacekeeping or a 
peacekeeping mission could be assigned by courts on a case-by-case basis following 
the evolution of law and practice at any given time. Such a solution is possible 
although not desirable in the realm of international criminal law, which is governed 
by the principle of specificity. This deficiency can, however, be remedied and the 
generic term somehow kept within certain boundaries by a reference to the 
commonly accepted characteristics of peacekeeping missions and these are the 
principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self defence. These 
principles were derived from the experiences of traditional observer peacekeeping 
missions and they are rooted in the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter. They 
are in line with the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of states and non-intervention in matters that are essentially within 
their domestic jurisdiction. They also underline a conceptual and constitutional 
distinction between peacekeeping and (peace) enforcement. The clear demarcation 
line between the two types of operations was drawn by the ICJ in Certain Expenses 
of the United Nations Advisory Opinion (1962) and still stands despite the evolution 
and transformation that peacekeeping has undergone. Peacekeeping is conceptually 
different from (peace) enforcement because it does not involve “preventive or 
enforcement measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter against a state, even if 
robust force is used at the tactical level to defend a mandate. Enforcement action, on 
the other hand, is an exception to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter, it does not require consent of any state and it uses force against a 
culpable state to enforce peace or impose a political solution.  
 
Traditional peacekeeping principles are said to continue to apply despite the 
evolution of peacekeeping, which moved beyond traditional cease-fire monitoring. 
However, they do not apply in their original form, and as with peacekeeping, they 
have proved to be flexible and adaptive concepts. The first jurisprudence on the issue 
coming from the SCSL and the ICC admitted, to some extent, the re-definition of 
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these principles. The flexibility of the constitutional principles of peacekeeping raises 
certain tensions. 
 
For example, the principle of consent has its origins in the early UN peacekeeping 
practice of deploying missions in inter-state conflicts. The United Nations was 
dealing with two or more sovereign states who needed to consent to the measure to 
deprive the action of enforcement character. The changing nature of conflicts and the 
new circumstances of internal strife with which peacekeepers were confronted have 
influenced the understanding of the consent requirement. As stipulated in the United 
Nations reports and as stated by the SCSL and the ICC, in a non-international armed 
conflict the consent must be obtained from the host-state, whereas the consent from 
local factions-parties to such conflict should be sought as a practical measure to 
facilitate the operation of the mission, not out of a legal obligation. This approach 
seems sound, as non-state actors do not have a standing equal to states under 
international law, although members of armed (opposition) groups can claim few 
rights under international humanitarian law if they satisfy conditions laid down in 
IHL treaties. The traditional position of international law admits the existence of the 
right of the recognised government to invite foreign forces to assist it in combatting 
rebels. The ICJ referred to this principle in its Nicaragua decision: 
 
“(…) the principle of non-intervention derives from customary international law. It would certainly 
lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be justified by a mere request of 
assistance made by an opposition group in another State (…). Indeed, it is difficult to see what would 
remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already 
allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the 
opposition”232 
 
However, what needs to be assessed from a legal point of view is the power of a 
government, which has lost authority and effective control in ongoing civil war and 
may therefore not be seen as representing the whole country/nation anymore. 
Although there is a strong inclination in international law in favour of established 
governments,233 the interplay of the principle of non-intervention and the right to 
self-determination should be given some attention here. The prohibition of the use of 
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force was enshrined in the UN Charter also to protect the right of a state and its 
people to solve a civil war without any military intervention from outside.234 On this 
basis some authors argue that the consent of the rebel faction or factions would still 
be necessary to establish a peacekeeping force in the traditional sense.235 The consent 
of a government, which has lost control over the country, or which itself is 
responsible for gross violations of human rights, may affect the principle of 
impartiality.  
 
The principle of impartiality also dates back to the early peacekeeping missions and 
the realities of that time and, similarly to the principle of consent, has also undergone 
some modifications since then. As underlined in the preceding sections, impartiality 
does not mean neutrality in the sense of inactivity or treating the parties as moral 
equals – bitter lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Impartiality 
now refers to the way the mandate should be implemented by a peacekeeping 
mission at the operational level. A mission must rigorously execute the mandate 
without favour or prejudice to any party.236 This interpretation has been confirmed by 
the SCSL and the ICC seized on attacks on peacekeeping missions and it 
corroborates a shift that has been made from the impartiality of the mandate to 
impartiality of the implementation of the mandate. At the same time some authors 
argue that peacekeeping missions are still apolitical or neutral in character in the 
sense that they do not aim to enforce peace or a political solution through the use of 
coercive force on a strategic level.237 Others contest this apolitical label, pointing out 
the fact that many stipulations in the mandates are overtly in favour of one party 
(almost always a host-government) and precisely tailored to influence the military 
and political balance of the conflict and to support its specific outcome. 238 They draw 
a direct link between the impartiality of the mandate and its implementation: if a 
mandate itself is partial, its implementation on the ground will reflect that.239 In 
response to this argument, it is submitted that as long as peacekeeping political 
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agenda is informed by the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, 
which are shared in common by the whole international community, the impartiality 
requirement is satisfied. 
 
Another aspect of the impartiality principle as currently understood and applied, 
which raises difficulties, concerns integrated missions or the so-called integration of 
UN humanitarian space. As elaborated in the preceding sections, peacekeeping 
missions contemporarily deployed are of a multidimensional character and 
comprised of different components: military, police and civilian. Many humanitarian 
NGOs, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, have been raising 
concerns regarding UN integration arguing that it blurs the distinction between 
humanitarian, political and military action and subjects humanitarian priorities to 
political and military objectives.240 The understanding of impartiality and neutrality 
on which humanitarian work is based is distinct from the way these terms are applied 
by the United Nations and there is a risk that the actions of the UN mission political 
or military component influences the way humanitarian actors are being perceived 
and treated. 
 
With regard to the phrase “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, the 
systemic interpretation of it supported by ICC jurisprudence justifies the conclusion 
that it requires the compatibility with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations in general, not just narrowly defined conformity with the specified powers or 
procedures. Hence it allows the inclusion of new activities and practices not 
expressly stipulated in the Charter. In the context of peacekeeping missions this 
clause should be interpreted broadly as encompassing not only missions established 
and operated by the UN in line with powers of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, but also other peacekeeping missions set up and run by regional 
organisations provided that they are compatible with the law of the Charter. Also the 
analysis of the preparatory works confirms that the intention of the Rome Conference 
was to widen the scope of protection beyond UN peacekeeping missions so as to 
cover humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions organised in a regional 
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context. Although the crime of attacking peacekeeping missions was based on the 
UN Safety Convention in the beginning of the negotiations, this link was then 
intentionally removed, precisely to widen the scope of protection. Therefore the UN 
Safety Convention should not be used to interpret the scope of application of Articles 
8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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3. Self-defence and the use of force 
!
The proceeding chapter examined the personal scope of legal protection under 
Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute and investigated what “a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” actually 
denotes. It concluded that despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of 
peacekeeping, there is a shared understanding of the constitutive characteristics of 
the phenomenon and these are: the consent of the parties to the conflict to the 
presence/deployment of a mission, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-
defence. In the course of analysis it was noted that these principles have evolved 
since their inception in response to the changing nature of conflicts and increasing 
demands placed on peacekeeping. 
 
The present chapter will focus in more detail on the third principle of non-use of 
force except in self-defence which, as already indicated, has also been redefined 
under UN law. From the perspective of this research it is important to pursue this 
analysis for two principal reasons. Firstly, as a defining principle of peacekeeping its 
precise meaning will help to further delineate the personal scope of legal protection 
under Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. Secondly, given that 
using force only in self-defence conditions the civilian protection granted to 
peacekeepers, the exact meaning and temporal dimension of self-defence in 
peacekeeping is vital to define the material scope of application of the war crime in 
question. If they use force beyond self-defence in the situation of armed conflict, 
they lose protection from direct attacks. The growing body of literature argues that 
self-defence in a peacekeeping context departs from its usual legal meaning and it 
includes “the defence of the mandate”.1 This conclusion was also reached by the 
SCSL in the RUF case discussed in the previous chapter, but the court did not go into 
detailed analysis to support this pronouncement. The present chapter will address this 
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matter. Firstly, the broad legal framework of the use of force in self-defence will be 
explained. Then the study will move to the right to self-defence in a peacekeeping 
context to investigate whether or not the extension of this right has indeed occurred. 
The analysis will proceed on three different, albeit interconnected, levels of UN 
peacekeeping practice: the Security Council resolutions establishing peacekeeping 
operations, UN military doctrine on the use of force, and the UN rules of engagement 
which regulate the use of force on a tactical level. As in the preceding chapters, and 
for reasons explained in the introduction of the thesis, the focus is narrowed to UN 
peacekeeping missions noting, where relevant, issues relating to regional 
peacekeeping. It will be concluded that no extension of the right to self-defence has 
in fact occurred. Individual self-defence is still exercised within limits prescribed by 
national laws of the troop contributing states, while “the defence of the mandate” 
shall rather be regarded as an extension of a political principle governing the use of 
force by peacekeepers and as a distinct right based on a different legal basis.  
 
3.1. Different types of self-defence and different legal bases 
 
 
Generally speaking, the right to self-defence is a legal justification for the use of 
force. It can be considered on two principal levels – on a state level from the 
perspective of public international law and on an individual level from the 
perspective of criminal law. The use of force by states is governed by jus ad bellum 
based on customary law and the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter contains 
a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations2 and reads as 
follows: 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. 
 
There are only two exceptions to this prohibition: the use of force by states 
authorised by the Security Council or in self-defence exercised by states individually 
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or collectively in response to an armed attack. The right of self-defence is enshrined 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of collective or individual self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 
The major focus of this chapter is on the right to self-defence as a justification to use 
force by individuals. For the purpose of this research national self-defence will be 
referred only cursorily where appropriate.  
 
The use of force by individuals in peacetime is allowed in three instances: in the 
exercise of law enforcement authority, in self-defence, and to accomplish operations 
or missions specifically authorised by a higher national or international authority 
such as the UN Security Council.3 The right to personal/individual self-defence is 
well recognised in all legal systems around the world, although its scope is 
differently defined in different national criminal laws.4 During armed conflict the use 
of force is primarily regulated by international humanitarian law and applicable 
human rights law, nevertheless, the right of self-defence continues to apply.5 The 
next section will consider different categories of self-defence exercised by 
individuals in different circumstances. 
 
3.1.1. Self-defence in a criminal law context 
 
In general, the right to personal self-defence derives from the inherent right of every 
human being to defend oneself against an illegal or unauthorised attack. It used to be 
explained by a reference to the law of nature. Blackstone, for example, affirmed that 
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the right to “self-defense (…) is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, 
neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.”6 
 
In a domestic criminal law context, self-defence is seen as an exception to the state 
monopoly to use force through the law enforcement mechanisms and as such it is one 
of the available defences to crimes committed by use of force. A person may also use 
such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for the purpose of defence of 
another, defence of property or in the prevention of crime or the apprehension of 
offenders. If acting reasonably and in good faith to defend themselves, their family or 
their property, they would not be prosecuted for such action.7  
 
The right of self-defence is premised upon the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. The necessity test would include the proof of the necessity to defend 
oneself at all, as opposed to other courses of action (reconciliation, retreat etc.); and 
the proof of the necessity to employ the particular means, such as the use of force 
among other means available at the time.8 The proportionality test would assess 
whether the response matched the threat posed, whether the force used, e.g. the use 
of weapons, was reasonable in the given circumstances. The point of departure in 
assessing the necessity and proportionality of the force used is what a reasonable 
person would have done in the situation under consideration i.e. whether, on the 
basis of the facts, a reasonable person would regard such use of force as reasonable 
or excessive. These principles are differently interpreted depending on specific 
circumstances e.g. the use of firearms in self-defence in a civilian setting would be 
less common and probably less likely to be considered reasonable than in a military 
context.9 Similarly, a reference to the judgment of a “reasonable person” in 
peacetime would be different than in armed conflict or if self-defence is exercised by 
a trained military. The necessity test will not be met if a defender is at fault i.e. if the 
attack was provoked or if a defender knowingly, willingly and unnecessarily sought 
out for specific situations that ultimately led to the use of force in self-defence.10 
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Also these conditions would be assessed differently depending on a context, civilian 
or military. In the latter case, it might be less likely to be able to avoid risky 
confrontational situations or a retreat might be incompatible with the objectives of a 
military operation. 
 
Some states apply a narrow restrictive definition of self-defence while other legally 
extend this right also over the defence of third persons. In the latter case, some 
additional limitations might apply though, such as a (close) relationship to a person 
attacked, near proximity of an incident or the necessity to provide the aid. It is less 
common under national statutes to recognise the defence of property as a part of 
personal self-defence and allow the use of deadly force, although it may constitute a 
complete defence for criminal liability for any loss or injury committed through the 
use of force.11 
 
3.1.2. Self-defence in a military/operational context 
 
 
The right to personal self-defence against an unlawful attack is a fundamental right 
of every individual applicable in both peacetime and during armed conflict. In armed 
conflict the monopoly to use force belongs to combatants. Civilians are forbidden to 
directly participate in hostilities; if they refrain from doing so, they are legally 
protected from direct attacks.12 They can, however, defend themselves against 
violence prohibited by IHL e.g. civilians can forcibly defend themselves against 
marauding soldiers. Such use of force in individual self-defence does not amount to 
direct participation in hostilities and they do not lose their protected civilian status.13 
With regard to military servicemen, personal self-defence as a criminal law defence 
is not so easily transposed into the circumstances of operational deployment in the 
sense that it has to be kept distinct from the use of force by them as combatants for 
mission accomplishment. The parameters of the use of force in self-defence are 
generally incompatible with objectives and necessities of a military operation and 
although self-defence applies in individual cases, it does not constitute a proper legal 
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basis for a military mission as such.14 Military personnel can still exercise this right 
especially when attacked in their private capacity or in a form of unit self-defence as 
discussed further below. However, if they resort to force to carry out their mission, 
the lawfulness of their actions must be based on a different legal basis i.e. the right to 
individual self-defence does not authorise military personnel to use force to fulfil 
their military or political mandate.15 In scenarios other than self-defence the use of 
force to accomplish an assigned military mission or in general to conduct combat 
operations is governed by other relevant national and international law, such as an 
international mandate of the Security Council or the law of armed conflict. The 
circumstances and limitations under which the force can be used by military 
personnel are delineated in the rules of engagement (ROE) issued by the competent 
authorities.16 Self-defence and rules of engagement operate independently from each 
other, especially the latter cannot trump or subjugate the inherent right of all 
individuals to defend themselves.17 The scope of the right of self-defence always 
depends on national criminal laws and the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
The third condition of immediacy, intuitively implicit in the necessity requirement, is 
stressed in the military setting by reference to the Caroline principles.18 
 
The case of a steamer Caroline from 1837 provided the basic rules for exercising the 
right of self-defence in a military context. The dispute arose between the United 
Kingdom and the United States over the destruction of the American vessel in the 
context of the rebellion against British rule in Canada. The American private 
steamboat, Caroline, was used by rebels to supply arms and manpower over the 
border to Canada. The British government unsuccessfully sought assistance on this 
matter from the American government and eventually in 1837 a British military 
warship entered the U.S. territory and destroyed the vessel. The United States 
strongly objected to the use of force within its territory by the British military, while 
the UK argued that its action was justified under the right of self-defence. The 
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Caroline principles were coined in the diplomatic correspondence between the 
British and American authorities following the events. The U.S. Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, accepted the existence of the right of self-defence which attached to 
“nations as well as individuals” but demanded that Britain demonstrate a: 
 
“necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation. It will be for [Britain] to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing 
the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did 
nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self defense, must be 
limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”19 
 
The Caroline test has been of lasting relevance ever since and it continues to apply in 
the context of military operations, which are discussed below. 
 
Unit self-defence 
Unit self-defence is the right (or according to military doctrines of some states – an 
obligation20) of a commander to take all necessary measures to defend his unit 
against an attack (generally referred to as a hostile act) or an imminent attack (or a 
hostile intent).21 Subject to necessity and proportionality test the unit self-defence 
can be exercised as long as a hostile act or intent continues22 and regardless of the 
source of the threat: armed forces, non-state armed groups, or individual actors.23 
Unit self-defence is particularly important during peacetime when international 
humanitarian law does not apply and soldiers do not act as combatants, hence they 
have no authority to target enemy forces. Consequently, the right of unit self-defence 
is of less practical relevance in armed conflict when combatants are entitled to use 
force to engage enemy combatants and this authority is rooted in international 
humanitarian law and not limited to situations of self-defence. Nevertheless, unit 
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self-defence might still be applicable in armed conflict e.g. in situations where 
military units are attacked by non-combatants 24 
 
Unit self-defence is generally accepted as fundamental to all international military 
codes and rules of engagement.25 Equally to personal self-defence it is considered 
“an inherent right and not dependent or contingent on a mandate or mission.”26 Unit 
self-defence applies exclusively to military units regardless of their size and nature as 
long as they operate as a single organic whole.27 It usually does not apply to the 
protection of non-military personnel and property or to the protection of foreign 
forces.28 Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement  (2009) states though that unit 
self-defence may be extended to units and individuals from other nations if 
authorised by the applicable ROE, which is the case of NATO.29 Arguably however, 
such extension would derive the authorisation to use force from the rules of 
engagement themselves rather than from the right of self-defence in its form of unit 
self-defence. 
 
Although the right to unit self-defence is generally recognised, there is little 
discussion in the literature as to the source of this right. Contributions are divided 
considering unit self-defence either as a distinct individual right based on customary 
international law or as a subset of national self-defence. Dinstein claims that all 
forms of self-defence including unit self-defence, which he calls on-the-spot 
reaction, are emanations of national self-defence since “[t]here is quantitative but not 
qualitative difference between a single unit responding to an armed attack and the 
entire military doing so”.30 Accordingly, counter-force used by military units in 
response to an armed attack is always a manifestation of national self-defence 
deriving its legitimacy from Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary 
international law. Such response is therefore exercised by the state even if a 
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particular action is conducted by a single military unit.31 Other authors oppose this 
interpretation arguing that the right of unit self defence has a legal standing 
independent of national self-defence. Unit self-defence is a distinct right of 
customary international law and its status has been corroborated by state practice and 
opinio juris.32 Military manuals and rules of engagement, where the concept of unit 
self-defence is principally found, characterize it as a “right” and sometimes also an 
“obligation” which is indicative of it being grounded in law rather than in the policy 
preferences of individual states.33 In contrast, and as Dinstein himself admits, 
national self-defence is a right but not a duty. There is no rule of international law 
laying down an obligation for states to exercise self-defence; it is in fact a matter of 
political preferences and considerations of individual states.34 States have the full 
right to defend themselves upon an armed attack, but they might choose not to do it 
for whatever reason. Unit self-defence permits to take action to repel an attack or 
imminent attack but such action must be necessary and proportional, temporally 
interwoven with the event that has triggered it and directed at the source of the attack 
or threat.35 For example, it would not be justified to relay on unit self-defence after 
much (undue) time lapse (even few days might be excessive for on-the-spot 
reaction), or to attack an entity other than that immediately responsible for the attack, 
or to take preventive actions to rule out future threats.36 The immediacy of the 
response in unit self-defence has to comply with the standards set by the Caroline 
incident. The immediacy condition is less compelling in exercising national self-
defence, and as international practice shows, states do not always act “instantly and 
without deliberation” when responding to an armed attack.37 Moreover, the measures 
taken in national self-defence need not to be locally limited to the immediate area of 
the attack but might be directed at military objectives which did not physically 
conducted attack themselves, provided that it can be reasonably expected that the 
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attacks will continue from there.38 These qualitative not just quantitative differences 
in scopes of the responses in unit self-defence and national self-defence justify the 
argument that unit self-defence is a distinct right not dependant on parameters of 
national self-defence. 
 
Extended self-defence 
Extended self-defence is a concept utilized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).39 A definition of extended self-defence in NATO unclassified ROE from 
2003 provides that: 
 
“In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, 
NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the 
use of necessary and proportional force to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from 
attack or imminent attack.”40 
 
Extended self-defence goes beyond unit self-defence as it allows protecting other 
units of other national forces of NATO members. Arguably, it should not be 
qualified as self-defence despite its name, unless these different national forces still 
somehow operate as an “organic whole” and the response to an attack is legitimate 
under national laws. Because national laws differ as to the extent of the right of self-
defence, the reactions of multinational forces will not always be consistent as to 
where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force to accomplish a 
mission as authorised by the mission ROE starts. If such differences exist, the 
mission’s ROE should not be interpreted as limiting the inherent right of self-
defence. 41 The meaning of the word “forces” would also have to be clarified in such 
multinational operations, i.e. whether or not it applies to civilians operating as 
integral members of a troop contributing nation’s commitment.42 On a different level, 
the concept of extended self-defence is linked to the principles of the alliance rather 
than to personal/unit self-defence per se. Given the nature of the NATO as a 
collective defence organisation, the protection/defence of other friendly forces could 
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be subsumed under the concept of collective self-defence grounded in the UN 
Charter and customary law.  
 
3.1.3. Self-defence in the Rome Statute  
 
Self-defence is a legitimate defence under international criminal law as well. The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the first treaty that (partially) 
codifies available defences in Articles 31, 32 and 33. Article 31(1)(c) reads as 
follows: 
 
Article 31 Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, 
a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct: 
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war 
crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which 
is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a 
manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property protected. 
The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself 
constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph 
 
Article 31(1)(c) of the ICC Statute sets forth two conditions which must be met to 
claim this defence: (a) the act must be in response to “an imminent and unlawful use 
of force”; in response to an attack on a “protected” person or property; (b) the act in 
self-defence must be “proportionate to the degree of danger”. These conditions are 
common in national criminal laws that deal with the use of force and there will be no 
shortage of guidance for the Court. The inclusion of property was proposed by the 
United States and Israel during the Rome Conference and was not accepted without 
controversy.43 In it final shape, the defence of property is confined to the cases of 
war crimes; additionally, property defended must be essential for the survival of the 
person or another person or essential for accomplishing a military mission. Upon 
ratification Belgium appended a declaration stating that it considered that Article 
31(1)(c) could only be applied and interpreted “having regard to rules of 
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international humanitarian law which may not be derogated from”.44 This definition, 
while extensive, still meets the limits acceptable by some national laws. Furthermore, 
the Rome Statute distinguishes between collective and individual self-defence. 
Participation in defensive operations does not in itself exclude criminal 
responsibility; any actions in self-defence must remain within the limits defined in 
this article. 
 
The issue of self-defence as a defence in international criminal law was discussed by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Kordic and Cerkez 
case (2001). The Trial Chamber noted that the Statute of the International Tribunal 
did not provide for self-defence as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility; 
however, it observed that ‘defences’ form part of the general principles of criminal 
law and, as such, they must be taken into account by the court. It broadly defined the 
notion of ‘self-defence’ as: 
 
“(…) providing a defence to a person who acts to defend or protect himself or his property (or another 
person or person’s property) against attack, provided that the acts constitute a reasonable, necessary 
and proportionate reaction to the attack.”45  
 
The Chamber recognised that the right of self-defence is preserved in the domestic 
law of every state and also included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court and may be regarded as constituting a rule of customary international law.46 
The Chamber briefly discussed the notion of self-defence as a criminal law defence 
in relation to the question whether defensive action or self-defence may amount to a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility for the commission of serious violations 
of international humanitarian law. It noted that although any argument raising self-
defence must be assessed on its own facts and in the specific circumstances relating 
to the charges, military operations in self-defence do not provide a justification for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.47 
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Whether the definition of self-defence in Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute can be 
applied to actions of peacekeepers is questionable. Since defences codified under the 
Statute are available to the perpetrators of international crimes included in the 
Statute, it seems that peacekeepers would have to first commit one of such crimes 
and then claim that their actions were taken in self-defence. 
 
3.1.4. Rules of engagement 
 
The use of force during armed conflict is governed by international humanitarian law 
and relevant human rights law. Within this legal framework, national law and policy 
may further regulate the use of force in certain operations or situations. These 
regulations come in the form of rules of engagement (ROE). ROE are used for all 
military operations and they provide authorisation for and/or limits on, among other 
things, the degree of force and the circumstances and manner in which the military 
can use it to accomplish the mission.48 ROE are classified, at least for the duration of 
the mission. Accordingly, this section draws primarily on de-classified ROE or 
standard ROE (USA, NATO, UN etc.), the Sanremo Handbook on Rules of 
Engagement (2009) and academic writings. 
 
ROE are issued by a national or international command authority for a particular 
mission in line with exacting politico-legal imperatives and in a direct relationship to 
the overarching purpose of the mission.49 The parameters of the use of force are 
therefore always mission-specific as they take into account the particular mission 
objectives, contemporary political and diplomatic priorities and national and 
international laws. With regard to legal factors, some national laws may restrict the 
use of (deadly) force when protecting others or defending property. States might also 
have different international treaty obligations, the extent of which will tailor the 
employment of certain specific military capabilities. Finally, states might have 
different views on the authority and responsibility of commanders. The bottom line is 
customary international law, which applies to all states and all operations. At the 
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international strategic level, the use of force is generally authorised in accordance 
with the UN Charter (pursuant to the right of self-defence, or authorisation of the 
Security Council). ROE might restrict the use of force below what is allowed by 
national and international law due to political considerations, e.g. some targets might 
be considered too controversial to attack even though they are valid military 
objectives.50 What ROE cannot, however, restrict is the inherent individual right to 
self-defence. The objectives and the extent of force that might be used to achieve 
them will change from mission to mission, but individual self-defence remains 
constant.51 Logically, the use of force in self-defence should not be included in rules 
of engagement; however, military doctrines of some states (e.g. U.S. Standing ROE) 
still cover the use of force in self-defence scenarios. This might be a source of 
confusion regarding a distinction between the amount of force that military personnel 
can use for mission accomplishment and the amount of force they can use to defend 
themselves. Blending the two in one document creates the appearance that the entire 
spectrum of the use of force is contained within ROE, and that the right to self-
defence is a subset of ROE.52 
 
ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines such as executive 
orders, deployment orders, operational plans, or standing directives. Some states like 
USA or Australia regard them as lawful commands and soldiers who disobey them 
are liable to court martial, while other states like Canada or New Zealand regard 
them simply as guidelines to military forces.53 ROE do not assign specific missions 
or tasks, which are assigned through operations orders, nor give tactical 
instructions.54 
 
Rules of engagement in multinational operations 
Given all the variables discussed above, drafting ROE for multinational operations is 
particularly challenging. The right to use force to achieve military or political 
objectives in such operations originates from the mandate of an international 
authority establishing them (e.g. the Security Council in case of UN operations or 
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regional organisations in cases of regional peacekeeping).55 The authorisation to use 
force might be explicit or implied in the tasks mandated to perform and the language 
of the mandate. This authorisation will have to be then filtered down to the level of 
national contingents and fulfilled in accordance with international obligations and 
national laws of contributing states, which is where major frictions occur. ROE 
issued for a multinational operation do not trump national ROE and as a result such 
missions operate according to the dual-key rule: each contingent operates under its 
own national ROE that reflect domestic legal and political constraints and 
additionally is issued with ‘international’ ROE.56 While the attempts are made to 
address the divergences between the two, this happens through negotiations rather 
than finding the lowest common denominator. Any legal or policy differences among 
troop contributing countries need to be identified and factored into the planning and 
conduct of operations so that participating nations would operate under coherent 
ROE arrangements. However, contradictions inevitably occur. Accordingly, some 
nations may issue restrictions or amplifying instructions to supplement ROE for 
multinational operations. Such contradictions sometimes mean that a contingent may 
not be able to perform tasks assigned to it. Consensus on each measure is not critical, 
however, sharing ROE information with the multinational force commander is 
critical.57 
 
In case of current United Nations operations, mission-specific ROE are drafted by 
the Military Staff of DPKO in accordance with the UN Model ROE and the mandate 
of the UN mission. The draft is then reviewed and approved by the Under Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Operations on the advice of the Military Adviser of 
DPKO, the Office of Legal Affairs and the Head of Mission. Such ROE would 
reflect the military objectives of a peacekeeping operation as set out in the relevant 
Security Council resolutions and, if appropriate, any recommendations made in the 
Secretary-General’s relevant reports. ROE assist the Force Commander in 
implementing the military objectives of a peacekeeping mandate. He may review 
ROE, in consultation with the Head of Mission, and recommend any change to 
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UNHQ. If such recommendation is agreed, the Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations issues a formal change or amendment to ROE.58 
 
Such UN-issued ROE will help to synchronize actions of national contingents 
participating in a UN operation; however, as already stated, they do not supersede 
national ROE. States contributing forces to a mission use their own command and 
control structures and ROE.59 Legal responsibilities and authorities of national 
contingents pursuant to their own domestic law follow them into a mission area, 
which is acknowledged through specific agreements made with the UN prior to 
national force participation in an operation.60 The issue of the UN authority at the 
tactical level is examined in more detail in the following section. 
 
3.2. Self-defence in a peacekeeping context 
 
Having set the background on the use of force in self-defence in civilian and military 
contexts and the use of force for mission accomplishment as regulated by ROE, 
which will be the main point of reference for the remainder of this chapter, the study 
will now move to an analysis of self-defence in the realm of peacekeeping.  
 
The peacekeeping principle of non-use of force except in self-defence, as much as 
peacekeeping, are by-products of a dysfunctional collective security system in the 
Cold War era when enforcement measures could not be agreed upon.61 In this light 
the principle should be considered on both state and individual-level. On a macro-
level, non-use of force and two other core principles were essential to emphasise the 
difference between peacekeeping and enforcement and to honour state sovereignty 
and comply with the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. As explained 
in the proceeding chapter, peacekeeping was originally regarded as a provisional 
measure that should not prejudice an outcome to a dispute or distort a political and 
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military balance in a conflict. A peacekeeping mission had neither a designated 
enemy nor any military goals to achieve. What follows from this presupposition is 
that on a micro-level the force could only be used in self-defence and not to achieve 
any military objective or to defeat any party.62 Peacekeepers had the right to defend 
themselves but they were not permitted to use force on their own initiative so to 
avoid getting involved in the conflict as this could jeopardise impartiality of the 
mission and consent of the parties. The differentiation of peacekeeping at its 
inception from an enforcement action was based on sound political, legal and 
practical reasoning, which still cannot be overstated. Apart from their vital political 
importance, the core characteristics of peacekeeping seem to be regarded as having 
become legal principles, which can be inferred from the way the United Nations is 
struggling to operate within the self-imposed limits of consent, impartiality and non-
use of force except in self-defence. Rather than doing away with these principles in 
the changed geo-political setting, they have been redefined to meet new political and 
operational demands of the post-Cold War era. The first expansion in the use of force 
happened already in 1973 when the concept of the defence of the mission was 
coined, although not much used until the end of the Cold War. Since 1990s the use of 
(coercive) force has been so justified. The scholarship on the topic highlights the 
complexity and controversy of this addition to the use of force in peacekeeping.63 
The commentators argue that the definition of self-defence under UN law differs 
from its usual legal meaning, that it has been extended to cover the use of force not 
only to defend oneself but also to effectively carry out peacekeeping mandates 
without the need to resort to enforcement measures.64 This section will analyse the 
extent to which peacekeeping missions can use force in self-defence and defence of 
the mandate to prove that such an extension has indeed occurred on the political level 
of peacekeeping as an extension of one of its defining principles on the use of force, 
but not on a micro-individual level as an extension of peacekeepers’ right to personal 
self-defence. It will be argued that the category of peacekeeping operations 
encompasses “traditional” missions where force is used in self-defence only as well 
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as “robust” operations where force is used also to “defend the mandate”. The latter 
use of force does not transform a peacekeeping operation into an enforcement action 
since military force is used at the tactical level only and is not directed against a host-
state, whose consent is still secured. At the same time it will be proven in this section 
that the scope of the right to personal self-defence and unit self-defence in a 
peacekeeping context does not depart from its usual legal meaning as described in 
the background section. The right to self-defence is still exercised within the limits of 
national laws of states participating in peacekeeping operations. To arrive at these 
conclusions, the use of force in self-defence and defence of the mandate will be 
carefully analysed from three interrelated perspectives: the practice of the Security 
Council’s authorisations, doctrinal justifications and rules of engagement, which 
regulate the use of force on a tactical level. 
 
3.2.1. Defence of the mandate 
 
The emergence of “defence of the mission/defence of the mandate” 
Although very narrowly delineated by Hammarskjo !ld in the Summary Study of the 
UNEF experience, the concept of self-defence was from the beginning prone to 
different interpretations. As the Secretary-General noted himself, “[t]here will always 
remain, of course, a certain margin of freedom for judgement, as, for example, on the 
extent and nature of the arming of the units and of their right to self-defence.”65 With 
the exception of the ONUC mission in the Congo in 1960s,66 the strict parameters of 
using force only in self-defence were generally applied in the following missions. 
The change came along with two missions, in Cyprus and Lebanon, which witnessed 
the expansion of the rule of non-use of force except in self-defence to encompass “a 
much wider variety of possibilities, known collectively as ‘defence of the 
mission’.”67 
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UNFICYP (1964-present) 
The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in 1964 in the civil 
war between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus.68 The resolution setting 
up the mission did not contain any guidelines on the use of force; they were provided 
a month later in the Secretary-General’s aide-memoire and drew heavily on the 
ONUC’s Operations Directive no. 6 of 28 October 1960.69 The memorandum 
contains general principles for the function and operation of the Force, principles of 
self-defence and protection against individual or organised attack, and arrangements 
concerning cease-fire agreements. The first hint at the circumstances in which the 
force might be used appears under the header “Guiding principles”: 
 
10. The troops of the Force carry arms which, however, are to be employed only for self-defence, 
should this become necessary in the discharge of its function, in the interest of preserving 
international peace and security, of seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and contributing to the 
maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. 
 
Using arms in self-defence in the “discharge of its function” is the first move away 
from the static scenario of a peacekeeping mission simply reacting in self-defence to 
an armed attack on themselves or the positions they occupy. This change is further 
elaborated in the section “Principles of self-defence”. At the outset, however, taking 
initiative in the use of armed force by peacekeepers is explicitly ruled out. The use of 
armed force is permissible only in self-defence, which is defined in paragraph 16 as 
including: 
 
(a) the defence of United posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack; 
(b) the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack. 70 
 
This definition does not really depart from a classic understanding of self-defence in 
a military context. The second sub-paragraph might be regarded as innovative in a 
sense that the general category of “other personnel” can well include civilian 
personnel, which is so clarified in paragraph 18(d) (see further below). Yet, given 
that they are all personnel of UNFICYP, members of one peacekeeping mission, the 
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extension (of protection) might be justified. The following paragraphs of the same 
section “Principles of self-defence” are the crux of the matter and the reason why the 
commentators and the UN itself71 talk about the expansion of the self-defence 
concept: 
 
17. No action is to be taken by the troops of UNFICYP which is likely to bring them into direct 
conflict with either community in Cyprus, except in the following circumstances: 
(a) where members of the Force are compelled to act in self-defence; 
(b) where the safety of the Force or of members of it is in jeopardy; 
(c) where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have been, or in the opinion of the 
commander on the spot are about to be, violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering 
law and order. 
18. When acting in self-defence, the principle of minimum force shall always be applied, and armed 
force will be used only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed. The decision as to when 
force may be used under these circumstances rests with the commander on the spot whose main 
concern will be to distinguish between an incident which does not require fire to be opened and those 
situations in which troops may be authorised to use force. Examples in which troops may be so 
authorised are: 
(a) attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders 
from their commanders, or to infiltrate or envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their 
commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardizing their safety; 
(b) attempts by force to disarm them; 
(c) attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their 
commanders; and 
(d) violation by force of UN posts, premises and vehicles and attempts to arrest or abduct UN 
personnel, civil or military. 72 
(…) 
Protection against individual or organised attack  
20. (…) If, despite these warnings, attempts are made to attack, envelop or infiltrate UNFICYP 
positions, thus jeopardizing the safety of troops in the area, they will defend themselves and their 
positions by restricting and driving off the attackers with minimum force.73 
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Heralded as an expansion of the notion of self-defence74, this fragment might also be 
interpreted differently. A careful and systemic reading of all above cited paragraphs 
suggests that rather than substantially expanding the definition of self-defence, the 
Secretary-General’s Note lists possible circumstances which might lead to or involve 
self-defence scenarios, including preventing peacekeepers from being disarmed and 
their posts and installations from being besieged.  
 
It is not (instantly) clear what is meant by “direct conflict” with communities or 
“action” in paragraph 17. Among three examples, which could potentially result in 
such “direct conflict”, the use of force is allowed only in the first one – acts in self-
defence, and this is due to the restrictive stipulation in paragraph 16 as already 
discussed. Arguably, actions taken in the circumstances specified in point (b) could 
come close to the anticipatory form of self-defence. Regarding point (c), the troops 
of UNFICYP could take “action” if “specific arrangements have been, or are about to 
be, violated”. Nothing in the sub-paragraph suggests though, that the troops are 
allowed to use force in such instances. It is not subsumed under self-defence which 
allows such use but listed separately as an alternative. 
 
Paragraph 18 speaks about the minimum force to be used when acting in self-defence 
and after all peaceful means of persuasion have failed. A decision on the course of 
action was to be taken by a commander on the spot, but a non-exhaustive list of 
examples justifying the use of armed force in self-defence was provided. This was 
the first time the Secretary-General publicly explained the range of situations in 
which UN peacekeepers were authorised to use force in self-defence.75 It should 
again be read in line with paragraph 16 on self-defence in response to an armed 
attack. Accordingly, all these instances listed would have to amount to such attack. 
Whether or not that expanded the self-defence norm is disputable. What it 
undoubtedly did though, was to indicate that the peacekeeping mission/force could 
adopt a more active posture without moving to combat (a middle ground between 
UNEF I and ONUC). Indeed, it was a change in initial and still quite common 
perception of peacekeeping as a static cease-fire monitoring business. As remarked 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 M Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’ (1993) 69 (3) International Affairs 
451, 455 
75 T Findlay (n 1) 93 
! 144 
by Moskos, these guidelines rest on the assumption that peacekeepers might pursue 
more dynamic activities which obviously increase the likelihood of force being used 
in self-defence while on duty.76 Self-defence would be situation-specific and not 
necessarily limited to defence against an unprovoked attack.77 Whether carrying out 
“responsibilities as ordered by the commanders” could be regarded as provoking 
situations that might lead to the use of armed force is again disputable. The 
memorandum tries to limit any such possibility of provocation by prohibiting taking 
initiative in the use of force or taking actions that might bring peacekeepers into a 
“direct conflict” with the communities, as already discussed, and also by upholding 
the requirement of utilising peaceful means, issuing warnings and finally using only 
minimum force as a last resort. Overall, the new guidelines allowed for a more 
independent and less passive posture of peacekeepers than in the past.78 
 
The UN Emergency Force II (1973–79) 
A second UN peacekeeping mission regarded as having expanded the use of force 
concept is the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II).79 It was established in 
October 1973 in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 340 
(1973) and operated till July 1979. UNEF II was mandated to supervise the ceasefire 
between Egyptian and Israeli forces at the end of Yom Kippur War and to control the 
buffer zones established under peace agreements. Given this mandate, UNEF II was 
designed as a standard cease-fire monitoring mission and in practice proved to be a 
fairly traditional peacekeeping operation; yet, the use of force guidelines issued by 
the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim moved a step further than troubled UNFICYP 
and introduced a “defence of the mission”. Paragraph 4 of his Report to the Security 
Council stipulates as follows: 
 
(d) The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It shall not use force 
except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent 
it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on 
the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all necessary steps for compliance with the 
decisions of the Security Council. 
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(e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality and will avoid actions 
which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned which in way affect the 
implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973) and operative paragraph 1 of 
resolution 339 (1973).80 
 
As apparent, sub-paragraph (d) patterns U Thant’s guidelines for UNFICYP although 
with some important changes. It explicitly states that force shall be used only in self-
defence but that self-defence includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to 
prevent the mission from discharging its duties as mandated by the Security Council. 
Previously force was authorised to defend the “responsibilities” or the “positions” of 
the mission as ordered by the force commander, whereas here “the authority of the 
Security Council itself was invoked to raise matters to a higher plane.”81 This move 
‘upwards’ allowed more room and flexibility for action; however, in doing so, the 
Force was supposed to remain impartial and avoid pursuing any agenda that could 
prejudice the rights or claims of the parties. Making a direct link between the use of 
force by peacekeepers and the Security Council might have also been necessary to 
provide a legal basis for expanding the concept of the use of force in peacekeeping, 
even if it was masked as self-defence. 
 
This new notion, named “defence of the mission” or “defence of the mandate” was 
approved by the Security Council and copied by all subsequent UN peacekeeping 
operations.82 It has triggered much debate in the United Nations itself and in 
academic circles about its precise meaning and consequences it might produce.83 
Defence of the mandate has been generally regarded as giving peacekeepers a much 
stronger basis to react to interference but also, and paradoxically, making the 
application of self-defence more hazardous and more difficult.84 It has been argued 
that defence of the mission does not differ from peace enforcement as the force 
might simply be used to impose a decision of the Security Council on a warring party 
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or parties.85 Moskos hints at the calculations to go around the ban on initiating fire 
towards fulfilment of the mission: 
 
“While fire cannot be initiated under any circumstances by UN troops, such troops can be ordered to 
perform missions which may draw fire. In that event, return fire may be allowable. (…) If the mission 
is to be pursued, however, the peacekeeping commander must seek to maneuver his men initially into 
a tactically defensive posture from which armed self-defense then becomes permissible (…) 
Calculations become very fine indeed when trying to determine what are the outer boundaries to 
which a peacekeeping mission can be pushed without [provoking] attack.”86 
  
With this remark in mind the plausibility of unprovoked attacks appears even more 
evident than in case of UNFICYP. In UNFICYP, the use of force guidelines allowed 
the mission to take a more independent and more dynamic course of action; however, 
they did not seem to cross the Rubicon as in no context, either civilian or military, 
does self-defence require to adopt a totally passive posture in order to be able to 
justify the use of force to preserve oneself. If individuals go around their usual 
legitimate business in good faith, this criminal law defence should still be available 
to them. While the legitimacy is provided by the Security Council resolution, the 
issue of good faith seems problematic in the light of Moskos’ observations; the line 
will always be a fine one to draw and case-specific. The Secretary-General’s Report, 
unchallenged by the Security Council, gave the green light to forceful reactions to 
forceful attempts to prevent the peacekeeping mission from fulfilling its mandate. 
The defence of the tasks/duties as mandated by the Security Council would 
presumably be allowed also when lives of peacekeepers were not put in immediate 
danger but only their mission sabotaged. The question whether the new concept has 
in fact expanded the meaning of self-defence, and more importantly, whether it is 
even possible to change/modify the meaning of the inherent right to self-defence is 
an important one to ask. The alternative reading points at the expansion of the 
general doctrine on the use of force in peacekeeping and the new distinct right to 
defend the mandate, even if introduced/promulgated through the backdoor of self-
defence. 
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“Defence of the mandate” in the Security Council resolutions 
No follow-up explanation of what the defence of a peacekeeping mission/mandate 
means in practice was given after UNEF II, nor was it put into use and its boundaries 
tested for the next twenty years. It was not until the end of the Cold War when the 
defence of the mission was called into question in mid-1990s, primarily in Bosnia 
and Somalia. The application of the defence of the mandate concept went in pair with 
blurring of the traditional distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement actions. 
Peacekeeping missions were deployed without consent or cooperation of the parties, 
who sometimes could not even be clearly defined, and in the absence of an effective 
ceasefire. The increasingly complex and hostile environments brought about new 
challenging tasks such as securing freedom of movement, delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, disarmament, protection of safe areas or protection of civilians. These 
tasks tested the established practices of peacekeeping especially the circumstances in 
which peacekeepers could open fire.87 The Security Council resolutions were 
ambiguous and the ‘defence of the mandate’ principle was implemented 
inconsistently within and between the missions.88 Discrepancies related to Chapter 
VII authorisations to use of force in self-defence and mandating peacekeeping forces 
to perform tasks which could have required more proactive use of force than just in 
self-defence. For example, as the situation deteriorated in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1993, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter proclaimed 
six “safe areas”, which aimed at protecting the civilian population, and decided to 
“ensure full respect for these areas”.89 While refraining from explicitly mandating 
UNPROFOR to use force to protect the safe areas, the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations decided to:  
  
5. (…) extend to that end the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas referred 
to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to 
promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to 
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participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 
(1992) of 14 September 1992;90 
 
It also authorised UNPROFOR 
9. (…) in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 776 
(1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defence, to take the 
necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas, by 
any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or 
around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian 
convoys.”91 
 
Later the UNPROFOR was authorised also under Chapter VII: 
“(…) in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the 
necessary measures including the use of force, to ensure its security and freedom of movement”.92 
 
In Rwanda in 1994, however, the Security Council did not refer to Chapter VII or 
explicitly authorised UNAMIR to use force in self-defence recognising that: 
 “UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten 
protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of 
delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief”93 
 
Logically, acting in self-defence, even if it includes the use of (armed) force, should 
not require authorisation under Chapter VII as it is an inherent right of every 
individual to defend oneself. If the right to self-defence had indeed been expanded 
under UN law to include the defence of the mandate without changing the nature of a 
peacekeeping operation, it should not have required authorisation under Chapter VII 
either. Such authorisation is normally reserved for enforcement, unless we assume 
that the reference to Chapter VII was in fact linked to the establishment of the 
peacekeeping operation. As the above cited resolutions show, the Security Council 
was responding in improvised fashion to events on the ground entrusting 
peacekeepers with dangerous tasks under mixed Chapter VI and Chapter VII 
authorisations, contradictory calling for the taking of ‘all necessary measures’ while 
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restricting the use of force to self-defence.94 The restrictive mandates stipulated that 
peacekeepers defending safe areas, freedom of movement or delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, could use force only to reply to attacks. This implies that if 
they themselves were not directly threatened by attacks, they should decline to act. In 
reality attacks on the safe areas were unlikely to be deterred only by the use of force 
in self-defence.95 Various contingents of UNPROFOR sometimes intentionally 
positioned themselves in the line of fire when Serb forces bombarded Bosnian towns, 
so that they could legally return fire as a form of self-defence to protect the civilian 
population.96 Such actions in self-defence can become, in strategy and tactics, 
indistinguishable from a standard military campaign, and in the case of UNPROFOR, 
they unintentionally amounted to interfering in a war by depriving one party of a 
strategic outcome of the seizure of few urban areas without that party’s consent.97 It 
has to be admitted that in such circumstances controlling the continuum of violence 
and reactions of those engaged is very difficult and drawing a difference between 
actions in self-defence and beyond is likely to be tactically indistinguishable.  
 
The United Nations struggled within these self-imposed limits on the use of force in 
peacekeeping trying to achieve mission’s humanitarian and protective goals as by-
products of acting in self-defence. In violent conflicts these challenging tasks 
demanded more than just reactive posture to which self-defence with minor 
modifications would still be limited. The failures in Somalia, Rwanda and 
Srebrenica, especially the failure to prevent genocide, led to a re-evaluation of the 
principle of using force only in self-defence. The Security Council seemed to have 
recognised that complex political tasks can only be achieved in secure environment 
and started to follow a practice of providing clearer mandates including, where 
necessary, an authorisation to use force under Chapter VII in specifically defined 
circumstances.98 The phrase “all necessary means” or “all necessary measures” has 
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become a shibboleth of the use of force beyond self-defence.99 An example of this 
new practice of the Security Council was the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), which was the first peacekeeping mission explicitly mandated to 
protect civilians. UNAMSIL was established by the Security Council in October 
1999 i.a. to monitor implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to assist the 
Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration plan; to provide support to the elections; to facilitate 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance.100 Additionally, the mission acquired a 
Chapter VII authorisation to “take the necessary action” in the discharge of its 
mandate: 
 
14 (…) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities 
and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, 
taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG;101 
 
Another example was the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) primarily set up to ensure the compliance with the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In this case the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII decided that MONUC:  
 
8. (…) may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it 
deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, 
installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and 
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;102 
 
Effectively, the use of force has been authorised in consensual peacekeeping 
operations to fulfil certain aspect of their mandates, e.g. to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of violence. The concept of the defence of the mandate/mission has 
not only been upheld but also given some teeth in the form of a Chapter VII 
authorisation. For example, in the case of East Timor, the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was created under Chapter 
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VII and explicitly authorised “to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”.103 
The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which replaced 
UNTAET, was authorised under Chapter VII “to take necessary actions, for the 
duration of its mandate, to fulfil its mandate.”104 Similarly, the United Nations 
Operations in Co !te d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was authorised under Chapter VII “to use all 
necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of 
deployment”.105 
 
In “robust” missions acting in self-defence and beyond to fulfil the mandate can 
happen to be increasingly intertwined. From the perspective of mission 
accomplishment it might not be so important to disentangle the precise role of the 
use o force. If kept within limits of the mandate’s objectives, the use of force is 
legitimate at the international level since it finds its legal basis either in the inherent 
right of self-defence or a binding decision of the Security Council adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In order to define more precisely the boundaries of 
the use of force in self-defence and defence of the mandate, the study moves on to an 
analysis of how the practice of the Security Council’s authorisations to use force has 
been supported by a military doctrine and translated into rules of engagement.  
 
3.2.2. Is there a United Nations military doctrine? 
 
The practice of the Security Council of explicitly or implicitly authorising the use of 
force beyond self-defence to fulfil the mandate has not been accompanied by a 
coherent military doctrine. A military doctrine is the compilation of experience and 
belief about “the best way to conduct military affairs.”106 A doctrine generally directs 
the action by providing a common frame of reference across the military rather than 
a set of fixed rules. NATO glossary of 2013 defines a doctrine as “fundamental 
principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It 
is authoritative but requires judgement in application”.107 The United Nations 
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engaged in peacekeeping without a proper doctrinal background on the use of force. 
The distinction between Chapter VI peaceful measures and Chapter VII enforcement 
actions was widely understood and Hammarskjo !ld’s Summary Study with its 
pioneering conceptualisation of the principles of traditional peacekeeping - consent, 
impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence - remained the conventional 
wisdom. The Security Council resolutions never offered any guidance on the use of 
force. They were repeating the standard wording about self-defence and later the 
defence of the mission and leaving the details for the Secretary General to address in 
background reports. For years there was no model ROE on which missions could 
rely nor any official UN training manuals to guide potential troop contributors.108 
The reasons for this state of affairs were few. Peacekeeping was first born in practice 
and its theoretical framework was built based on these practical experiences; even 
though rudimentary, it proved supportable for many years. It was only in the 1990s 
when the quantitative growth in activity and its qualitative evolution, especially in 
the realm of the use of force, outstripped the doctrinal justifications. The reflection 
first came after major failures revealing the limitations of the instrument in use. 
Nevertheless, the UN chose to approach the matter pragmatically rather than 
dogmatically. Since the 1992 Agenda for Peace few other reports were issued by 
successive Secretaries-General and commissioned groups of experts, as well as 
internal manuals, all of which obviously advanced the debate but more in a form of 
lessons learned rather than a comprehensive doctrine. The peacekeeping practice 
seems to be always one step ahead of the peacekeeping theory. The difficulties in 
conceptualising peacekeeping are caused not only by the fast-paced reality on the 
ground but are also compounded by highly politically divisive issues of what 
ultimately is to be achieved through peacekeeping and how. As an instrument of the 
multilateral political organisation peacekeeping functions in a realm of partial control 
and competing priorities, which also makes it incapable of being used to conduct 
offensive military operations.109 For these reasons UN Member States were always 
reluctant to agree on a military doctrine, although few such attempts were made. 
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In 1995 the UN published The General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations 
designed for training purposes.110 Despite the developments in Bosnia and Somalia 
in the background, the General Guidelines were restricted to “traditional 
peacekeeping” and did not try to introduce any wider concept of the use of force. The 
document discusses the use of force in self-defence explaining that: 
  
“The peace-keeper’s right to self-defence does not end with the defence of his/her own life. It includes 
defending one’s comrades and any persons entrusted in one’s care, as well as defending one’s post, 
convoy, vehicle, or rifle. Each peace-keeping operation is expected to function as a single, integrated 
unit and an attack on any one of its members or subunits engages the right to self-defence of the 
operation as a whole.”111  
 
This is an important clarification, akin to the definition of unit self-defence in a 
military context. Although it does not mention a protection/defence of civilian 
components, it views a peacekeeping operation as a single integrated whole, which 
leaves space for a future concept of integrated multidimensional missions. A 
protection of “any persons entrusted in one’s care” similarly provides such a 
possibility and is potentially open-ended. The General Guidelines refer also to the 
concept of the defence of the mandate introduced in 1973 but fail to operationalise its 
precise meaning. Instead, the document observes that in practice the commanders 
were reluctant to use their authority to defend peacekeeping mandates fearing the 
loss of consent and cooperation of the parties to a conflict.112 At the strategic level, 
the General Guidelines maintain the traditional divide between peacekeeping and 
enforcement repeating after the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace that “peace-
keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative 
techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum. There is no easy transition 
from one to the other”.113 At the tactical level, the General Guidelines do not address 
the fact that different contingents of a peacekeeping operation use different ROE, 
which differently delineate the parameter of the use of force, bitter lesson from 
Somalia where participating contingents were unfamiliar of each other’s ROE and 
could not react in a concerted manner.114 
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Next in line, the Brahimi Report (2000),115 an unprecedented examination and 
critical review of peacekeeping practice came up with many recommendations on 
reforms to enhance military effectiveness, planning and support, rapid deployment 
and the use of force. It tackled many dilemmas that peace operations were confronted 
with and the principles it laid down remain central to modern peacekeeping.116 It 
advocated more robust ROE, focused on capabilities and effectiveness of the 
missions to defend themselves and their mandates but failed to offer a new 
comprehensive military doctrine for peacekeeping operations. 
 
In 2003 the UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit published a Handbook on United 
Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. The Handbook was intended to 
serve as an introduction to the different components of multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations. In the section on a military component it points out the fact 
that although armed forces of states operate under national doctrines, their actions in 
UN peacekeeping operations are governed by certain principles including the 
appropriate use of force.117 Military forces under UN command would not usually be 
required to use force beyond that necessary for self-defence which is defined as the 
right to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons 
under UN protection.118 This definition, even if broad enough to include the defence 
of property, does not trespass the limits set by national laws. The Handbook notes 
that the use of force by the military component will depend on the mandate and rules 
of engagement. It admits that the force may be used beyond self-defence, which 
would have to be authorised by the Security Council and then specified by rules of 
engagement for a particular peacekeeping operation.119 
 
The closest the UN has ever got to a doctrine was in 2008 when “United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” were released. Whether or not 
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Principles and Guidelines constitute a military doctrine is disputable. It should be 
noted that although commonly referred to as Capstone Doctrine, they are not 
officially titled as such. They were published as an internal document of DPKO/DFS, 
which weakens their significance and authority. While announced as the guidance 
document sitting “at the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United 
Nations peacekeeping”, they were at the same time introduced with a caveat that they 
do not seek to override national military doctrines of individual Member States 
participating in peacekeeping operations.120 Principles and Guidelines reflect the 
multi-dimensional nature of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations 
and accordingly, they cover the entire spectrum of peacekeeping activities of which 
the use of force is only one component. Building upon lessons learned and the 
accumulated institutional knowledge, including the analysis contained in the Brahimi 
Report and other existing sources, Capstone Doctrine presents a codification rather 
than a transformative agenda. It restates and clarifies the basic principles that should 
guide the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations, remarking though that 
specific application of these principles will require judgement and will vary 
according to the situation on the ground.121 The holy trinity of peacekeeping: 
consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the 
mandate, is reaffirmed and provided with a contemporary understanding of how it 
should be employed in practice. With regard to the principle of non-use of force, the 
document re-interprets it to apply to the strategic level as a non-use of enforcement. 
Peacekeeping should remain a consent-based and non-aggressive activity at the 
strategic and international level, meant to support a peace process and not to enforce 
it. Peacekeeping operations might, however, take a robust form at the tactical level, 
precisely to support this peace process, to defend the mission and the mandate from 
spoilers and criminals. Its core business is to create a secure and stable environment 
to facilitate the political process. Within this context the primary distinction between 
peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping is thus about the objectives of the use of 
force and less about how much force is being used, although certain caveats are 
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stipulated.122 The use of force at the tactical level requires the authorisation of the 
Security Council, “if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate”.123 The 
reference to the authority of the Security Council in context of self-defensive use of 
force is surprising though, as the right to self-defence, as extensively analysed in the 
background section of this chapter, exists regardless of such authorisations. 
However, as also discussed in the proceeding part, it can be interpreted that the 
defence of mission personnel and defence of the mandate are very often interlocked 
hence using them together in one commonly repeated phrase. Since Capstone 
Doctrine does not provide its own definition of self-defence, a conclusion might be 
drawn that it does not seek to supersede the definitions provided in preceding UN 
documents, which do not depart from the standard meaning. With regard to the 
defence of the mandate, it is said that the “robust” mandates would authorise to “use 
all necessary means” against criminal gangs and spoilers “to deter forceful attempts 
to disrupt the political process, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order”.124 The 
doctrine allows for the proactive use of force in defence of the mandate; at the same 
time however, it places certain restrictions such as exhaustion of other means of 
persuasion and restraint in using force. 
 
“The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace 
process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat. The use of force by a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate 
manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while 
sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. In its use of force, a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation should always be mindful of the need for an early de-escalation of violence and a return to 
non-violent means of persuasion.”125 
 
This is an important pronouncement on the objective of the use of force, which in 
peacekeeping is governed by a different logic than in a standard warfare. 
Peacekeeping operations do not aim at militarily defeating any enemy because there 
is no enemy designated at the strategic level who would be a legitimate target of 
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lethal force at all times. The principle of “the minimum force necessary to achieve a 
desired effect” runs contrary to the standard practice of a regular army to apply 
maximum force it is capable of applying. This fundamental repurposing of how to 
apply military force is spurred by the clear intention to keep peacekeeping separate 
from war-fighting. The commentators remain doubtful though as to whether 
Capstone’s distinction between the use of force at the tactical and strategic level is 
tenable in the real world.126 Even the use of force at the lowest tactical level of 
deployment might have unforeseen political implications on a strategic plane. 
Another difficulty is to differentiate between plain criminal gangs and militias with 
political agenda linked to one of the parties to the conflict, or even to the host 
government, the problem that MONUC had to face.127 If a peacekeeping mission is 
confronted with the latter type, and especially in the situation where such groups 
systematically target the civilian population, not defeating them through military 
force might effectually mean failing to fulfil the protective mandate. A third 
challenge is to be able to respond in a unified and concerted way. Peacekeeping 
forces are composed of different national contingents trained in different military 
cultures, with diverse fighting capabilities and battle experience, and which 
accordingly reply differently to threats and attacks.128 The last and maybe the 
primary challenge is to generally safeguard that trained military would react 
according to a different logic they are familiar with - the one of persuasion, minimum 
use of force and de-escalation. 
 
In the light of the above review, the 2008 Principles and Guidelines seem to come 
close to a doctrine, even if not officially endorsed, as they offer a general framework 
to guide the operations and basic principles to govern the use of force. They give the 
green light to the use of force upon the authorisation of the Security Council to 
defend a peacekeeping mandate at the tactical level albeit in calibrated and limited 
manner; yet apart from these instructions, they do not operationalise the “defence of 
the mandate” concept. They do not go into details of military tactics, techniques and 
procedures, as this is not a job of a doctrine to give exact clarifications of the 
different levels of force to be used in various circumstances. These matters are 
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regulated by rules of engagement for the military and directives on the use of force 
for the police components and Capstone Doctrine explicitly states that they remain 
the prerogative of individual Member States.129 The use of force at the tactical level, 
precisely where ROE are applied, is thus the cutting edge in this discussion. The 
Security Council resolutions authorising the use of force in self-defence and defence 
of the mandate do not operationalize such uses. The UN peacekeeping doctrine 
excludes the use of force at the strategic level; at the same time however, it does not 
provide any specific parameters of the use of force at the tactical level, only general 
principles and guidelines. Effectually, everything boils down to rules of engagement. 
Given that applying force is restricted in peacekeeping operations, rules of 
engagement seem even more critical as they would have to be subject to a different 
logic than the military is normally subject to in war. The next section will look at the 
unclassified UN Model ROE to investigate any possible extension of the right to self-
defence on this last tactical level of a peacekeeping operation. 
 
3.2.3. The United Nations Model Rules of Engagement 
 
Rules of engagement are critical in planning of any military operation. The United 
Nations have always used rules of engagement to regulate the use of force in its 
peace operations, although they have not always been named as such and knowledge 
of them was often limited to the military.130 In late 1990s the UN Secretariat, DPKO 
and OLA engaged in consultations with UN Member States and the ICRC to come 
up with model ROE to help the UN quickly produce mission-specific ROE for future 
missions and for training purposes.131 Due to prolonging process of consultations and 
fundamental disagreements over the content, the Secretary-General announced in 
2002 Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations132 (thereafter UN Guidelines for ROE) as a 
working document subject to periodic review, which would be used provisionally by 
the military planning staff of the DPKO. The document is intended to safeguard that 
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the use of force by UN armed military personnel is undertaken in accordance with 
the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council mandate, and 
the relevant principles of international law including international humanitarian 
law.133 The doubts might be cast though on the authority of this “working document” 
and given the classified nature of operation-specific ROE, it is also difficult to assess 
its impact since it was announced. 
 
A basic format of ROE as provided in the UN Guidelines for ROE contains the 
outline of the mandate, a list of numbered ROE, definitions, supporting directions 
and procedures, and weapon states. Sample ROE attached to ROE Guidelines spells 
out under “Execution of ROE” header basic principles applicable to peacekeeping 
operations including inter alia the duty to warn and challenge; to try alternatives to 
the use of force; the principle of minimum and proportional force; military necessity; 
avoidance of collateral damage; the principle of self-defence. Despite the restrictions 
on the use of force, UN military are not expected to be as reactive as they have 
traditionally been - the guidelines stipulate that that a greater degree of force can be 
used to pre-empt escalation in order to minimise the cost in terms of UN casualties 
and civilian casualties.134 With respect to self-defence the UN Guidelines for ROE 
clearly enunciate in the introductory part that any UN guidelines/directive(s) in no 
way restricts an individual’s inherent right to act in self-defence. The principle of 
self-defence is further explained in Sample ROE as follows: 
 
Self-Defence 
(a) Nothing in these ROE negates a Commander’s right and obligation to take all necessary and 
appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.  
(b) Pre-emptive self-defence against an anticipated attack must be supported by credible evidence or 
information that justifies a reasonable belief that hostile units or persons are about to attack. 
(c) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals or by individual units that 
are under attack or in danger of being attacked, as well as by other UN forces that are able to assist 
those individuals or individual units. Potentially hostile forces which are beyond the range of their 
known weapon systems or which are not closing on friendly forces are not to be attacked without 
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authority from a superior commander or clear and credible evidence or information that justifies a 
reasonable belief that a hostile act from those forces is imminent.135 
 
Definitions annexed to Sample ROE stipulate the following: 
 
Self-defence - is the use of such necessary and reasonable force, including deadly force, by an 
individual or unit in order to protect oneself, one’s unit and all UN personnel against a hostile act or 
hostile intent. 
 
In the earlier version of UN Guidelines for ROE from 2000 this definition is 
accompanied by the following explanation: 
 
The definition of self-defence has deliberately been restricted. As such it does not reflect the broad 
definition of self-defence which has prevailed in recent years and pursuant to which, self-defence 
included, as relevant, the protection of other international personnel. The definition will have to be 
addressed, on a case by case basis, to ensure that it is consistent with the mandate of the operation 
concerned as set out in the relevant Security Council Resolutions.136 
 
As apparent, this definition does not depart from the usual meaning of self-defence in 
national criminal laws. It does recognise the military context of peacekeeping 
operations and is adjusted accordingly to include in its core the unit self-defence. The 
possible variations that occur in national laws concern the extent to which self-
defence encompasses the defence of others and whether or not it includes also the 
defence of property. With respect to the first issue, the definition speaks of defending 
“all UN personnel”, who in annexed Definitions are defined as all members of UN 
peacekeeping operation (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), UN 
officials and experts on mission on official visits. This does not necessarily represent 
any extension of the personal scope of self-defence given the peacekeeping context. 
“Unit” is a generic term in a sense that its exact qualitative and quantitative 
denotation might vary depending on the circumstances and is only limited by the 
requirement that a “unit” must operate as one organic whole. As already discussed, a 
peacekeeping mission is currently composed of different components – military, 
police and civilian – but still considered to operate as one organic whole. A potential 
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danger of extending the right to use force in defence of all UN mission personnel 
spread throughout the country is arguable minimal as unit self-defence has to 
conform to the constraints of the Caroline principles and therefore will be always 
limited in time and space. Any further extension over “other international 
personnel”137 will have to be supported by a peacekeeping mandate, which suggests 
that its legal basis would be found in the authorisation of the Security Council, rather 
than in the inherent right of self-defence itself. The defence of property is not 
included in the UN definition; however, there is a reference to it in the numbered 
ROE (explained further below). 
 
The UN Guidelines for ROE contain a Master List of Numbered ROE, where a 
reference to self-defence can also be found. The list comprises the rules from which 
specific ROE should be selected for future peacekeeping operations. It is not meant 
to be exhaustive and might be subject to adjustments. The rules are grouped in four 
sets: Use of Force (Rule 1), Use of Weapons System (Rule 2), Authority to Carry 
Weapons (Rule 3), Reaction to Civil Action/Unrest (Rule 4). They permit UN armed 
military personnel to use force, if so authorised, in certain specified circumstances 
and in varying degrees, and with a caveat that the principle of the minimum 
necessary force is to be observed at all times. The first cluster of rules entitled “Use 
of Force” encompasses different contingencies that have confronted UN 
peacekeeping operations so far. The use of force in personal self-defence appears 
among other uses of force and is not singled out with any ‘self-defence’ header: 
 
1.1. Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN personnel against 
a hostile act or a hostile intent is authorised. 
1.2. Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend other international personnel against a 
hostile act or a hostile intent is authorised. 
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As the footnote to the second rule explains, it can only be included to rule 1.1 if 
consistent with the mandate of a UN peacekeeping operation, which is in line with 
the restricted definition of self-defence in annexed Definitions. The following rules 
authorise the use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist attempts to 
abduct or detain oneself and other UN personnel (again with the option of other 
international personnel to be added if consistent with the mandate); to protect United 
Nations’ installations, areas or goods, designated by the Head of the Mission in 
consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act (or additionally key 
installations, areas or goods if so mandated); to defend any civilian person who is in 
need of protection against a hostile act or hostile intent, when competent local 
authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance; finally, the use of 
force is authorised against any person and/or group that limits or intends to limit 
freedom of movement. With respect to the last two, the protection of civilians and 
ensuring freedom of movement, a permission to use force should be sought from the 
immediate superior commander when and where possible. Additionally, the use of 
force, excluding deadly force, is authorised to prevent the escape of any detained 
person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities. Arguably, the attempts 
to abduct or detain UN personnel are just instances of hostile acts against which self-
defence can be lawfully exercised. Similarly, the protection of UN property can 
come within the remit of self-defence, as common in national laws of many states. 
Other examples of the uses of force are distinct from self-defence though, as their 
legal basis is derived from the authorisation in a peacekeeping mandate. This is the 
only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the caveats that the inclusion of these 
rules in ROE would need to be specifically authorised by the Security Council or that 
the permission to use force should be sought from a commander. A contrario, if such 
authorisation or permission were not granted, the use of force in such instances 
would be illegal. Given that UN ROE in no way limit the inherent right to self-
defence, as explicitly stated, these rules cannot be subsumed under self-defence. 
 
The earlier draft version of UN Guidelines for ROE dated 2000 include one more 
rule which authorises the use of force, up to and including deadly force, “to resist 
armed/forceful attempts to prevent peacekeepers from discharging their duties”, 
again with a caveat that this rule can only be included in ROE of a particular UN 
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peacekeeping operations if specifically authorised by the Security Council 
Resolution. This wording mirrors the classic defence of the mission/mandate concept 
as introduced in 1973. Although this rule was dropped in amended UN Guidelines 
for ROE of 2002,138 it can serve as an indication that the “defence of the mandate” 
was seen as quite distinct from self-defence and requiring a specific authorisation of 
the Security Council. Interestingly, Sample ROE of this amended version contain a 
rule “Use of Force Beyond Self-Defence” applicable in certain specifically stipulated 
circumstances upon authorisation of the Security Council. Whether this is where the 
defence of the mandate has been encrypted is open to speculation. As noted by 
Findlay this rule ensures that if the Security Council decides, for example, that 
violations of a ceasefire are to be responded to with deadly force, or that force is to 
be used to stop widespread human rights abuses, such elements can be readily 
accommodated in the UN peacekeeping ROE template.139 
 
The analysis of the UN Model Rules of Engagement allows concluding that no 
meaningful extension of the right to self-defence has occurred at this last tactical 
level of the use of force. The UN Model ROE restate that the right to self-defence is 
an individual’s inherent right and cannot be restricted. The definition of self-defence 
that they provide takes into account a peacekeeping context; however, it does not 
depart from the usual legal meaning of personal and unit self-defence under national 
criminal laws. The defence of “United Nations’ installations, areas or goods” can 
also be accommodated within the limits of self-defence without the need to claim any 
extraordinary extension of this right since national laws of many states allow for the 
defence of property as well. The UN Model ROE include other uses of force e.g. to 
protect the freedom of movement or civilian persons, which the peacekeepers might 
be authorised to employ if so mandated by the Security Council. It has to be noted 
though that such uses are quite distinct from self-defence and founded on a different 
legal basis, that is the resolution of the Security Council.  
 
While UN ROE issued for peacekeeping operations delineate the use of force by UN 
armed military personnel in accordance with the Purposes of the UN Charter, the 
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Security Council mandate and the relevant principles of international law, their role 
seem to be only supportive or complementary. They might guide the troop 
contributing countries and try to harmonise the actions of national contingents; 
however, they do not trump national ROE. Given the dual-key rule, the definition of 
self-defence in UN ROE might not be given full effect regarding the defence of UN 
goods and installations if national laws of contributing states do not allow using 
deadly force to defend property. Also, national ROE might differently define certain 
terms such as a “hostile act” or “hostile intent”, and accordingly have a different 
threshold for an aggressive reaction than the one stipulated in UN ROE. Differing 
national laws and political views might produce inconsistencies as to the moment in 
which the right to self-defence ends and the use of force to accomplish the mission in 
accordance with rules of engagement begins. This has been happening in practice 
and the so-called “phone home” syndrome, when participating contingents seek 
domestic legal guidance with respect to issues concerning the use of force so to 
ensure the compatibility of their actions domestic legal standards, is an 
acknowledged fact.140 
 
3.3. Discussion and conclusions 
!
This Chapter discussed the right to self-defence as it applies in different contexts and 
the peacekeeping principle of non-use of force except in self-defence. The detailed 
analysis of the peacekeeping doctrine and practice shows that the principle of non-
use of force except in self-defence has been redefined on the political and doctrinal 
level to include the defence of the peacekeeping mandate. The use of force to defend 
the mandate must be seen as a concept distinct from self-defence as it is based on a 
different legal fount namely the resolution of the Security Council. The introduction 
of this new concept expanded the category of peacekeeping operations to include 
“robust” missions but it did not expand the legal meaning of the right to self-defence 
as it applies in a peacekeeping context. Any assumptions as to such extension of the 
right to self-defence have to be rejected as totally inaccurate. Meticulous analysis of 
three different levels of UN peacekeeping practice corroborates that the right to 
personal and unit self-defence is still being defined and exercised within the limits 
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prescribed by national laws. A few observations have to be made in this connection. 
The operational context of peacekeeping deployments necessarily impact on the 
circumstances in which self-defence is being exercised in the sense that self-defence 
and defence of the mandate are often interwoven, which is also due to the fact that 
the latter has not been properly operationalized. While soldiers might have an 
ingrained sense of what constitutes self-defence, “the defence of the mission” proves 
more difficult to comprehend especially as “the mission” itself is often unclear.141 
The use of force “to defend the mandate” has remained problematic ever since it was 
first proclaimed as a right. It is potentially open-ended and could, if not properly 
regulated, lead to uncontrolled escalation and turn peacekeeping into (peace) 
enforcement. That seems especially plausible if the mandate includes such tasks as 
the enforced or protected delivery of humanitarian assistance, the protection of 
civilians at risk or the disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces. The risk 
seems even greater if the mission is established by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII and is authorised to “use all necessary means” to perform mandated 
tasks.  
 
With regard to Chapter VII authorised missions there seems to be a dissonance 
between different levels of UN peacekeeping practice on the use of force. The 
Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, authorising “all necessary 
means” to fulfil peacekeeping mandates, are not accompanied by equally robust 
measures at the tactical level. The UN Model ROE qualify the use of force in 
peacekeeping operations with caveats such as the duty to warn, to try non-forceful 
alternatives and the principle of minimum and proportional force. What is, however, 
even more important is that UN-issued ROE do not reflect the authority of binding 
Security Council resolutions which establish the particular mission, as they do not 
have a similarly obligatory nature and by no means derogate nationally-issued ROE 
of the troop contributing states.  
 
That leads us to another observation with regard to self-defence specifically and with 
regard to the authority of the Security Council at the tactical level of peacekeeping 
more generally. It seems justified to argue that whatever the definition of the right to 
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self-defence under UN law, it might be of no relevance in peacekeeping practice as 
the implementation of peacekeeping mandates can only take place in accordance 
with national laws and national doctrines. This is a fact of practice and also 
acknowledged at the level of UN doctrine and UN agreements with participating 
states. If national law delineates stricter parameters for the use of force in self-
defence, they will have decisive application in shaping the posture of the national 
contingent unless international standards could be incorporated into national law. 
This is a consequence of the positivist approach to international law and the basic 
conceptions of the international legal order. States are principal subjects of the 
international legal system and in accordance with the PCIJ Lotus case’s famous 
pronouncement: “restrictions upon the independence of States cannot (…) be 
presumed”. Although there is no doubt about the capacity of the Security Council to 
adopt binding resolutions at the strategic international level and the obligation of UN 
Member States to give effect to them, this can happen only through application of 
their national laws and in accordance with their international obligations. 
Accordingly the implementation of the will of the Security Council might face 
considerable constraints.  
 
The Security Council resolutions establishing peacekeeping operations are not 
specific enough to prompt any changes as to, for example, the way the right to self-
defence is defined by Member States, even though the Security Council theoretically 
possess such power. Tactically focused ROE have this level of specificity, yet the 
legal authority of UN-issued ROE is far from settled and any argument that they 
represent legal instruments in their own right, that could have a substantive legal 
impact from a domestic legal perspective, can hardly be supported. Apparently, the 
UN legal authority to bind national contingents to use force at the tactical level is 
largely constrained by national laws, a fact to which the majority of peacekeeping 
scholarship seems to be oblivious.142 The next chapter will explore the issue of the 
Security Council legal authority in more detail in the context of applicability of 
international humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations. 
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Since the defence of the mandate can be claimed to exist as a right deriving its legal 
basis from the binding resolution of the Security Council but distinct from self-
defence, that has a critical impact on the scope of protection of peacekeepers under 
IHL and consequently under the Rome Statute. If, in the situation of armed conflict, 
they use force beyond self-defence to defend their mandate, such actions might 
deprive them of civilian protection and make them legitimate targets. The next 
chapter will examine this issue in more detail.  
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4. The applicability of international humanitarian law to 
peacekeeping operations  
!
The last chapter of this thesis examines the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations. Again, the focus is narrowed to UN 
peacekeeping operations noting, where relevant, issues relating to regional 
peacekeeping. The question of applicability of IHL is discussed from two angles – 
from the perspective of the troop contributing states and also that of the United 
Nations. The chapter starts with the analysis of the command and control structure in 
UN peacekeeping operations to conclude that the extent of the states’ control over 
their contributed contingents is greater than is generally acknowledged by 
commentators. This complements the findings of the previous chapter with regard to 
the applicable national laws that regulate the right to self-defence. The chapter then 
moves on to the applicability of IHL and reports that it binds both the United Nations 
and troop-contributing states. The following sections examine the status of 
peacekeepers under IHL and the material scope of application of Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) 
and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute in relation to tasks that peacekeepers are 
mandated to perform. The chapter concludes that peacekeeping personnel shall be 
considered civilians under IHL and are entitled to protection unless and for such time 
as they take direct part in hostilities. The peacekeeping constitutive principles as well 
as the law of neutrality in war prove helpful in making this determination. In the light 
of the principle of equal applicability of IHL, the fact that they are involved in a 
peacekeeping mission is irrelevant for the evaluation of their participation in 
hostilities. A logical conclusion is that some tasks that peacekeepers are mandated to 
perform might qualify as direct participation in hostilities and hence deprive them of 
civilian protection. The last section of this chapter discusses the relationship between 
the jus ad bellum authorisation of the Security Council to fulfil the peacekeeping 
mandate and jus in bello qualification of the mandated tasks. It also discusses powers 
the Security Council could employ to extend the protection of peacekeepers beyond 
that currently available to them under IHL. The chapter concludes that the principle 
of distinction is a jus cogens norm of international law and cannot be overridden by a 
resolution of the Security Council.  
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The applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace 
operations has been subject to debate since the beginning of the Organization.1 It has 
been part of a more fundamental query regarding the international legal personality 
of the United Nations and the extent to which it can be both a rights holder and duty-
bearer under international law. This question, not settled by the actual terms of the 
UN Charter, arose in the first years of the existence of the UN. It was positively 
resolved by the International Court of Justice in the 1949 Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion.2 The Court 
considered the characteristics of the Organization in connection to its political tasks 
and concluded that the Charter conferred upon the UN rights and obligations 
indicative of its international personality, although different from those of its 
Members. The UN could not fulfil its purposes and exercise its functions if it was 
deprived of an international personality. Accordingly, the Organization has an 
objective international personality, distinct from that of its Members, and the 
capacity to operate on an international plane; however, it is not to be considered a 
state or a super-state.3 The UN is not a sovereign and holds only limited powers, 
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either explicitly recognised in the UN Charter or implicitly deduced from its practice 
as long as they are necessary to fulfil its purposes.4 Therefore, in order to determine 
the norms of international law applicable to the UN, one must refer back to its 
purposes and functions.5  
 
The ICJ reaffirmed the general applicability of international law to international 
organisations later in the 1980 Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt stating that: 
 
“International organisations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any 
obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or 
under international agreements to which they are parties.”6  
 
The principle of functionality determines the scope of law applicable to activities 
carried out by international organisations. When applied to the UN’s primary 
purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security, its enforcement 
powers and peacekeeping activities, the functional approach justifies the conclusion 
that the United Nations, as such, is bound by norms of international humanitarian 
law. The practice of the UN itself as well as states regarding this matter has gradually 
developed over the years and there is a wide consensus now that IHL is applicable to 
UN military operations as a matter of law.7 
 
There are, however, a few important issues, which deserve a closer look in the 
context of the present study. They relate to the relationship between the organisation 
establishing a peacekeeping operation (the UN or a regional organisation), the troop 
contributing states and peacekeeping forces on the ground, especially the nuances of 
authority structures, which impact upon the scope of applicability of IHL.  
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4 This reasoning was later confirmed in the jurisprudence of the Court. See: J F Hogg, ‘Peace-keeping 
Costs and Charter Obligations - Implications of the International Court of Justice Decision on Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations’ (1962), 62 Columbia Law Review, 1230 
Legality of the use of nuclear weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996], ICJ Reports 1996, para. 25 
5 M N Shaw, International Law (5th ed. Cambridge University Press, 2008) 46; G Porretto, S Vite, 
‘The application of international humanitarian law and human rights law to international 
organisations’ (2006) Research Paper Series No.1 Centre Universitaire de Droit International 
Humanitaire University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, 18 
6 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt Reports (Advisory 
Opinion) [1980] ICJ Reports 1980, 73 at 89-90 para. 37 
7 See: Section 4.2 of this thesis. 
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4.1. Command and control in United Nations-led peacekeeping 
operations 
 
 
The drafters of the United Nations Charter at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference 
envisaged the new world organisation with strong coercive powers able to fulfil its 
goal of maintaining international peace and security.8 To achieve this, a centralised 
enforcement system was agreed and incorporated in the UN Charter with Article 43 
as one of its cornerstones. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 43, Member States 
undertake to make armed forces available to the Security Council and to render 
further assistance if necessary.9 However, due to the fundamental disagreements 
among major powers regarding the practicalities of the implementation of the 
envisaged system, the provisions regarding the standing UN army remained a dead 
letter. The UN has no standing army or police force and must rely on ad hoc 
contributions or coalitions for peacekeeping or enforcement action. In general, all 
UN-mandated peace operations depend on the voluntary contribution of troops by 
Member States and that has a major impact on the command and control 
arrangements.10 The most important distinction from a political and organisational 
perspective is the one between UN “authorised” and UN “commanded” operations. 
The first category relates to an enforcement action, which is normally delegated to a 
regional organisation or a coalition of states willing to enforce a Security Council 
mandate, so called “the coalitions of the willing”. The Security Council retains 
overall legal and political authority over the operation, but most if not all command 
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8 M Bothe, ‘Peace-keeping’ in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd 
edn Oxford University Press 2002) 703 
9 Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of 
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security 
Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security 
Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
10 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (2008) 52 
<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf> [hereinafter: UN, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines] 
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and control is transferred to a lead nation or regional or other organisation.11 The 
second group encompasses operations in which contributing countries usually 
transfer part of their authority over the troops to the United Nations for the duration 
of their participation in the operation.12 This is the rule in most peacekeeping 
operations. As it is briefly described below, United Nations command and control in 
such cases is limited which, in fact, makes the dichotomy of “authorised” and 
“commanded” operations of less significance than it is stressed in the literature.13 
 
Command and control arrangements in multinational operations, including UN peace 
operations, have a direct impact on the development of rules of engagement, 
applicable laws and other key issues such as command responsibility or individual 
criminal responsibility.14 The next section provides the general framework for the 
authority over armed forces and then discusses in greater detail the precise nuances 
of the command and control structure in UN-led peacekeeping operations. 
 
4.1.1. Command and control - definitions 
 
Command and control is the authority over armed forces in military operations.15 The 
command and control structures and related definitions vary among states, yet a basic 
framework can be distinguished and it rests on three generally recognised levels: 
full/strategic, operational and tactical.16 
 
Full command  
Full command is the totality of command authority covering all aspects of 
organisation, administration and direction of forces. It is exclusively exercised at the 
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11 T D Gill, ‘Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations’ (2011) Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 39 
12 Ibid 39 
13 For critique of this distinction see: D Stephens, ‘The lawful use of force by peacekeeping forces: the 
tactical imperative’ (2005) 12(2) International Peacekeeping 157 
14 B Cathcart, ‘Command and control in Military Operations’ in D Fleck, T D Gill (eds) The 
Handbook of the International law of military operations (Oxford University Press 2010) 238 
15 According to NATO Glossary Terms AAP-06 (2013), command and control are defined as follows: 
Command - the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, 
and control of military forces (29 May 2002); Control - the authority exercised by a commander over 
part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his 
command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives (30 Jan 2012) 
16 R Murphy, ‘Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian and 
Irish Forces’ (1999) 4(1) J Conflict Security Law 41, 49 
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national strategic level and as an attribute of national sovereignty cannot be 
delegated.17 What follows is that no international organisation or coalition exercises 
full command over national armed forces. Contributing countries always retain full 
command, which includes the authority to decide to participate in a given 
(multinational) operation and to withdraw from it.18 Strategic level command 
includes the overall direction and coordination of armed forces and the provision of 
advice to and from political authorities at the national and international level.19 In the 
context of multinational operations it usually implies at least some degree of 
influence over the overall strategic objectives of a given operation, but it will vary 
according to circumstances.  
 
Operational command 
Operational command is the authority granted to a commander to assign specific 
tasks or missions to subordinate commanders, to deploy units within the area of 
operations, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate elements of operational or 
tactical level command or control.20 Operational level command aims at fulfilling the 
overall strategic objectives of the operation as a whole as it links strategy and tactics. 
Operational control is an attribute of operational level command and means the 
authority of a commander to direct forces assigned to accomplish specific missions 
or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units 
concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It can be delegated 
and it does not include administrative or logistic control.21 In a multinational 
operation all or part of operational command and control can be delegated by a troop 
contributing country to an international organisation, which will designate a 
multinational commander.22  
 
Tactical command 
Tactical command and control are exercised at the level of single units or 
combination of subunits. Tactical command is the authority delegated to a 
commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of 
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17 B Cathcart (n 14) 237 
18 T D Gill (n 11) 46 
19 B Cathcart (n 14) 238 
20 The definition dated 1 October 2010 in NATO Glossary Terms AAP-06 (2013) 
21 The definition dated 1 October 2010 in NATO Glossary Terms AAP-06 (2013) 
22 B Cathcart (n 14) 238 
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the mission mandated by a higher authority; whereas tactical control is the detailed, 
local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish 
missions or tasks.23 In multinational operations tactical command and control are 
normally retained by troop contributing countries, although they must be exercised in 
conformity with the operational authority of the UN, NATO, or coalition operational 
commanders.24 
 
4.1.2. The United Nations chain of command 
 
Despite over a half-century long history of United Nations peacekeeping, there still 
exists a certain “degree of institutional ambiguity not normally considered consistent 
with an efficient and effective command structure.”25 This is partially due to the ad 
hoc nature of peacekeeping operations and the fact that the UN for years lacked a 
proper military doctrine to support command and control arrangements. 
Nevertheless, after few decades of practice the typical organisational and authority 
structure of a peacekeeping operation can be identified and it involves four 
hierarchical/organisational levels: (1) the principal organ, which creates the 
peacekeeping forces (usually the Security Council, although the General Assembly 
acted in this role as well), (2) the Secretary-General, (3) the commander-in-chief and 
his staff, (4) national contingents headed by national contingent commanders.26  
 
The Security Council provides “the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and 
political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations”.27 Troop contributing states 
retain full and exclusive strategic level command and control over their armed forces 
and equipment but they transfer operational authority to direct their forces to the 
United Nations. This is done either through a formal agreement or through a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concluded between contributing states and 
the United Nations and involves transferring the authority to issue operational 
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23 The definitions dated 1 September 1974 and 1 October 2001 respectively in NATO Glossary Terms 
AAP-06 (2013) 
24 T D Gill (n 11) 49 
25 H McCoubrey and N D White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations (Darthmout 1996) 137 
26 M Bothe (n 8) 681-82 
27 Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Policy February 
2008, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support (Ref. 
2008.4) 6 
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directives within the limits of (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council; (2) an 
agreed period of time, with the requirement of a prior notification in case of an 
earlier withdrawal of a contingent; and (3) a specific geographic area (the mission 
area as a whole).28 The Security Council possesses a discretionary power to 
determine the overall strategic objectives of the UN-mandated operation; however, it 
will engage in consultations with the UN Secretariat, contributing states and other 
key players. The sustained consultations with troop and police contributing countries 
at all stages of the planning and decision-making process of a peacekeeping 
operation are regarded as critical to its success.29 
 
The Security Council confers the operational authority over a peacekeeping mission 
on the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who acts through the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), 
headed by Under-Secretaries-General in charge of those respective departments.30 
The Secretary-General appoints a civilian Head of Mission and the UN Force 
Commander (or Head of Military Component). The Head of Mission, usually a 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, has the overall control of the 
mission including military, police and civilian resources, and reports to the 
Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations. The Force Commander exercises operational control (but not command) 
over military personnel provided by Member States and reports to the Head of the 
Mission.31 Operational control is thus unified and centralised, and the chain of 
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28 Ibid 3 
29 Capstone Doctrine lists all key stages in the life of a United Nations peacekeeping operation at 
which such consultations should take place, including: a) the development of the concept of 
operations and the elaboration of the mandate of a new operation; b) any change in the mandate, in 
particular the broadening or narrowing of the scope of the mission, the introduction of new or 
additional functions or components, or a change in the authorisation to use force; c) the renewal of the 
mandate; d) significant or serious political, military or humanitarian developments; e) a rapid 
deterioration of the security situation on the ground; f) the termination, withdrawal or scaling down in 
size of the operation, including the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding; and g) 
before and after Security Council missions to a specific peacekeeping operation. UN, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 10) 52 
30 ‘Planning a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation’ in UN, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 10) 47–56; 
P C Cammaert, B Klappe, ‘Authority, Command, and Control in United Nations-led Peace 
Operations’ in T D Gill and D Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military 
Operations (Oxford University Press 2012) 159–161 
31 As stipulated in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines  “military personnel 
provided by Member States . . . are placed under the operational control of the United Nations Force 
Commander or head of military component, but not under United Nations command” [emphasis 
added] UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (n 10) 68 
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command runs from the Security Council to the Secretary-General and then to the 
Head of Mission. In the field, unity of command is maintained through the overall 
authority of the Head of Mission over all mission components. At the Headquarters 
level, the keystone of unity of command is that the Under-Secretary-General for 
Field Support reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations 
on all peacekeeping related matters. Contributing states are expected to be familiar 
with UN authority arrangements so to ensure that personnel are contributed 
accordingly.32 Once assigned, national contingents in UN peacekeeping forces are 
under UN (operational) control exercised through national commanders of those 
contingents.33 National contingent commanders report to the Force Commander and 
they should not act on national direction, especially if such actions could adversely 
affect implementation of the mission mandate or contradict United Nations policies 
applicable to the mission.34 This is critical to secure the unity of command in a 
peacekeeping mission. However, as Peacekeeper’s Handbook (1984) states “if 
soldiers of a contingent are required to undertake duties or acts which in any way 
clash with the normal principles under which they would be expected to operate in 
their own army, the contingent commander has the right to refer to his own Minister 
of Defence.”35 As a matter of fact there is an accepted practice that national 
commanders consult their national capitals to make sure that their actions are in 
accordance with national laws and policies. For example, U.S. Doctrine for the 
Armed Forces of the United States (2013) states as follows: 
 
“US commanders will maintain the capability to report to higher US military authorities in addition to 
MNFCs (Multinational Force Commanders – clarification added). For matters perceived as illegal 
under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the President has 
agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign MNFC. If issues 
remain unresolved, the US commanders refer the matters to higher US authorities.”36 
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32 Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Policy February 
2008 (n 27) 3 
33 R C R Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-keeping Forces (Martinus 
Nijhoff1991) 119 
34 “Managing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” in UN, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 10), 67-68  
35 International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (Pergamon Press1984), 365 
36 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication1 - Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(2013) II-24 
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The management of multinational military operations at the tactical level as well as 
the supervision of individual personnel remain in hands of troop contributing states.37 
The tactical level of command and control generally involves the physical conduct of 
tasks assigned, the detailed and local direction and control of movement or 
manoeuvre necessary to implement or safeguard the mission’s mandate.38 Internal or 
administrative control over contingents including their organisation, disciplinary and 
criminal jurisdiction is also a national responsibility. National command and control 
at the tactical level is necessitated by the fact that peacekeepers remain soldiers in 
their national service as well as by constitutional requirements of many states, which 
prohibit putting national armed forces directly under foreign command.39 The 
contingents comprising a UN force retain therefore their national character and 
remain “subject to the military rules and regulations of their respective national 
States without derogating from their responsibilities as members of the Force as 
defined in these [the relevant U.N.] Regulations.”40 This unique cluster of 
peacekeepers’ legal and institutional obligations is reflected even in their attire, they 
wear their countries’ uniforms supplemented by a UN blue helmet or beret and a 
badge.41 
 
4.1.3. The legal framework of United Nations-led peacekeeping operations 
 
The normative framework of peacekeeping operations corresponds to the 
organisational and authority structure described above and is usually composed of: 
(1) the resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly, (2) the Status of 
Force Agreement between the United Nations and the host state (SOFA); (3) the 
agreement between each of the troop contributing states and the United Nations; (4) 
and the regulations for the force issued by the Secretary General.42  
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37 T D Gill (n 11) 49 
38 Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Policy February 
2008 (n 27), 4 
39 See e.g. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication1 - Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States (2013); Canada Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01 
- Canadian Military Doctrine (2009) 
40 Regulations Governing United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC), U.N. SC, 15th Sess., para. 
29(c), U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/ONUC/I (1963), reprinted in: Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations 
Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary 71 (1980) 3 
41 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newoperation.shtml 
42 R Murphy (n 16) 41, 43 
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The resolution provides the legal basis for a peacekeeping operation, defines its 
purpose and the mandate. Following the peacekeeping mandate, the Status of Force 
Agreement regulates the relationship between the United Nations and the state, in 
which the UN forces are deployed, outlining the rights and obligations as between 
the parties. It specifies the principles and arrangements under which the 
peacekeeping force will function, stipulates special freedoms, privileges and duties 
necessary for a peacekeeping force to carry out its mission.43 The SOFA grants the 
members of the peacekeeping operation the privileges and immunities given to 
mission commanders and UN officials and experts. Military personnel are subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of their national states for any criminal offence committed 
in the host nation or territory. They are granted functional immunity for any action 
committed while carrying out their official duties. This functional immunity 
continues to operate even when they are no longer members of the operation.44 The 
practice of signing such arrangements began with UNEF I in Egypt and drawing on 
this experience the Secretary General issued, at the request of the General Assembly 
in 1990, the Model Status of Forces Agreement to serve as the basis for the mission-
specific SOFAs to be agreed between the UN and host states.45 The Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter may decide to provisionally apply the 
Model SOFA until a mission-specific agreement is concluded. 
 
The agreement between each of the troop contributing states and the United Nations, 
called the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), forms the third important pillar 
of the legal framework for UN peacekeeping operations. The MOU establishes the 
responsibility and standards for the contribution of personnel, major equipment and 
self-sustainment support services for both the UN and the contributing state. 
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43 The provisions of the agreement include, inter alia: the status of the operation and its members; 
responsibility for criminal and civil jurisdiction over the members of the operation; taxation, customs 
and fiscal regulations pertaining to the members of the operation; freedom of movement, including the 
use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields; provision of water, electricity and other public 
utilities; locally recruited personnel; settlement of disputes or claims; protection of United Nations 
personnel; and liaison. Such agreements also require inter alia, that the parties provide certain 
facilities (e.g., suitable premises for the operation's headquarters) free of charge. 
44 Major General Tim Ford (Retd), Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. A Course 
Produced by The United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence 
Instruction; Series Editor: Harvey J. Langholtz (UNITAR POCI 2004), 26 
45 Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United Nations and the State on whose 
territory United Nations Forces are deployed, UN Doc. A/45/594, 9 October 1990. For discussion of 
Model SOFA see e.g. F L Kirgis, International Organisations in their Legal Setting (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 2nd ed., 1992) 722-733 
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Similarly to the Model SOFA, the UN Secretary-General promulgated in 1991 the 
Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States contributing 
personnel and equipment to the United Nations peace-keeping operations,46 intended 
to provide the basis for individual agreements subject to modifications appropriate 
for particular cases. 
 
Finally, the Secretary General issues the regulations for the force, usually in a form 
of a directive to the Force Commander, which is based on the mandate and provides 
instructions for carrying out the tasks assigned.47 
 
As stipulated in MOU, contributed military personnel are bound by UN codes of 
conduct and administrative guidelines and obliged to respect host nation law.48 It is 
unclear though what are the consequences for an individual soldier for the breach of 
UN regulations. They are intended to be legally binding but unless specifically 
incorporated into domestic law of a contributing state, they do not have an immediate 
municipal effect. The fact that a state concluded an agreement to contribute troops to 
United Nations peacekeeping does not automatically amend its municipal law, or 
establishes a legal obligation to do so.49 While neither the Force Commander nor the 
Head of Mission has direct authority over the internal structure and functioning of a 
particular contingent, or criminal and disciplinary matters which remain exclusive 
prerogative of contributing states, they can recommend the removal of a contingent 
commander and/or individual members for failing to perform assigned tasks or 
breaching of UN administrative codes of conduct. In case of grave misconduct, a 
whole contingent can be sent home and a troop contributing country banned from 
participation in the mission.50  
 
Retaining national authority over troops at the tactical and internal levels determines 
the applicability of national laws and procedures. Forces remain bound by national 
law and treaty obligations of their national states, which means that soldiers can only 
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46 UN Secretary-General, Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States 
contributing personnel and equipment to the United Nations peace-keeping operations (23 May 1991) 
UN Doc. A/46/185  
47 R Murphy (n 3) 41, 43 
48 T D Gill (n 11) 50, Footnote 19 
49 R Murphy (n 16) 41, 47 
50 T D Gill (n 11) 50 
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be held individually criminally responsible for violations of national law or 
international law that binds their country. Each troop contributing state normally has 
its own ROE or at least national caveats on UN ROE, its own interpretation of self-
defence, military objective or the use of deadly force to defend property.51 National 
commanders are responsible to their own governments that their units are not used in 
excess of the approved mandate or inconsistently with the understanding of national 
authorities.52 This finding complements the conclusions of the proceeding chapter on 
rules of engagement and the right to self-defence – peacekeeping missions operate 
according to the dual-key rule: each contingent operates under its own national ROE 
that reflect domestic legal and political constraints and additionally is issued with 
“international” ROE. 
 
As apparent from this brief description, command and control arrangements in UN-
led peacekeeping operations result in the UN and the troop contributing countries 
exercising different degrees of authority over the troops participating in the mission. 
This multi-layered authority structure gives rise to certain operational and legal 
issues - it places certain limits of what can be demanded from national contingents as 
well as what law is applicable to the conduct of military personnel. This is elaborated 
in more detail in the next section. 
 
4.2. International humanitarian law obligations of the United 
Nations and Member States 
 
This section briefly discusses the extent to which UN peacekeeping forces are bound 
by international humanitarian law. Since this topic has been extensively covered by 
scholarship, this section only summarises the findings to provide background for an 
analysis of the material scope of the war crime of attacking peacekeeping personnel 
and objects. Given the command and control arrangements in UN-led peacekeeping 
operations, the IHL obligations of the UN and obligations of contributing states are 
discussed accordingly. 
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51 B Cathcart (n 14) 242-243 
52 H McCoubrey, N D White (n 25) 145; as an example see the above cited fragment from U.S. 
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013) 
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Due to the functional and limited nature of the legal personality of the United 
Nations, it is necessary to determine the extent of its rights and obligations under 
international humanitarian law. IHL was originally developed to regulate actions of 
states as primary subjects of international law possessing the exclusive right to use 
force hence its application to other international subjects must factor in necessary 
adjustments.53 It was acknowledged early on that the UN was subject to customary 
international humanitarian law, which by virtue of its customary status is presumed 
to bind all members of the international community and would apply to the UN 
mutatis mutandis.54 More problematic were treaty-based IHL norms. As a rule, only 
states can accede to IHL treaties, which is often indicated by the explicit terms of 
their preambles and provisions.55 Some of the state-centred rules may not be easily 
transposable on the non-state international bodies which do not have necessary 
administrative or judicial structures to implement certain provisions, such as those 
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war or regulating the prosecution and 
punishment of grave breaches of the law.56 The debate about the scope of 
applicability of IHL to the UN was intensified in the 1990s by the unprecedented 
increase in peacekeeping operations. One of the points of legal and political debate, 
apart from those mentioned above, was the sensitive issue of some IHL treaties 
which are not universally ratified including the 1977 Additional Protocols. It was 
argued that any declaration on their applicability would be prejudicial to 
peacekeeping troops of those contributing States which were not parties to the 
Protocols, whereas non-applicability would be detrimental to the promotion of IHL 
as a whole.57 
4.2.1. The United Nations early approach to the applicability of 
international humanitarian law to its military operations 
 
The United Nations’ own approach to the applicability of international humanitarian 
law to forces and operations under its authority has evolved over time. Initially, the 
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53 With time rules were adopted for additional actors – non-state armed groups participating in “armed 
conflict not of an international character, see Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
the 1977 Additional Protocol II 
54 D W Bowett (n 1) 507; D Schindler (n 1) 526-528; Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide 
to humanitarian law (2nd ed. Lanham, Md.; Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002) 308 
55 J K Kleffner, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues’ in T D Gill and 
D Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 61 
56 Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier (n 54) 308 
57 U Palwankar (n 1) 227ff 
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UN used to generally acknowledge the importance of this legal regime while 
maintaining that peacekeeping forces discharging the mandate act on the behalf of 
the “international community” and cannot be considered a “party” to the conflict nor 
a “power” under the Geneva Conventions.58 With time the UN recognised that 
peacekeeping troops must respect the “principles and spirit of general international 
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel”.59 This stipulation is 
used in the Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States 
contributing personnel and equipment to the United Nations peace-keeping 
operations issued in 1991, in which the UN peacekeeping mission undertakes to 
observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general conventions applicable to 
the conduct of military personnel, while the contributing states undertake to ensure 
that the members of their national contingents are familiar with the principles and 
spirits of these conventions.60 Interestingly, such clause does not appear in the Model 
Status of Forces Agreement (1990).61 It should be noted though that such provision 
was nevertheless added to many of the mission-specific SOFAs concluded in the 
1990s. The clause about conducting UN operations with full respect for the 
“principles and spirit” of the relevant IHL treaties and an assurance that 
peacekeeping forces were familiar with the relevant standards was introduced for the 
first time in 1993 UNAMIR SOFA.62 The continued practice of including such 
reference triggered a debate about its precise meaning.63 The clause was regarded as 
too abstract to guide peacekeeping operations on practical issues, such as the legal 
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58 D Shraga (n 1) 67 
59 Ibid 64, 67-68; R D Glick, ‘LIP Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations 
Forces’ (1995) Vol. 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 53- 107 
60 UN Secretary-General, Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States 
contributing personnel and equipment to the United Nations peace-keeping operations (23 May 1991) 
UN Doc. A/46/185, Annex, para. 28: 
X. Applicability of International Conventions 
28. [The United Nations peace-keeping operation] shall observe and respect the principles and spirit 
of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. The 
international conventions referred to above include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict. [The Participating State] shall therefore 
ensure that the members of its national contingent serving with [the United Nations peace-keeping 
operation] be fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of these Conventions. 
61 Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United Nations and the State on whose 
territory United Nations Forces are deployed (9 October 1990), UN Doc. A/45/594 
62 Many of the subsequent SOFAs contained such reference e.g. UNCRO/Croatia (1995), 
UNIFIL/Lebanon (1995), MONUC/Uganda (2003), ONUB/Burundi (2005) and UNAVEM 
III/Angola (1995); for a discussion see generally: United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, 
School of Law, University of Essex, UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement. 
Background Paper Prepared for the Experts’ Workshop (26 August 2010), paras. 162-165 
63 See e.g. U Palwankar (n 1); L Condorelli et al. (eds) (n 1) 317ff 
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status of UN forces taken hostage, or that of detainees held by UN forces, or the use 
of certain types of weapons.64  
 
More concrete declaration regarding the applicability of IHL to UN operations 
appeared in the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel. Article 20 on saving clauses acknowledges “the applicability of 
international humanitarian law and universally recognised standards of human rights 
as contained in international instruments in relation to the protection of United 
Nations operations and United Nations and associated personnel”. There are two 
major implications of this provision. As Bourloyannis-Vrailas notes, although the 
Convention criminalises attacks on UN personnel, it does not absolve UN and 
associated personnel from respecting rules of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law. In turn, these two regimes also confer certain rights on UN and 
associated personnel independently from the operation of the Convention.65 If 
persons protected under the Convention find themselves in the area of armed conflict 
while performing non-combatant functions, they are also protected as civilians under 
international humanitarian law.66 The Convention has been criticised though for not 
making its own protective regime and IHL mutually exclusive.67 
 
4.2.2. The United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin  
 
Aiming at further clarification of the scope of applicability of IHL to UN operations, 
the ICRC initiated a series of expert meetings. The conclusions were submitted to the 
UN Secretariat and served as a basis for the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law.68 The 
Bulletin was promulgated in 1999 “for the purpose of setting out fundamental 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations 
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64 D Shraga, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and 
Responsibility for Operations-related Damage’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 406, 
407 
65 M Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel (1995) 44 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 583 
66 Ibid 
67 See literature review on the UN Safety Convention in Chapter 1 of the thesis. 
68 D Shraga (n 64) 407 
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forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control”69 as stated 
in its introductory paragraph, which can be regarded as the Secretariat’s official 
recognition of the applicability of IHL to UN forces. The Bulletin is an 
administrative regulation issued by the Secretary-General acting as “commander-in-
chief” and, as stated in the cited above paragraph, it is binding on members of UN-
commanded and controlled operations. It does not apply to UN-authorised missions 
conducted under national or regional command and control.70  
 
The Bulletin outlines the field of its application and accordingly it sets out the 
fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to 
members of UN forces actively engaged as “combatants” in situations of armed 
conflict, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. Importantly, they 
apply in enforcement actions as well as in peacekeeping operations when the use of 
force is permitted in self-defence.71 This stipulation implies that it is not the 
qualification of a mission by the Security Council that is determinative of the 
application of IHL but the situation on the ground as even consensual peacekeeping 
operations might get engaged in combat. This is in line with the universal agreement 
that the application of IHL should be determined in accordance with the facts on the 
ground. The Bulletin refers to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel stating that it does not affect the protected status of 
members of peacekeeping operations under this Convention “as long as they are 
entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed 
conflict” (para. 1.2). This formulation comes from the Rome Statute rather than from 
the Convention though, and accordingly, it finally draws the line between 
peacekeepers “as combatants” and peacekeepers who as “non-combatants” are 
entitled to protection given to civilians under IHL.72 Shraga stresses two cumulative 
conditions of a “double-key” test that must be met for IHL to apply to UN forces: (1) 
the existence of an armed conflict in the area and time of their deployment, and (2) 
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69 UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law (6 August 1999) ST/SGB/1999/13 
70 D Shraga (n 64) 408 
71 The Secretary-General’s Bulletin (n 69) Section 1 
72 D Shraga (n 64) 409 
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their engagement as combatants.73 The Bulletin does not claim to be exhaustive, or to 
prejudice or replace the national laws by which military personnel remain bound 
throughout the operation. It does not create any new obligations under IHL or 
changes its scope. As noted by Shraga, the source of legal obligation in relation to 
the principles and rules covered by the Bulletin lies outside of it, namely in the IHL 
provisions incorporated in the municipal laws of states participating in the operation 
and in customary rules.74 The contributing states would also prosecute in national 
courts the violations of IHL committed by their personnel.75  
 
The Bulletin is not restricted to customary IHL norms to be found in the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols and the 1954 Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property,76 but includes also rules which have not attained 
such status.77 As it does not qualify the nature of armed conflict in the area of 
deployment of UN forces, the Bulletin is by implication presumed to extend to both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.78 Such interpretation is 
consistent with the UN unqualified undertaking in Status of Force Agreements 
concluded since 1990 to “observe and respect the principles and spirit” of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols and the Hague Convention 
on the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict (emphasis 
added).79 From 1999, and in line with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, SOFA 
references to IHL were amended to respect the “principles and rules” of the relevant 
IHL conventions.80 
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73 D Shraga, ‘The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by the United Nations Forces of the 
International Humanitarian Law: A Decade Later’ (2009) 39 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 357, 
358 
74 Ibid 360 
75 The Secretary-General’s Bulletin (n 69) Section 4 
76 The Bulletin sets out the principles and rules governing protection of the civilian population in the 
UN area of operation and in the area controlled by the other party; means and methods of combat; 
treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat; treatment of detained persons; protection of the 
wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel. 
77 Provisions of conventional international law nature such as the prohibitions on using methods of 
warfare intended to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment; 
rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and causing the 
release of dangerous forces with consequent severe losses among the. 
78 D Shraga (n 73) 372 
79 See supra note 45 
80 More recent SOFAs, e.g. UNAMID (2008), UNMISS (2011) include the following provision: 
 “Without prejudice to the mandate of [name of mission] and its international status: 
(a) The United Nations shall ensure that [name of mission] shall conduct its operations in the 
territory with full respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions applicable to the 
conduct of military personnel. These international conventions include the Four Geneva Conventions 
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4.2.3. International humanitarian law obligations of troop contributing 
states 
 
By virtue of Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions states parties are 
bound to “respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances”. While Article 1(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I repeats this 
provision, it does not appear in the 1977 Additional Protocol II applicable to non-
international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, such conflicts indirectly fall within the 
scope of this obligation, insofar as Protocol II “develops and supplements” common 
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, as stated in its Article 1(1).81 According to 
the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study state practice has 
established this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.82 As a customary norm it binds 
all subjects of international law. 
 
The International Court of Justice has elaborated about Common Article 1 in a few 
cases before it. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua the Court ruled that: 
 
“(…) there is an obligation on the United States in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, 
to ‘respect’ the Conventions, and even to ‘ensure respect’ for them ‘in all circumstances,’ since such 
an obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but from the general principles 
of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give expression. The United States is thus 
under an obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in 
violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (…) The 
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of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 
May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict; 
(b) The Government undertakes to treat at all times the military personnel of [name of mission] 
with full respect for the principles and rules of the general international conventions applicable to the 
treatment of military personnel. These international conventions include the Four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 April 1949 and their additional Protocols of 8 June 1977. 
 [Name of mission] and the Government shall ensure accordingly that members of their respective 
military personnel are fully acquainted with the principles and rules of the above-mentioned 
international instruments.”  
UNAMID SOFA (2008) available at: 
http://unamid.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMID/UNAMID%20SOFA.pdf 
UNMISS SOFA (2011) available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/documents/unmiss_sofa_08082011.pdf 
81 L Boisson de Chazournes and L Condorelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 
revisited: protecting collective interests’ 837 International Review of the Red Cross (2000), 67, 85–86 
82 Rule 139, applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts, in: J-M 
Henckaerts, L Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules 
(ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2005) 
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Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force by means of special agreements, al1 
or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.”83 
 
In its Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory the Court’s view was stronger that Article 
1 entails third party obligations: 
 
“It follows from that provision that every State party to that Convention, whether or not it is a party to 
a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question 
are complied with.”84 
 
The obligation to respect and to ensure respect for IHL is two-folded. “To respect” 
means that the state is required to do everything it can to ensure that the rules in 
question are respected by its organs and all others under its jurisdiction; while “to 
ensure respect” can be interpreted to entail an obligation to take all possible steps to 
ensure universal compliance with the rules, regardless of whether the state itself is 
engaged in a conflict.85 Since the states possess the capacity to legislate for their 
nationals and to impose upon them obligations that originate from international law, 
IHL is binding on individuals because their national states consented to conventional 
rules or are bound by customary norms.86 The binding force of IHL on individuals 
has been long recognised, and it applies to them disregarding their formal status 
under IHL: combatants in an international armed conflict as members of the armed 
forces of a party to such conflict, members of armed groups in a non-international 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Reports 1986, para. 220 
84 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Reports 136, para. 158 
85 According to the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:  
The use of the words “and to ensure respect” was, however, deliberate: they were intended to 
emphasize and strengthen the responsibility of the Contracting Parties. It would not, for example, be 
enough for a State to give orders or directives to a few civilian or military authorities, leaving it to 
them to arrange as they pleased for the details of their execution. It is for the State to supervise their 
execution. Furthermore, if it is to keep its solemn engagements, the State must of necessity prepare in 
advance, that is to say in peacetime, the legal, material or other means of loyal enforcement of the 
Convention as and when the occasion arises. It follows, therefore, that in the event of a Power failing 
to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, 
endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention.  
J S Pictet (ed.), Commentary, I Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (ICRC 1958) 25-26 
86 This is according to the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction. See: L Moir, The Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict (Oxford University Press 2002) 53–54; J Kleffner, ‘The applicability of international 
humanitarian law to organized armed groups’ (2011) 93(882) IRRC 443, 445-449 
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armed conflict or civilians.87 It is important to keep in mind that IHL distinguishes 
between two addressees, namely parties to an armed conflict being the collective 
entities (states and organised armed groups) and individuals. The former are not just 
the sum of all their members but bear duties under IHL independently from their 
members acting as individuals. What follows is that the violations of IHL committed 
by individuals engaged in the violence on a behalf of a collective entity, e.g. a state, 
may simultaneously entail both their individual criminal responsibility and the 
responsibility of the state to whom their acts or omissions can be attributed.88  
 
Concurrent responsibility to respect international humanitarian law 
In the light of the above discussion, it must be concluded that peacekeeping forces 
bear obligations under IHL even if they themselves are not involved in armed 
conflict. IHL is fully applicable to peacekeeping troops due to the international 
obligations of their national states, and it is concurrently applicable to a 
peacekeeping operation as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations which is bound 
by customary IHL mutatis mutandis. Given that the UN does not have necessary 
judicial and administrative structures to enforce laws, it enters agreements with 
troops contributing states, which stipulate that national contingents provided by 
states are subject to states’ exclusive criminal jurisdiction in respect of any crimes or 
offences that might be committed by them while they are assigned to the military 
component of a United Nations peacekeeping mission as well as disciplinary 
jurisdiction with respect to all other acts of misconduct committed that do not 
amount to crimes or offences.89 
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87 C Greenwood, ‘Historical development and legal basis’, in Fleck D (ed), The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2008) para. 134; J Kleffner, 
‘The applicability of international humanitarian law to organized armed groups’, 93(882) IRRC 
(2011), 443, 449-450 
88 A Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between individual responsibility and state responsibility in 
international law’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 615–640. In contrast to the 
state responsibility, a legal regime for the collective responsibility of organised armed groups is still 
pretty underdeveloped. For analysis see J Kleffner, ‘The collective accountability of organised armed 
groups for system crimes’ in A Nollkaemper and H van der Wilt (eds), System Criminality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 238–269. 
89 Revised Draft Model MOU, see Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and 
Its Working Group on the 2007 Resumed Session (12 June 2007) UN Doc. A/61/19 (Pt III) annex 
(Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding) (‘Revised Draft Model MOU’). Also the 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin stipulates that the contributing states would prosecute in national courts 
the violations of IHL committed by their personnel, see: supranote 75. This has also been confirmed 
in the UN submissions to the ILC on the responsibility of international organisations see: ILC, 
Responsibility of international organizations. Comments and observations received from international 
organizations (17 February 2011) A/CN.4/637/Add.1 Commentary to Draft Article 6, para. 3.4 
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In the context of applicability of IHL to peacekeeping forces and the responsibility of 
the UN v. the responsibility of its member-states, Tittemore points at the more 
general issue of independence of the Organization. It goes back to the ICJ 
pronouncements in the Reparation Case about the need to keep UN agents 
independent of UN Member States.90 The United Nations and its Members have 
concurrent duties to uphold the independence of the Organization and its agents, 
which can be compromised if the UN leaves it entirely to individual Member States 
to ensure that acts authorised by the UN comply with international law.91 
 
If IHL applies to peacekeeping forces through their national states in any case, one 
could ask why for so many years the ICRC and the UN battled about acknowledging 
that IHL applies also to the UN. One of the reasons is the already mentioned issue of 
the responsibility of collective entities for illicit acts. An international legal 
personality implies not only the capacity to bring claims under international law as in 
the Reparations Case but also the capacity to accept the responsibility for such 
claims.92 A regime of legal liability for international wrongdoing requires that the 
illegal act is attributable to the legal person in question and that it breaches one of 
that legal person’s international duties.93 In the case of violations of IHL, the UN 
could only be responsible for violations of IHL attributed to it if it was itself bound 
by IHL in the first place. Having established the applicability of IHL to the UN, the 
question of attribution requires the examination of the command and control 
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90 As the Court held: 
In order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel that this protection is 
assured to him by the Organization, and that he may count on it. To ensure the independence of the 
agent, and, consequently, the independent action of the Organization itself, it is essential that in 
performing his duties he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the Organization 
(save of course for the more direct and immediate protection due from the State in whose territory he 
may be). In particular, he should not have to rely on the protection of his own State. If he had to rely 
on that State, his independence might well be compromised, contrary to the principle applied by 
Article 100 of the Charter. And lastly, it is essential that whether the agent belongs to a powerful or to 
a weak State; to one more affected or less affected, by the complications of international life; to one in 
sympathy or not in sympathy with the mission of the agent - he should know that in the performance of 
his duties he is under the protection of the Organization. This assurance is even more necessary when 
the agent is stateless. ICJ, Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ Reports 174, 183-184. 
91 B D Tittemore, ‘Belligerents in blue helmets: applying international humanitarian law to United 
Nations peace operations’, 33(1) Stanford Journal of International Law (1997) 61, 92-93. 
92 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 323 
93Art. 2(a) of the UN ILC Draft Articles of State Responsibility (2001) U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Art. 3(2)(a) 
of the UN ILC Responsibility of International Organizations (2003) U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.632  
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arrangements between the UN and contributing states and the application of the 
“effective control test”. When a peacekeeping operation is conducted under the 
(operational) command and control of the UN, it has a legal status of the UN 
subsidiary organ and violations of IHL committed by its members might be 
imputable to the Organization.94 With the responsibility comes the liability to make 
reparations.95 By virtue of the multi-layered authority structure in peacekeeping 
operations it might be difficult to assess the appropriate locus of responsibility for 
IHL violations of peacekeeping forces.96 In the submissions to the International Law 
Commission on the responsibility of international organisations, the United Nations 
Secretariat explained that: 
 
“In the practice of the United Nations the test of “effective command and control” applies 
“horizontally” to distinguish between a United Nations operation conducted under United Nations 
command and control and a United Nations-authorized operation conducted under national or regional 
command and control.”97 
 
This is in contrast to the test of “effective control” as proposed by the Commission 
that would apply “vertically” in the relations between the United Nations and its 
troop contributing states to condition the responsibility of the Organization on the 
extent of its effective control over the conduct of the troops in question. The UN 
further explained that: 
 
“It has been the long-established position of the United Nations, however, that forces placed at the 
disposal of the United Nations are “transformed” into a United Nations subsidiary organ and, as such, 
entail the responsibility of the Organization, just like any other subsidiary organ, regardless of 
whether the control exercised over all aspects of the operation was, in fact, “effective”. In the practice 
of the United Nations, therefore, the test of “effective control” within the meaning of draft article 6 
has never been used to determine the division of responsibilities for damage caused in the course of 
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94 D Shraga (n 1). There are two tests which could be applied to this case – an “effective” control test 
set out by the ICJ in Nicaragua Case and an “overall” control test used by the ICTY in Tadic Case 
95 Art. 3 of the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 
October 1907; Art. 91 of 1977 the Additional Protocol I 
96 It might be shared between the participating states and the United Nations; see e.g.: ECtHR, 
Behrami v. France (Application no. 71412/01) and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway 
(Application no. 78166/01) (2007); ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 
27021/08) (2011); The Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Hasan Nuhanjovic v. The State of the 
Netherlands (12/03324) (2013). However, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss this issue in 
more details. 
97 ILC, Responsibility of international organizations. Comments and observations received from 
international organizations (17 February 2011) A/CN.4/637/Add.1 Commentary to Draft Article 6, 
para. 3.2 
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any given operation between the United Nations and any of its troop-contributing States (…) In this 
connection, the Secretariat notes that the residual control exercised by the lending State in matters of 
disciplinary and criminal prosecution, salaries and promotion for the duration of the operation, is 
inherent in the institution of United Nations peacekeeping, where the United Nations maintains, in 
principle, exclusive “operational command and control” and the lending State such other residual 
control. However, as long as such residual control does not interfere with the United Nations 
operational control, it is of no relevance for the purpose of attribution.”98 
 
4.3. The status of peacekeepers under international humanitarian 
law 
 
Having established full applicability of international humanitarian law to 
peacekeeping forces by virtue of the obligations of their national states and 
concurrent obligations of the United Nations, their formal status under international 
humanitarian law needs to be examined.  
 
4.3.1. The principle of distinction 
 
One of the most fundamental principles of international humanitarian law is the 
principle of distinction which requires that parties to the conflict must at all times 
distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on one hand and combatants and 
military objectives on the other, and they may direct attacks only against the latter 
group.99 The principle appeared for the first time in the preamble to the St. 
Petersburg Declaration, which states that:  
 
“(…) the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken 
the military forces of the enemy (…) for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible 
number of men”.100  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 ILC, Responsibility of international organizations. Comments and observations received from 
international organizations (17 February 2011) A/CN.4/637/Add.1 Commentary to Draft Article 6, 
para. 3.3 -3.4. The further discussion of the issue of attribution and international responsibility is, 
however, beyond the scope of this research. 
99 A P V Rogers, Law on the battlefield (Juris Publishing Manchester University Press, 2nd ed. 2004), 
7; M Sassòli,  A Bouvier, A Quintin, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and 
Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Outline 
of International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 3rd ed. 2011) 1 
100 Preamble of St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 (or in full Declaration Renouncing the Use, in 
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight) 
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The 1907 Hague Regulations do not spell out the principle of distinction with regard 
to persons but they prohibit “the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of 
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended”.101 Similarly, the 
1907 Hague Convention IX contains such prohibition in Article 1 with regard to 
undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings. In Article 2 it excludes 
from the prohibition of bombardment by naval forces  
 
“(…) military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war matériel, workshops or 
plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the 
harbour”.102  
 
In modern international humanitarian law the principle of distinction is codified in 
Articles 48, 51 and 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Article 48 of AP I reads as 
follows: 
Article 48 – Basic Rule 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties 
to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives. 
 
There is no such explicit expression of the principle of distinction in conventional 
IHL relating to non-international armed conflicts. However, this rule is expressed in 
other terms in particular as the principle of distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, whereby civilians who do not take direct part in hostilities are included 
in the category of non-combatants.103 No official contrary practice was found with 
respect to either international or non-international armed conflicts and the principle is 
recognised as a customary international law norm applicable to both types of armed 
conflicts.104 It has been so applied by international courts and tribunals. Inter-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Art. 25 of 1907 Hague Regulations 
102 Art. 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of 
War 
103 Indirectly, Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of the 1977 
Additional Protocol II apply the principle of distinction speaking of those who do not take a 
active/direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, and providing 
fundamental guarantees for them. The explicit prohibition of attacks against civilians is included in 
Article 13(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, and in other international treaties: II and III Protocol 
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, in the Ottawa Convention banning anti-
personnel landmines, and in the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
104 Rule 1 (Distinction between Civilians and Combatants) and Rule 7 (Distinction between Civilian 
Objects and Military Objectives) of the ICRC Customary International Law Study and commentary to 
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American Commission on Human Rights noted the customary status of the principle 
of distinction and its applicability to all armed conflicts.105 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia affirmed that the principle of distinction 
together with the principles of precaution and protection form “the foundation of 
international humanitarian law”.106 In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the International Court of Justice stated that the 
principle of distinction, aiming at the protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects and establishing the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, was one of “the cardinal principles (…) constituting the fabric of 
humanitarian law” so fundamental to the respect of the human person and 
“elementary considerations of humanity” that they are to be observed by all states 
whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they 
constitute “intransgressible principles of international customary law”.107 As restated 
by the ICTY: “(…) it is now a universally recognised principle (…) that deliberate 
attacks on civilians or civilian objects are absolutely prohibited by international 
humanitarian law.”108 
 
Combatants v. civilians 
The corollary of the principle of distinction regarding persons is that there are two 
formal statuses under international humanitarian law: combatants and civilians. The 
definition of combatants is provided in Article 43(2) of the Additional Protocol I, 
which stipulates that: 
Article 43 – Armed forces 
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities.109 
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these rules. For a general discussion on customary status of the principle of distinction see e.g.: C 
Greenwood “Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols” in A J M Delissen, G J Tanja 
(eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict- Challenges Ahead (Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht-Boston-
London 1991), 108; Y Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2004) 82 
105 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Tablada case, Report No. 55/97, Case No. 11.137: 
Argentina, OEA/ Ser/ L/V/II.98, Doc. 38, December 6 rev., 1997, para. 176-177 
106 The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milo#evi", Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgement, (12 December 
2007), para. 941 
107 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996], ICJ Reports 1996 at 
257, paras. 78-79 
108 The Prosecutor v. Kupre#ki" et al. Case No. IT-95-16, Judgment, (14 Jan 2000), para. 521 
109 State practice has established this rule as a norm of customary international law in international 
armed conflicts; see: ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 3 
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The term “armed forces” is defined in paragraph 1 of the same Article as the armed 
forces of a party to a conflict consisting of all organised armed forces, groups and 
units under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates. 
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system to enforce their 
compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law.110 This definition of 
armed forces is based on the qualifications of belligerents in the Hague Regulations 
and the qualifications of prisoners of war in the Third Geneva Convention.111 
Accordingly, all members of regular/organised armed forces of a party to a conflict 
are considered to be combatants; whereas “irregular” militia and volunteer corps, 
including organised resistance movements, belonging to a party to the conflict are 
required to comply with certain conditions in order to be considered combatants 
(entitled to POW status).112 All these provisions are based on the same idea that all 
persons fighting on a behalf of a party to a conflict and meeting certain criteria are 
combatants.113 The concept of “belonging to” necessitates at least a de facto 
relationship between an organised armed group and a party to a conflict. It may be 
expressed by an official declaration or just a tacit agreement if actions of the 
“irregular” forces are indicative of their affiliation.114  
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110 State practice has establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in 
international armed conflicts. For purposes of the principle of distinction, it may also apply to State 
armed forces in non-international armed conflicts; see ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 4 
111 Annex to the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907): 
Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land - Section I: On belligerents - Chapter I: 
The qualifications of belligerents 
Art. 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer 
corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included 
under the denomination “army”. 
See also Art. 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention 
112 They all are entitled to prisoner-of-war status provided that they comply with the rules of 
international law of armed conflicts. Violations of these rules do not deprive combatants of their 
combatant status or the right to be a prisoner of war, with the exception that when they fail to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population, they will forfeit the right to be a prisoner of war; 
see Article 44 of AP I. 
113 See Commentary to Rule 4 of the ICRC Customary IHL Study 
114 J S Pictet (n 85) 57 
! 195 
Civilians, on the other hand, are defined negatively as persons who are not members 
of the armed forces, as set forth in Article 50 of the Additional Protocol I.115 As 
according to ICRC Customary IHL Study, state practice has established this 
definition of civilians as a norm of customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.116 This definition of civilians by 
exclusion as “anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organised 
military group of a party to a conflict” has been recognised and applied as customary 
law by the ICTY.117 In the Bla#ki" case, the Tribunal further clarified that civilians 
are also “persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces”.118 
 
There is no formal combatant status in non-international armed conflicts. Treaties 
applicable to this type of armed conflicts use the terms “civilian”, “armed forces” 
and “organised armed group” but do not define them. These concepts should, 
nevertheless, be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to them in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of IHL.119 
Since the protection of civilians is one of the main goals of international 
humanitarian law and the principle of distinction applies equally in non-international 
armed conflicts, the parties to such conflict must draw a distinction between 
combatants understood in generic sense as those who fight (“fighters”)120 and the 
civilian population/civilians who does not. In line with this, Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions provides that each party to the conflict must afford protection to 
“persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat”. The Additional 
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115 Art. 50 AP I Definition of civilians and civilian population 
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in 
Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of 
civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. 
116 Rule 5 of the ICRC Customary Study. In case of non-international armed conflict, however, 
practice is vague as to whether members of armed opposition groups are considered members of 
armed forces or civilians; see further the commentary to Rule 5 
117 The Prosecutor v. Gali", Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgement, (5 December 2003), para. 47; The 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla#ki", Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgement, (29 July 2004), para. 110; 
The Prosecutor v. Kordi" and $erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, (17 December 
2004), para. 97 
118 The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla#ki", Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement, (2 March 2000), para. 180 
119 Art. 31(1) o the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
120 E.g. the term “fighters” is used in the Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law (Sanremo 2006) at 4 
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Protocol II implicitly distinguishes between “armed forces” of a state, “dissident 
armed forces”, and “other organised armed groups” who have the function and 
ability “to carry out sustained and concerted military operations”121 on the one hand, 
and the civilian population and individual civilians who enjoy general protection 
against the dangers arising from military operations carried out by these forces and 
the protection from the attack “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities” on the other.122 Therefore, it can be concluded that similarly to 
international armed conflicts the concept of a civilian in non-international armed 
conflict is delimited in opposition to state “armed forces”, “dissident armed forces” 
and “other organised armed groups”.123  
 
The ICRC Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law suggests that for the purposes of 
the principle of distinction in a non-international armed conflict, organised armed 
groups constitute the armed forces of a non-state party to the conflict and consist 
only of individuals whose continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities 
(“continuous combat function”).124 Members of such armed groups belonging to a 
non-state party to the armed conflict cease to be civilians and lose protection against 
direct attack for so long as they take on their continuous combat function. A 
continuous combat function does not entitle to combatant privilege; rather, it 
distinguishes members of the armed forces of a non-state party from civilians who 
assume political, administrative or other non-combat functions for a non-state party 
and from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a spontaneous, sporadic, 
or unorganised basis.125 
 
In light of the above analysis of treaty and customary IHL, the combatant and 
civilian statuses under IHL are recognised as complementary and exclusive. This 
position was questioned by the U.S. and Israel in the wake of the “war on terror” and 
the third category of “unlawful combatants” was applied to detained members of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Art. 1(1) of the Additional Protocol II 
122 Art. 13 of the Additional Protocol II. The prohibition on directing attacks against civilians is also 
contained in Protocol II and Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; The 
Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines 
123 N Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 2009) 29-30 
124 Ibid 27 
125 Ibid 33-34 
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terrorist organisations.126 An “unlawful combatant” would be a person who takes part 
in hostilities and thereby is not protected from direct attacks but who upon capture 
neither qualifies for the privilege of being a prisoner of war nor is he subject to rules 
applicable for the detainment of civilians.127 The qualification of some detainees as 
“unlawful combatants” has been criticised by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and international human rights institutions as not having any legal 
justification.128 Human Rights Watch129 recalled the 1998 judgment of the ICTY in 
$elebi"i Camp case, which stated that: 
 
“(…) there is no gap between the Third and the Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an individual is not 
entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of the First or Second 
Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4 
requirements [defining a protected person – an explanation added] are satisfied.”130 
 
The ICTY referred to the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which 
asserts that: 
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126 The existence of the third category of “unlawful combatants”/”unprivileged belligerents” was 
advocated by the Bush Administration and the Government of Israel. The term “unlawful combatant” 
was first used in U.S. municipal law in a 1942 United States Supreme Court decision in the case Ex 
parte Quirin et al. (Supreme Court of the United States, Ex parte Quirin et al, 317 US 1 (1942)). See 
e.g.: The White House, President George W. Bush's Military Order of 13 November 2001: Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism; The White House, 
Memorandum Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees February 7, 2002; Final Report 
of the Independent Panel To Review DoD Detention Operations, August 2004 (United States, The 
Schlesinger Report); Government of the United States, Reply of the Government of the United States 
of America to the Report of the Five UNCHR Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, 10 March 2006; Supreme Court of Israel, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. 
Government of Israel, Case No. HCJ 769/02, 13 December 2006; Supreme Court of Israel, Iyad v. 
State of Israel, 1 Crim A 6659/06, 11 June 2008 
127 For a general discussion about “unlawful belligerency” see e.g.: R R Baxter, ‘So-called 
‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrilla, and Sabateurs’ 28 B.Y.I.L. (1951) 323; Y Dinstein, ‘The 
Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War Criminal’ (2003) 79 International Law Studies, 
151; Y Dinstein (ed.) International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 103; G Aldrich, ‘The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the determination of 
illegal combatants’ 96 American Journal of International Law (2002), 892; K Dörmann, ‘The legal 
situation of “unlawful/unprivileged combatants”’ (2003) No. 849 85 IRRC 45; K W Watkin, 
‘Combatants, unprivileged belligerents and conflicts in the 21st century’ (January 27-29,2003) 
Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research 
128 Reactions of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Schlesinger Panel Report on 
Department of Defence Detention Operations (8 September 2004): 
D. Page 86-7: “[The ICRC] contends that Geneva Conventions III and IV allow for only two 
categories of detainees: (1) civilian detainees who must be charged with a crime and tried and (2) 
enemy combatants who must be released at the cessation of hostilities.” 
129 Human Rights Watch, Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S. 
Forces (29 January 2002) 
130 The Prosecutor Muci" et al. Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, (16 November 1998), para. 271 
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“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a prisoner 
of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or 
again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. 
There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel that this is a 
satisfactory solution – not only satisfying to the mind, but also, and above all, satisfactory from the 
humanitarian point of view.”131 
 
Military objective v. civilian objects 
The principle of distinction with regard to objects distinguishes between military 
objectives, which may be attacked, and civilian objects, which must be protected 
from direct attacks. The term “military objectives” first came into use in the non-
binding 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare. Article 24 legitimises aerial 
bombardment only when directed at a military objective, which is defined as “an 
object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military 
advantage to the belligerent”.132 The definition is accompanied by an illustrative list 
of military objectives.133 The embodiment of the principle of distinction can be found 
in Article 48 and 52 of the Additional Protocol I.134 Paragraph 2 of Article 52 
provides a definition of a military objective: 
 
Article 52 – General protection of civilian objects 
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military 
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.135 
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131 Ibid; Commentary to GC IV, 51 
132 Art. 24(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare 
133 Art. 24 (2) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare; The list includes: military forces; military 
works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-known centres 
engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines of 
communication or transportation used for military purposes. The list is not considered to be 
exhaustive; see: APV Rogers (99) 60 
134 Generally, Chapter III (Arts. 52-56) of the Additional Protocol I deals with the protection of 
civilian objects. The prohibition on directing attacks against civilian objects is also included in 
Amended Protocol II and Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, “intentionally directing attacks against civilian 
objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives”, constitutes a war crime in international 
armed conflicts (Article 8(2)(b)(ii)). 
135 The Geneva Conventions refer to military objectives but do not define them, e.g. Article 19 of the 
GC I requires that the responsible authorities ensure that “medical establishments and units are, as far 
as possible, situated in such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their 
safety”. Article 18 of the GC IV contains a similar provision for the benefit of civilian hospitals. 
Article 8(1) of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural implies what may constitute 
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This definition is considered to reflect a norm of customary international 
humanitarian law applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.136 The term “attacks” is defined in Article 49(1) of the Additional Protocol 
as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” The 
noun “objects” clearly refers to material and tangible things,137 however, it is not to 
say that “military objectives” are limited to inanimate objects. Military personnel are 
also military objectives.138  
 
The definition contains two elements both of which must be simultaneously present 
for an object to constitute a military objective. With regard to the first prong, it refers 
to different types of objects that may make an “effective contribution to military 
action” of the enemy either by virtue of their inherently military “nature” or because 
of the circumstances surrounding their “location, purpose or use”. The fact that a 
military objective must make an “effective contribution to military action” does not 
require a direct connection with a combat operation such as is implied in Article 
51(3) of the Additional Protocol I with respect to civilians.139 Contrary to civilian 
persons who lose their protection from direct attacks only while they “take a direct 
part in hostilities”, civilian objects may become military objectives and lose the 
immunity from direct attacks through their use which is only indirectly related to 
combat action, but which nonetheless provides an “effective contribution” to the 
military phase of a party’s overall war effort.140 However, an “effective contribution” 
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a military objected but does not define it either. The definition in Article 52(2) of AP I is limited to 
objects, nevertheless, members of the armed forces are considered military objectives, which is in line 
with Preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg, see further: Commentary AP I at 635 para. 2017 
136 Rule 8 of the ICRC Customary IHL Study; for a general discussion of the principle of distinction, 
see: H B Robertson Jr., “The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict” in 
Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), The Law of Military Operations – Liber Amicorum Professor Jack 
Grunawalt, volume 72, US Naval War College’s International Law Studies (1998) 199, 204-207; A P 
V Rogers (n 99) 58-85; S Oeter, ‘Methods and means of combat’ in D Fleck (n 87) 175-193 
137 Y Sandoz, C Swinarski, B Zimmermann (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987), 633-
634, para. 2007-2008 [hereinafter: Commentary on the Additional Protocols] 
138 It is worth noting the language of Article 52(2): “[i]n so far as objects are concerned,” underscoring 
that not only inanimate objects constitute military objectives. See: A P V Rogers (n 96) 63; Y 
Dinstein, ‘Legitimate Military Objectives Under The Current Jus In Bello’ in A E Wall, (ed.), Legal 
and Ethical Lesson of NATO's Kosovo Campaign (2002) Vol. 78, US Naval War College’s 
International Law Studies 139, 142-143 
139 W A Solf, ‘Article 52’ in M Bothe, K J Partsch and W A Solf (eds) New Rules for Victims of 
Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982) 318, 324, para. 2.4.3; Y Dinstein (n 138) 145 
140 W A Solf (n 139) 324, para. 2.4.3.; Y Dinstein (n 138) 145 
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does not cover general war-sustaining efforts.141 It is also important that the targeted 
object is connected to the military action of the enemy, which necessarily excludes 
such civilian objects that only politically, financially or psychologically support the 
war machine.142  
 
With regard to the “nature”, the term denotes the intrinsic character of the military 
objective which makes an effective contribution to military action. According to the 
ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, the “nature” category comprises 
objects of inherently military character such as weapons, equipment, fortifications, 
depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff headquarters or communications 
centres.143 A particular “location” of objects might also satisfy the requirement of 
effective contribution to military action, like in the case of bridges.144 According to 
interpretative declarations made with respect to Articles 52(2) of API, a specific area 
may constitute a legitimate military objective in view of its location and the 
circumstances.145 The criterion of “purpose” refers to the intended future use of an 
object.146 Since any object could be converted into something useful for the military 
in the future, this criterion needs to be considered in the light of “the circumstances 
ruling at the time” which excludes too broad interpretation of any hypothetical 
possible future uses.147 The use of the present tense “make effective contribution” in 
Article 52(2), instead of the conditional “would make” or “could make”, corroborates 
this approach. The term “use” is concerned with the present/current function that 
makes an object of a military value, e.g. if a building such as school or hotel is used 
as military headquarters, it becomes a military objective.148 In case of doubt whether 
an object, which is normally used for civilian purposes, is being used for a military 
action, it should be presumed to have a civilian status and be protected from a direct 
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141 Y Dinstein (n 138) 145-146; M Sassòli, ‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International 
Humanitarian Law’ (Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge 2003), Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, HPCR (2003) 3 
142 A Boivin, ‘The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context of 
Contemporary Warfare’ (2006) Research Paper Series No. 2 University Centre for Humanitarian Law, 
18 
143 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 636 para. 2020 
144 Ibid para. 2021 
145 Statements and declarations with regard to Article 52(2) of AP I were made by Canada, Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom; see Commentary 
AP I at 636 para. 2025; see also: A P V Rogers (n 99) 68-69 
146 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 636 para. 2022 
147 W A Solf (n 139) 323-324 
148 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 636 para. 2022 
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attack.149 If an object has a dual-function or dual-use, i.e. it is being used for civilian 
as well as military purposes such as communications facilities or power plants, its 
classification depends, in the final analysis, on the application of both prongs of the 
definition of a military objective.150 Finally, since the first prong of the definition of 
military objectives is of an objective character, it requires reliable information on 
“nature, location, purpose or use” of an object in question to be obtained before 
ordering or executing the attack. 
 
The second element of the definition demands that “destruction, capture or 
neutralization” of an object capable of making an effective contribution to military 
action must offer a “definite military advantage” to the attacking party in “the 
circumstances ruling at the time”. A contrario, if “destruction, capture or 
neutralization” of an objects would offer only potential or indeterminate advantages, 
such object should not be attacked.151 The expression “definite military advantage” 
(as well as “military objective” discussed above) derives from the 1923 Hague Rules 
of Air Warfare, which uses the phrase “a distinct military advantage.”152 According 
to the Commentary, the adjective “definitive” was discussed at length during 
negotiations but eventually no reason was given for the choice among other words: 
“distinct”, “clear”, “immediate”, “obvious”, “substantial”, “specific”.153 What it does 
stand for is “a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical 
and speculative one.”154 It must also be of a military nature and not just purely 
political, hence for example: forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes of the 
adverse party would not qualify as a military advantage.155 The process of assessing 
military advantage must be made “in the circumstances ruling at the time”, which 
turns certain objects into military objectives only in specific timeframes.156 This 
restriction to the actual situation at hand is critical as every object could, due to 
possible future developments, become a military objective.157 This element 
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149 Art. 52(3) of the Additional Protocol I; It should be stressed that the presumption applies only to 
objects, which normally do not have any significant military use or purpose 
150 Rule 8 of the ICRC Customary IHL Study 
151 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 636 para. 2024 
152 Art. 24(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare 
153 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 635 para. 2019 
154 W A Solf (n 139) 326. 
155 Y Dinstein (n 138) 144 
156 Ibid 144 
157 M Sassòli (n 141) 3 
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emphasises dynamic circumstances of war and necessitates that timely and reliable 
information of the military situation is provided for the selection of targets for 
attack.158 
 
Despite these situational limitations the notion of “military advantage” is not 
restricted to tactical gains but has a broader meaning that takes into account the full 
context of a war strategy159 which is not, however, to be confused with the entire 
war.160 The term “military advantage” refers to the advantage which can be expected 
from an attack as a whole and not from its isolated parts.161 This interpretation 
recognises the fact that military operations consist of separate actions, each of which 
could be described as a specific “attack”, but which are directed toward a goal lying 
outside such single action and depending on the aggregate strategy of the party to a 
conflict.162 It would also cover “coalition wars”, so common in recent conflicts, as 
the military advantage could be applied to coordinated operations undertaken by the 
members of the coalition, providing that they fight for the same goal in an 
coordinated integrated manner.163 Finally, it is not necessary that the “effective 
contribution” made by the object to the military action of the enemy be related to the 
advantage anticipated by the attacker from the destruction, capture or neutralisation 
of the object.164  
 
The integrity of the principle of distinction is preserved only if two prongs of this 
definition are considered and satisfied.165 Furthermore, even if an object is 
determined a military objective, it might still be unlawful to attack it if other 
conditions are not satisfied: precautionary measures to spare civilians must be 
taken;166 indiscriminate attacks167 as well as reprisals168 are prohibited; the 
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158 Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 636 para. 2024; W.A. Solf (n 139) 326 
159 E.g. J Burger, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to Be 
Learned’ (2000) 82 IRRC 129, 132 
160 Y Dinstein (n 138) 145 
161 E.g. S Oeter, ‘Methods and means of combat’ in D Fleck (n 87) 185-186 
162 Ibid 186; W A Solf (n 139) 324-325 
163 M Roscini, ‘Targeting and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment’ (2005) 54 International and 
Comparative Law Quaterly 411, 423 
164 Solf gives the example of preparations of the invasion in Normandy in 1944, see: W A Solf (n 139) 
325 
165 A Boivin (n 142) 16 
166 Art. 2(3) of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX), Art. 57(1) of Additional Protocol I; Art. 3(10) of the 
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Art. 7 of the Second 
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proportionality rule must be respected;169 and the natural environment must be 
protected against widespread, long-term and severe damage.170 Some objects are 
exempted from attack, despite their distinct character as military objectives, such as 
works and installations containing dangerous forces.171 
 
Regarding the definition of civilian objects, the second sentence of Article 52(1) of 
the Additional Protocol I defines civilian objects using a negative method, similarly 
to Article 50 dealing with civilians: civilian objects are all objects that are not 
military objectives. Although the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
does not include definitions of military objectives or civilian objects, such definitions 
have nevertheless been incorporated into treaty law applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts and are regarded to reflect norms of customary IHL.172 
 
References to peacekeeping missions in international humanitarian law treaties 
Articles 8(2)(b)(ii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute prohibit intentionally 
directing attacks against peacekeeping personnel and objects in international and 
non-international armed conflicts respectively “as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict”. It is not the same as to say that peacekeeping personnel and objects are 
civilians and civilian objects. It should be noted that following the concept of 
“integrated missions”, most contemporary peacekeeping operations consist of 
different components: military, police and civilian.173 The Rome Statute does not 
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Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property; Rule 15 of the ICRC 
Customary IHL Study 
167 Art. 51(4) of the Additional Protocol I 
168 Arts. 51(6) and 52(1) of the Additional Protocol I 
169 Art. 51(5)(b) and 57 of the Additional Protocol I; Art. 3(3) of the Protocol II to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons; Art. 3(8) of the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons; Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute; Rule 14 of the ICRC Customary IHL 
Study 
170 Art. 35(3) and 55(1) of the Additional Protocol I; Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute; Rule 45 of the 
ICRC Customary IHL Study 
171 Art. 56 of the Additional Protocol I 
172 Rules 8 and 9 of the ICRC Customary IHL Study. The definition of military objectives is repeated 
in Amended Protocol II and Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. Protocol II and III 
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons contain also definitions of civilian objects. 
173 The concept of “integration” of the UN activities in the field was formally introduced in 1997, 
although various efforts aiming at achieving greater coherence within the UN system were undertaken 
long before. Calling for “unity of purpose” the Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated in 1997 a 
program for UN reform centred on “integration” between its humanitarian, peace-keeping and 
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make any reference to this fact. While the status of civilian police and civilian 
personnel such as administrative and humanitarian staff should not cause much 
controversy, the same is not true for military personnel. There is no specific 
reference to peacekeeping missions in any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or their 
Additional Protocols.174 An indirect reference that can be found in Article 37(1)(d) of 
the Additional Protocol I relates to the prohibition of perfidy and bans “the feigning 
of protected status by the use of signs emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or 
of neutral of other States not Parties to the Conflict”. This provision suggests the 
implied protected status of persons entitled to use these signs and has been so 
assessed by scholars.175 Cottier compares it to the protected status of civilians and 
persons hors de combat.176 However, it should be noted that the same article contains 
separate paragraphs prohibiting “the feigning of an intent to surrender, or an 
incapacitation by wounds or sickness, or civilian, non-combatant status”,177 which 
suggests that the protected status related to the UN might be of a distinct nature. 
Doria refers in this context to Article 38 of the Additional Protocol I on recognised 
emblems arguing that Article 37(1)(d) places the ICRC and the UN in the same 
category of “specially protected entities”.178 It is worth noting, however, that the 
Additional Protocol I itself does not explicitly define the nature of the “protected 
status” in the particular case of the United Nations or the rights and obligations 
flowing from it for UN personnel.179 The protective rules explicitly applying to 
peacekeepers can also be found in the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention 
(Article 9) and its Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Article 8).180 
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Before accepting Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute in the 
present form, delegations at the Rome Conference discussed different proposals on 
the structure and scope of the crime. These proposals advocated for a split of the 
offence as it was done for Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii), thereby differentiating 
between the personnel attacked and the objects attacked.181 It was also suggested to 
make a distinction between civilian and military personnel of a humanitarian 
assistance or peacekeeping mission and to define the protected objects as not 
associated with the latter category of persons. This concept was eventually dropped 
as not likely to be easily determined in practice.182 It was believed that the reference 
to IHL would provide better protection of missions than “an explicit association of 
the personnel and objects involved with combatants”.183 What the commentaries do 
not conclude but what can be reasonably deduced on the basis of the preparatory 
work is that the categories “peacekeeping personnel” and “peacekeeping objects” 
were not seen as homogenous but as containing or composed of dissimilar groups or 
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High Contracting Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article 1, the Party shall 
continue to be bound by the obligations of this Convention and of the relevant annexed Protocols until 
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elements (military and civilian), which appeared troubling in the context of equal 
civilian protection proposed for them. 
 
Despite the lack of the explicit qualification of peacekeeping personnel in core IHL 
treaties, all peacekeepers have to belong either to the category of combatants or the 
category of civilians, as the two are complementary and exclusive and there is no 
intermediate status between them. The same applies to objects involved in 
peacekeeping missions. The following section will briefly discuss how this issue was 
approached in international jurisprudence. 
 
4.3.2. Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals 
 
The status of peacekeeping personnel under international humanitarian law in 
relation to the attacks against them came before both UN ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and 
ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court.184  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
The first two indictments for crimes against peacekeepers were filed against Radovan 
Karad!i" and Radko Mladi" before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and concerned the hostage taking of over 200 UN peacekeepers 
and military observers in 1995 and holding them in various locations of strategic or 
military significant across Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to prevent further NATO 
air strikes against those sites. Given that the ICTY Statute does not contain any 
specific provisions dealing with the “intentionally directing attacks” against 
peacekeepers, the indictments against the two suspects charged them with “taking of 
hostages, a violation of the laws and customs of war, as recognised by Common 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949” (Count 11).185 This qualification 
places peacekeepers into a general category of individuals protected by Common 
Article 3 and these are persons who take no active part in the hostilities “including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause”. It does not indicate the 
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status of peacekeepers taken hostage as the protection covers equally civilians taking 
no active part in hostilities as well as combatants rendered hors de combat and no 
longer taking active part in hostilities.  
 
Karad!i" tried to challenge the charge of UN hostage taking on the basis that, inter 
alia, this crime requires the unlawfulness of detention whereas the UN personnel had 
been captured prisoners of war and not civilians hence their detention could not have 
been unlawful.186 The Trial Chamber dismissed the motion ruling that the detention 
of peacekeepers had been unlawful as they had been held not to ensure their safety or 
to protect them but in order to compel the NATO to abstain from conducting air-
strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. Also, they had been unlawfully 
threatened with death and/or injury during their detention. The Chamber reminded 
that the protection against hostage taking in Common Article 3 extended to both 
civilians and persons hors de combat and at the very least UN personnel had been 
rendered hors de combat by the mere fact of detention. In the light of this, the Trial 
Chamber did not find it necessary to rule on the status of peacekeepers prior to the 
detention.187 The issue of the status of UN personnel in relation to UN hostage taking 
returned before the Chamber in 2012.188 Also this time the Appeals Chamber did not 
take a position on whether the peacekeepers were combatants, finding that Common 
Article 3 would apply to the detained UN personnel irrespective of their status prior 
to detention.189 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also had an opportunity to approach 
the issue of the status of peacekeepers under international humanitarian law. In the 
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case The Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora et al. the killings of ten Belgian 
paratroopers serving for the United Nations Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) were 
subsumed under crimes against humanity and war crimes (serious violation of 
Common Article 3 and AP II) since the ICTR Statute does not contain a crime of 
intentionally directing attacks against peacekeeping personnel.190  
 
In relation to crimes against humanity committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population, it had to be established whether or not 
the killed peacekeepers had been civilians. The Trial Chamber was very brief and 
simply ruled that: 
 
“[c]onsidering their status as United Nations peacekeepers and that they were disarmed, the Chamber 
is satisfied that the victims could not be considered as combatants. The fact that the peacekeepers 
were able to obtain a weapon during the course of the attack in order to defend themselves against a 
mob of soldiers intending to kill them can in no way alter this conclusion.”191 
 
Interestingly, the Chamber referred to the ICTY Appeals Judgment in Marti! case, 
which ruled that the crimes against humanity could also be directed against hors de 
combat provided that all other conditions were met.192 The importance of this 
reference is that it implies that peacekeepers could have been combatants before they 
were disarmed and rendered hors de combat and the attack against them would still 
qualify as a crime against humanity. However, the second sentence of the cited 
fragment of the Bagosora Judgment contradicts the condition of being hors de 
combat, as it says that the peacekeepers could obtain weapons and defend 
themselves.193  
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In relation to the attacks against peacekeeping personnel as a serious violation of 
Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II, the Trial Chamber had to 
determine whether or not peacekeepers had been taking active part in hostilities at 
the time of the attacks. Again, the Chamber was very succinct. It stated that although 
the Belgian peacekeepers had been highly trained members of the Belgian Army’s 
Para Commando Battalion, as part of UNAMIR they had been neutral in the conflict 
between the Rwandan government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. They had 
been disarmed well before the attack against them and had not been taking active 
part in hostilities. The fact that one of them had obtained a weapon and used it in 
self-defence did not alter their status and they remained civilians.194 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
In the case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan 
Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, the specific crime of attacking 
peacekeeping personnel was applied for the first time.195 The attacks against 
peacekeepers were subsumed also under other offences in the Statute, murder as a 
crime against humanity, hostage taking and murder as war crimes.  
 
At the outset of its analysis, the Trial Chamber stated that the prohibition of attacks 
on peacekeeping personnel did not represent a new crime under international 
criminal law but rather a particularisation of the general prohibition on attacks on 
civilians and civilian objects.196 It did not explain why peacekeeping personnel 
should be regarded as civilians in the first place, but moved on to the discussion of 
the limits of this protection. The Chamber held that: 
 
“(…) common sense dictates that peacekeepers are considered to be civilians only insofar as they fall 
within the definition of civilians laid down for non-combatants in customary international law and 
under Additional Protocol II as discussed above – namely, that they do not take a direct part in 
hostilities. It is also the Chamber’s view that by force of logic, personnel of peacekeeping missions 
are entitled to protection as long as they are not taking a direct part in the hostilities – and thus have 
become combatants - at the time of the alleged offence. Where peacekeepers become combatants, they 
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can be legitimate targets for the extent of their participation in accordance with international 
humanitarian law.”197 
 
This is an interesting passage to analyse. At first sight (and despite the appeals to 
logic) the Chamber seems to miscomprehend the mutual exclusivity of the combatant 
and civilian status. If peacekeepers are civilians, the fact that they start taking direct 
part in hostilities does not turn them into combatants. It does deprive them of 
protection from direct attacks, but they remain civilians, which means that they can 
only be targeted for the duration of their participation in hostilities and that they are 
not entitled to the prisoner of war status upon capture. In contrast, combatants can be 
targeted at all times and not only when they are directly involved in combat. It has to 
be noted though, that the case before the Court concerned the crimes committed in a 
non-international armed conflict, while the formal combatant status applies only to 
international armed conflicts. Therefore, it should be assumed that the Court used the 
term “combatant” in the generic sense, as meaning someone directly involved in 
combat.198 With regard to the limits of protection granted to peacekeepers, the 
Chamber held that: 
 
“As with all civilians, their protection would not cease if the personnel use armed force only in 
exercising their right to individual self-defence. Likewise, the Chambers opines that the use of force 
by peacekeepers in self-defence in the discharge of their mandate, provided that it is limited to such 
use, would not alter or diminish the protection afforded to peacekeepers.”199 
 
Regarding the first sentence, the Court correctly stated that the use of force in 
individual self-defence does not qualify as direct participation in hostilities hence it 
does not deprive civilians of their protection. The second sentence is more 
problematic. Elsewhere in the judgment, the Chamber held that the concept of self-
defence for peacekeeping missions includes “the right to resist attempts by forceful 
means to prevent the peacekeeping operations from discharging its duties under the 
mandate of the Security Council”.200 It did not use the term “defence of the 
mission/mandate”, however this expression stands for this concept.201 As already 
analysed, the individual self-defence and the defence of the mandate can be 
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increasingly intertwined when exercised in practice; nevertheless, they constitute two 
distinct rights resting on two different legal bases. The Court stated that this extended 
right to self-defence is now “settled law” but did not refer to any international or 
national criminal law to support this conclusion. It only referenced the UN Capstone 
Doctrine and few reports of the UN Secretary-General but without any further 
analysis.202 The Court’s interpretation of the extent of peacekeepers’ right to self-
defence has been criticised in the scholarship as unconvincing.203  
 
In order to determine whether personnel or objects involved in a peacekeeping 
mission were entitled to the civilian protection the Court held that it must consider 
“the totality of circumstances existing at the time of any alleged offence”: 
 
“(…) including, inter alia, the relevant Security Council resolutions for the operation, the specific 
operational mandates, the role and practices actually adopted by the peacekeeping mission during the 
particular conflict, their rules of engagement and operational orders, the nature of the arms and 
equipment used by the peacekeeping force, the interaction between the peacekeeping force and the 
parties involved in the conflict, any use of force between the peacekeeping force and the parties in the 
conflict, the nature and frequency of such force and the conduct of the alleged victim(s) and their 
fellow personnel.”204 
 
When applying these criteria to the facts of the case, the SCSL found that UNAMSIL 
personnel had not participated directly in hostilities although they had used force in 
self-defence in response to the attacks by the RUF.205 As rightly noted by Engdahl, 
the examination of “the totality of circumstances” is not really necessary to 
determine whether personnel were entitled to the protection of civilians. Analysing 
the mandate or ROE might help to determine whether the mission was of a 
peacekeeping or an enforcement nature but the entitlement to protection would 
depend on the facts on the ground and actual actions taken by peacekeepers. He 
stresses that the authorisation to use force belongs to the jus ad bellum perspective of 
international law, not determinative for the protection under jus in bello.206 It might 
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also be questioned whether the same standard of reviewing “the totality of 
circumstances” is required from the attacking party before launching an attack and 
how this party is supposed to know the mission-specific ROE or operational orders to 
be able to determine whether peacekeepers are still entitled to civilian protection or 
not any longer.  
 
With regard to the count on taking hostages of UNAMSIL personnel, as a violation 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II,207 
the Chamber confirmed that one of the general requirements for this war crime is that 
the person or persons held hostage must not be taking a direct part in hostilities at the 
time of the alleged violation.208 As already discussed in relation to Karad!i" case, it 
encompasses civilians as well as hors de combat, hence is unhelpful in the 
determination of the status of peacekeepers prior to capture. 
 
In relation to the attacks against UNAMSIL personnel as other offences under the 
Statute, the Chamber maintained the qualification of peacekeepers as civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities.209  
 
The International Criminal Court 
In the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the case The Prosecutor v. Bahar 
Idriss Abu Garda210 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber referred in many instances to the 
SCSL’s jurisprudence. The legal findings in Abu Garda Decision were reiterated in 
the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus case.211 For the first time the 
Court considered the status of “installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
peacekeeping mission” under IHL, as this matter was not addressed by the SCSL. 
 
The Chamber analysed the mandate of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and 
found that it was a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the UN Charter and 
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therefore its personnel and objects should enjoy the protection given to civilians and 
civilian objects.212 Given the context of a non-international armed conflict, the 
Chamber referred to Article 13(3) of the Additional Protocol II and stated that 
peacekeepers were entitled to the protection unless and for such time as they took a 
direct part in hostilities. The protection would not have ceased if they used armed 
force in exercise of their right to self-defence. Similarly to the approach taken by the 
SCSL, the ICC considered that AMIS personnel were entitled to civilian protection 
simply because they were involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
UN Charter. It did not find it necessary or even relevant to investigate why a 
peacekeeping mission should be granted such a protection in the first place. Instead 
of applying IHL criteria for combatants and civilians, the Chamber focused on the 
question whether peacekeepers as civilians retained their protected status at the time 
of the attack. Based on the presented evidence, the Chamber concluded that there 
were substantial grounds to believe that AMIS personnel had not taken any direct 
part in hostilities or used force beyond self-defence and therefore they had been 
entitled to the protection of civilians.213 
 
With regard to peacekeeping objects, the Chamber noted that while the Additional 
Protocol I provides for general protection of civilian objects during international 
armed conflict, such broad protection is not offered by the Additional Protocol II 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts as only a limited number of civilian 
objects is protected under the latter treaty. Accordingly, the Rome Statute mirrors 
this asymmetry and there is no equivalent to Article 8(2)(b)(ii) that would apply to 
non-international armed conflicts.214 The Chamber turned then to the definition of a 
military objective in Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I and asserted that this 
definition applies as a rule of customary international humanitarian law also in non-
international armed conflicts.215 Accordingly, it ruled that: 
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“(…) installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission in the context of an 
armed conflict not of an international character shall not be considered military objectives, and thus 
shall be entitled to the protection given to civilian objects, unless and for such time as their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to the military action of a party to a conflict 
and insofar as their total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”216 
 
The Defence’s submission in this case was that peacekeeping objects had lost their 
protection due to their improper use, without challenging the civilian protection of 
AMIS personnel. The Defence alleged that the AMIS base in Haskanita had been 
used by the representative of the government of Sudan, who had been present there, 
to collect intelligence and to provide the coordinates to attack rebel groups. Thus, the 
base had become a lawful military target. Having examined the evidence, the 
Chamber found that the representative of the government of Sudan had been 
evacuated from the compound two weeks before the attack and in the presence of the 
members of the armed rebel groups. In the light of this fact, the Chamber concluded 
that the alleged improper activities of the government representative could not be 
considered as having had an impact on the protected status of AMIS installations, 
material, units or vehicles at the time of the attack.217 It recalled that the presence of 
the representatives of all parties to the conflict had been permitted in accordance with 
the agreement signed between them, and determined that the mere presence of the 
government representatives, or of rebel representatives, could not have rendered the 
base a legitimate military target.218 Noticeably, in arriving to the conclusion that 
AMIS installations, material, units or vehicles had been entitled to the protection 
afforded to civilian objects, the Chamber did not in fact apply the two-prong test for 
military objectives. It did not consider whether the peacekeeping objects could have 
made an effective contribution to military action of the government of Sudan due to 
their nature, location, purpose or use and whether their destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, could have offered a definite 
military advantage to the rebel groups. The only element that the Chamber relied on 
in its ruling was the time issue, which makes the legal analysis incomplete. 
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4.3.3. Peacekeeping personnel and objects entitled to civilian protection 
 
For the purpose of determining whether peacekeepers are entitled to the protection of 
civilians, the alternative approach to the one taken by the international courts is to try 
to first identify whether peacekeepers qualify as combatants.219 Given the way the 
definitions of the combatant and civilian statuses are constructed, the analysis should 
start by examining whether peacekeeping forces can be qualified as the armed forces 
belonging to a party to the conflict; only if that is determined in negative, they can be 
considered as falling into the category of civilians. Similarly, the status of objects 
involved in a peacekeeping mission should be determined by reference to the 
definition of military objectives.  
 
As the pervious sections prove beyond any doubt, military personnel of 
peacekeeping operations are members of the armed forces of troop contributing 
states, placed under responsible command and subject to an internal disciplinary 
system ensuring their compliance with international humanitarian law. It does not in 
itself make them combatants unless the second condition of belonging to a party to 
the armed conflict is also satisfied. A state participating in a peacekeeping operation 
would have to become a party to the conflict for its armed forces to become 
combatants. Since “a party to the conflict” represents a collective entity, not 
exclusively a state, a question might be raised here whether the United Nations could 
equally become a party to the conflict and what criteria should be used to determine 
whether peacekeeping forces could be said to “belong to” the UN–party to the 
conflict. Melzer argues that in the case of organised armed groups, they can be said 
to belong to a state if their conduct is attributable to that state under the international 
law of state responsibility.220 By analogy, if conducts of peacekeeping forces are 
attributable to the UN, could they be said to “belong to” it and would that make the 
UN a party to the conflict? The positive answer does not seem convincing. The level 
of command and control exercised by the UN over peacekeeping forces might be 
sufficient to attribute the responsibility for illicit acts committed by those forces and 
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the UN itself admits such responsibility for the act of its subsidiary organs,221 it 
would not, however, change the fact that military personnel contributed to a 
peacekeeping operation remain armed forces of their national states, subject to 
national jurisdiction and internal disciplinary system and that these states never 
relinquish full command over their contingents at the strategic level e.g. they might 
decide to withdraw their contingents at any time and for whatever reason. The fact 
that the UN does not have its own armed forces nor has it ever exercised “exclusive 
command and control” over peacekeeping forces contributed by UN Member States 
(despite the commonly and incorrectly used phrase), so to make them “belonging” to 
the Organization rather than to their national states, seems to preclude the UN from 
becoming a party to a conflict. This is regardless of the fact that the UN might still be 
held liable for violations committed in the course of a peacekeeping operation.222 
 
The risk for peacekeeping forces to become a party to a conflict is ruled out at least 
in the beginning of the operation since peacekeeping missions are deployed on the 
basis of the consent, which as elaborated in Chapter 2 is one of the fundamental 
principles of peacekeeping. Consent is necessary to ensure freedom of movement 
and to enable a mission to carry out its mandate, and this is why a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure the consent of the main 
parties and avoid situations that could jeopardize it.223 The Status of Force 
Agreements concluded between troop contributing states and a host state, granting 
peacekeeping personnel certain privileges and immunities, corroborate a consensual 
character of peacekeeping operations. In this light, how should we treat the armed 
forces of a state not engaged in a conflict itself that find themselves in the area of 
hostilities? The law of neutrality might provide some guidance in this respect.  
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The international legal regime of neutrality has its sources in both customary and 
conventional international law.224 Neutrality refers to the formal position taken by a 
state, which is not participating in an armed conflict and does not want to become 
involved. This status entails certain rights and obligations. The basic principles that 
should guide neutral states are non-participation and non-discrimination. In return, 
the neutral state has the right to stand apart from and not be adversely affected by the 
conflict.225 Nationals of a neutral state benefit from its neutral status unless they 
commit hostile acts against a belligerent, and/or acts in favour of another 
belligerent.226 As long as their national state maintains diplomatic relations with a 
belligerent state in which territory they live or visit, they remain under diplomatic 
protection and should be treated in the same way, as they would be in peacetime.227 
The SOFA is a diplomatic law instrument and indicative of the fact that the states-
parties to this agreement are not in a “state of war” and retain normal diplomatic 
relations. Given that the combatant status is only applicable in wartime, visiting 
forces of a neutral state have to be treated as civilians. If, for some reason, there are 
no such diplomatic relations, nationals of a neutral state are entitled to be treated as 
protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.228 It dos not make a 
difference to their status under IHL if they are civilians or members of the armed 
forces of a neutral state to which they belong.229 This analysis supports the view that 
peacekeeping forces are entitled to civilian protection. At this juncture, the reference 
should be made to the constitutive principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality 
and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. As 
extensively discussed in Chapter 2, the three principles distinguish peacekeeping 
from peace enforcement and prevent a peacekeeping mission from becoming a party 
to a conflict. Consent of a host state to the presence and operation of a peacekeeping 
mission within its territory is expressed through signing SOFAs with troops 
contributing states. If consent is withdrawn, the mission has to be withdrawn as well. 
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Impartiality shall be understood as an operational term. Peacekeeping missions are 
impartial in their dealings with the parties since they treat them equally in material 
terms in relation to the operation’s mandate. Peacekeepers may use force in self-
defence and defence of the mandate, but this is allowed only at the tactical level in 
the execution of the mandate and without favour or prejudice to any of the parties. 
Peacekeeping is meant to facilitate peace but not to enforce it. Such understanding of 
impartiality is compatible with the requirements of the neutral status under IHL. As 
explained above neutrality in war is conditional upon the principles of non-
discrimination and non-participation. Similarly, the peacekeeping principle of 
impartiality requires equal treatment of all parties vis-à-vis a mandate, without 
favour or prejudice to any of them, while the principle of non-use of force except in 
self-defence excludes participation in a conflict as a party to it. 
  
Accordingly, peacekeepers’ protection against direct attacks shall be governed by the 
same rules and standards of the international law of armed conflict that protect 
nationals of neutral states, which essentially means the rules and standards of civilian 
protection. As in case of all civilians, the protection of peacekeepers would cease 
“for such time as they take direct part in hostilities”.230 The following section will 
address this issue in more detail. 
 
As regards the objects involved in a peacekeeping mission, it should be noted at the 
outset that their status under international humanitarian law does not depend on the 
status of peacekeepers using them. The two have to be assessed separately. The 
analysis of the status of installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
peacekeeping mission should start with the two-prong test from Article 52(2) of the 
Additional Protocol I. Let us take military equipment of peacekeeping forces as an 
example. Weapons, ammunitions, armoured vehicles or attack helicopters that a 
peacekeeping mission might be equipped with seem easy to qualify as military 
objectives due to their inherently military nature. As discussed earlier however, it 
does not suffice if they do not in any way contribute to military action of a party to a 
conflict or to military action of peacekeeping forces themselves if they become 
directly involved in hostilities. The contribution has to be “effective” otherwise the 
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first condition of the test is not met. As noted before, an “effective contribution to 
military action” does not require a direct connection with a combat operation. This is 
relevant for objects of non-military nature, which through their location, purpose or 
use might only be indirectly related to a specific combat action. The example of a 
peacekeeping base serving as headquarters of one of the parties to the conflict or a 
radio station in such base being used to provide intelligence to one of the parties, like 
was allegedly the case in Haskanita, would meet the first requirement. The second 
prong of the definition of military objectives demands that “destruction, capture or 
neutralization” of an object satisfying the first condition offers a “definite military 
advantage” to the attacking party in “the circumstances ruling at the time”. If we 
apply this condition to the above example of the peacekeeping compound used as a 
military base of the one the parties to plan and prepare operations, destroying or 
neutralising it will offer “a definite military advantage” to the adversary. If however, 
a radio station is no longer used to provide intelligence then destroying it will not 
offer any definite military advantage to the attacking party “in the circumstances 
ruling at the time”, as it will not change the actual situation on the ground in any 
way. The test for a military objective would thereby fail. 
 
4.4. What constitutes “direct participation in hostilities”? 
 
International humanitarian law treaties do not define the notion of direct participation 
in hostilities.  The term derives from “ taking active part in hostilities” in Common 
Article 3 where the concept was used for the first time. Although the Additional 
Protocols use the word “direct”, the equally authentic French texts consistently use 
the phrase “participent directement” throughout the Geneva Conventions and both 
Protocols, which implies that the terms are synonymous and that they stand for the 
same type of participation in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. This interpretation was confirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda in the Akayesu case.231 Nevertheless, a disagreement among academics 
regarding this interpretation has emerged after the adoption of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. The Preparatory Committee for the Establishment 
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of an International Criminal Court distinguished between “active” and “direct” 
participation in the specific context of recruitment of children. It is argued, however, 
that this choice of words was made to draw a distinction between “combat” and 
“military activities linked to combat”, not between “active” and “direct” 
participation.232 
 
“Direct participation” refers to the individual involvement, while “hostilities” is 
understood as the collective recourse by parties to the conflict to means and methods 
of injuring the enemy.233 Treaty law on conduct of hostilities use the term 
“hostilities”, but also “warfare”,234 “military operations”235 or “operations”.236 The 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols stresses that the immunity granted to 
individual civilians is subject to a strict condition of abstaining from all “hostile 
acts”, interpreted as “acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause 
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces”237 or “struck at the 
personnel and ‘matériel’ of enemy armed forces”.238 An example given is that of a 
civilian who takes part in armed combat, either individually or as part of a group, and 
thereby becomes a legitimate target but only for as long as he takes part in 
hostilities.239 By reference to the discussions during the conference leading to the 
adoption of the Protocols, the Commentary implies that the expression “hostilities” 
includes preparations for combat and the return from combat, similarly to the phrase 
“military deployment preceding the launching of an attack” in Article 44 of the 
Additional Protocol I.240 There seems to be no condition that a civilian actually uses 
his weapon as the word ‘hostilities’ also covers the time when he is carrying it as 
well as situations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a weapon.241 
Only during direct participation in hostilities a civilian loses his immunity and 
becomes a legitimate target. Once he ceases to participate, he regains the protection 
and may no longer be attacked, as he no longer presents any danger for the 
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adversary.242 Furthermore, there is a presumption in favour of the civilian status in 
case of doubt provided for in Article 50(1) of the Additional Protocol I,243 which 
according to the Commentary concerns “persons who have not committed hostile 
acts, but whose status seems doubtful because of the circumstances.”244 The 
Commentary makes a clear distinction between direct participation in hostilities and 
participation in the war effort. The latter may involve the population as a whole in 
various degrees as many activities of the nation contribute to the conduct of 
hostilities, directly or indirectly.245 The term “direct participation in hostilities” 
implies a “direct” causal relationship between the activity and the harm done to the 
enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place, or put differently, 
between the act of participation and its immediate consequences.246  
 
The Commentary’s general approach to what constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities was applied by the ICTY Trial Chambers in Gali"247 and Milo#evi" 248 and 
referred to by the ICC Pre-Trail Chamber in the Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charged in Abu Garda case.249 The international jurisprudence has relied on the 
contextual determination of direct participation in hostilities, which involves a case-
by-case analysis. In Tadi" the Trial Chamber applied the test to ask whether, at the 
time of the alleged offence, the alleged victims of the attacks had been directly taking 
part in hostilities, in the context of which these attacks were committed and 
concluded that: 
 
“It is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active part in hostilities and those 
who are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine the relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain 
whether, in each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at the 
relevant time.”250 
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Similarly, the need for a case-by-case analysis was stressed by the Israeli Supreme 
Court Judgment in “Targeted Killings” case.251 The ICTY Appeal Chamber in the 
Strugar case gave few examples of direct participation in hostilities including: 
bearing, using or taking up arms; taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, 
conduct or operations; armed fighting or combat; participating in attacks against 
enemy personnel, property or equipment; transmitting military information for the 
immediate use of a belligerent; and transporting weapons in proximity to combat 
operations.252 All these pronouncements have shed some light on the interpretation of 
the notion of direct participation in hostilities, yet none of the courts has attempted to 
provide a more comprehensive guidance that would help to address dilemmas 
surrounding its practical application in the complex circumstances of contemporary 
warfare and related to the recent trends such as an increased outsourcing of 
previously traditional military functions to civilian personnel or private contractors, 
or unprecedented intermingling of civilians and armed actors. In order to advance the 
debate with a view to strengthening the implementation of the principle of 
distinction, the International Committee of the Red Cross in accordance with its 
international mandate to work for the better understanding and faithful application of 
international humanitarian law, initiated jointly with TMC Asser Institute in the 
Hague the series of expert consultations on the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities.253 Widely informed by the discussions held during these expert meetings 
and based on other materials and sources, the ICRC produced in 2008 the 
Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law. Ultimately, the Interpretative Guidance represents 
solely the ICRC’s institutional position and provides its recommendations on the 
interpretation of international humanitarian law as far as it relates to the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities. It is not a document of a binding nature, nor does it 
endeavour to change the law.254 The following sections will discuss briefly the ICRC 
interpretative guidelines for the notion of direct participation in hostilities and then 
apply them to peacekeeping operations. 
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4.4.1. The International Committee of the Red Cross approach – 
Interpretative Guidance 
 
The ICRC Interpretative Guidance addresses three major questions: (1) Who is 
considered a civilian for the purposes of the principle of distinction? (2) What 
conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities? (3) What modalities govern the 
loss of protection against direct attack? In this connection it provides ten 
recommendations and the commentary to them. 
 
Having established that personnel involved in peacekeeping missions are considered 
civilians, this section will discuss and apply the findings of the ICRC with respect to 
the second and third question. 
 
Direct participation in hostilities as a specific act 
In treaty IHL the notion of direct participation in hostilities applies equally to 
conducts of all individuals regardless of their status as civilians or combatants. The 
Interpretative Guidance relies on this understanding and emphasises that the scope of 
individual conduct that constitutes direct participation in hostilities is the same in 
case of individuals engaging in it on a spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganised basis or 
as part of a continuous function assumed by an organised armed force.255 It notes the 
importance of restricting the notion of direct participation in hostilities to specific 
acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to 
an armed conflict.256 This is based on the distinction made in IHL between 
temporary, activity-based loss of protection in case of civilians, and continuous, 
status or function-based loss of protection in case of combatants. 
 
The Interpretative Guidance proposes three cumulative criteria that must be met by a 
specific act to qualify as direct participation in hostilities:  
 
1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects 
protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
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2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from 
that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation), and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in 
support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).257 
 
 
Threshold of harm 
A specific act will qualify as direct participation in hostilities if the harm that is 
likely to result from it attains a certain threshold. The harm reaching this threshold 
does not have to materialise though, the objective likelihood that the act will result in 
such harm suffices. In case of a harm of a specifically military nature, any 
consequence adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to the conflict would qualify. There is no requirement to inflict death, injury or 
destruction on military personnel or objects. In absence of such military harm, for a 
specific act to qualify as direct participation in hostilities it must be likely to cause 
death, injury, or destruction of protected persons or objects.258 
 
Direct causation 
The use of words in the term “direct participation in hostilities” implies that some 
forms of participation might be “indirect”. On a collective level such acts would 
correspond to general war efforts or war sustaining activities. They would not result 
in the loss of protection. In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, there 
must be a sufficiently close causal relation between the act and the resulting harm. 
The distinction between direct and indirect participation in hostilities should 
therefore be interpreted as corresponding to that between direct and indirect 
causation of harm. As further explained, direct causation means that the harm must 
be brought about in one causal step. A conduct building up or maintaining the 
capacity of a party to harm its enemy only indirectly causes harm, and therefore falls 
outside the scope of direct participation in hostilities.259 Additionally, it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient that the act be indispensable to the causation of harm or that 
the act and its consequences be connected through an uninterrupted causal chain of 
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events.260 With regard to direct causation in collective military operations, the 
standard of direct causation would be met in case of conducts constituting an integral 
part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly causes the required 
threshold of harm. Lastly, the requirement of direct causation refers to a degree of 
causal proximity, and regardless of temporal or geographical proximity.261 
 
Belligerent nexus 
As remarked in the Interpretative Guidance, not every act that directly adversely 
affects the military operations or capacity of a party to an armed conflict or directly 
inflicts death, injury, or destruction on protected persons and objects necessarily 
constitutes direct participation in hostilities. The third requirement needs to be 
satisfied that “the act must also be specifically designed to do so in support of a party 
to an armed conflict and to the detriment of another”.262 In this context, belligerent 
nexus is an objective criterion and should be distinguished from concepts such as 
subjective intent and hostile intent.263 Many activities during armed conflict cause a 
required level of harm but lack belligerent nexus such as individual self-defence, 
exercise of power or authority over persons or territory, civil unrest or inter-civilian 
violence.264  For example, the use of force by civilians to defend themselves against 
an unlawful attack or looting, rape, and murder by marauding soldiers may reach the 
required threshold of harm, but it clearly lacks belligerent nexus as it is not 
undertaken to support a party to the conflict against another. If the use of force is 
necessary and proportionate in such situations, it cannot be regarded as direct 
participation in hostilities.265 
 
The Interpretative Guidance advocates that if applied in conjunction, the three 
requirements of threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus allow 
distinguishing activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities and therefore 
entail loss of protection against direct attacks, from those that do not.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 Ibid 54 
261 Ibid 54-55 
262 Ibid 58 
263 Ibid 59 
264 Ibid 61-63 
265 Ibid 61 
! 226 
Temporal scope 
Similarly to the dominant interpretation as discussed in previous section, the 
Interpretative Guidance asserts that the concept of direct participation in hostilities 
includes measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct 
participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the 
location of its execution regardless of their temporal and geographical proximity, 
provided that they constitute an integral part of that act.266  
 
According to treaty and customary IHL civilians enjoy protection against direct 
attack “unless and for such time” as they take a direct part in hostilities. This phrase 
implies that in such cases their protection against direct attacks is temporarily 
suspended for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities; they do not however, cease to be civilians. This necessarily entails the so-
called “revolving door” phenomenon; civilians lose and regain protection against 
direct attacks in parallel with the intervals of their involvement in direct participation 
in hostilities.267 The Interpretative Guidance draws a clear distinction in this respect 
between civilians and members of organised armed groups belonging to a non-state 
party to an armed conflict. The latter group lose protection against direct attack for 
the duration of their membership i.e. for as long as they assume their continuous 
combat function.268 
 
The next section will apply these interpretative guidelines in a peacekeeping context 
in order to determine whether certain activities undertaken in the defence of the 
mandate in situation of an armed conflict could qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities.  
4.4.2. Can “defence of the mandate” qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities? 
 
To answer the question whether “defence of the mandate” qualifies as direct 
participation in hostilities, this section will examine the MONUSCO’s Intervention 
Brigade. 
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On March 28, 2013, acting on the recommendations of the Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon and in response to the call of the governments in Africa’s Great Lakes 
region, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2098 
(2013) which extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and authorised the 
creation of an “Intervention Brigade” to conduct offensive operations against armed 
revels groups. The Brigade is a “first-ever offensive combat force” intended to carry 
out targeted operations against 23 March Movement (M23) and other Congolese 
rebels and foreign armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.269 As 
stressed in the Resolution, the Intervention Brigade is established within the 
operation’s existing force “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent 
or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping”.270 The Brigade operates 
under the direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander “with the 
responsibility of neutralizing armed groups (…) and the objective of contributing to 
reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in 
eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities”.271 With reference to 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution authorises MONUSCO to take all 
necessary measures to perform the mandated tasks, through its military component - 
its regular forces and its Intervention Brigade as appropriate. Specifically, 
MONUSCO is authorised, in support of the authorities of DRC and taking full 
account of the need to protect civilians, to carry out: 
 
“(…) targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade (…) either unilaterally or jointly 
with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with 
international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence 
policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, 
neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the 
threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make 
space for stabilization activities”272 
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There are a few legal issues that arise from the creation of the Intervention Brigade 
and from its mandate, which are relevant and illustrative in the context of the 
research question asked in the beginning of this section. The first issue is the status 
of the Brigade. As explicitly stated, it remains an integral part of the MONUSCO 
operation formed from its existing forces under the same command and control 
arrangements. Specifically, it is not meant to be an enforcement measure to operate 
alongside the existing peacekeeping operation and supportive to it but under 
command and control of participating states, as it happened in the former Yugoslavia 
or Somalia.273 The Resolution 2098 (2013) reaffirms in its preamble “the basic 
principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-
use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate” as well as the 
Security Council’s “strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of the DRC” and “the need to respect fully the principles of non-
interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation”.274 Given the structural 
integration of the Brigade with the existing peacekeeping operation as well as the 
consent of the host state, DRC, to its newly transformed mandate,275 the status of its 
personnel seems to remain essentially the same as the rest of the mission, that is 
civilian. As all civilians, they are protected from direct attacks unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. The mandate adopted under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter with the explicit authorisation to take all necessary means to 
neutralise and disarm armed rebel groups through targeted offensive operations “in a 
robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” is more than plausible to involve the 
military personnel of the Brigade in the hostilities. The qualification of their actions 
in fulfilment of such mandate will still depend on the facts on the ground but the 
analysis of the resolution makes it reasonable to assume that three cumulative 
conditions as put forth by the ICRC in its Interpretative Guidance are likely to be 
met and such actions would amount to direct participation in hostilities.  
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Firstly, the targeted offensive operations undertaken in order to “neutralize and 
disarm” armed groups are probable to reach a required threshold of harm by 
adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity of a party to the 
conflict. Examples of such harm listed in the Interpretative Guidance include: the 
killing and wounding of military personnel; the causation of physical or functional 
damage to military objects; sabotage and other armed or unarmed activities 
restricting or disturbing deployments, logistics or communications. The capturing or 
otherwise establishing or exercising control over military personnel, objects or 
territory to the detriment of the opposing party would also adversely affect military 
operations of that party or its military capacity.276 The resolution 2098 explicitly 
authorises offensive actions, as opposed to actions taken in self-defence, which if 
read in line with the usual meaning of the concept of military offensive actions, 
would include deliberate attacks, conducting ambushes and holding ground against 
the adversary.277 The term “neutralize” might reasonably be read to mean targeting 
armed forces with lethal force or at least the power to capture and detain members of 
the armed groups.278 This interpretation has been confirmed by the actual military 
operations undertaken by the Brigade, which undoubtedly reached the required 
threshold of harm.279 
 
With regard to the second condition of direct causation, the collective nature and 
complexity of contemporary military operations must be taken into account. Not all 
activities constituting a military operation would, when undertaken in isolation, 
directly cause the required threshold of harm. As advised by the Interpretative 
Guidance, the standard of direct causation for collective operations should be 
interpreted to include also these conducts that cause harm only in conjunction with 
other acts, provided that they all form integral parts of a concrete tactical operation. 
Examples of such acts are, inter alia, the identification and marking of targets, the 
analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to attacking forces, or the 
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instruction and assistance given to troops for the execution of a specific military 
operation.280 In the case of the Intervention Brigade, the required standard of direct 
causation of harm would therefore be met for all individual conducts constituting 
integral parts of targeted offensive operations against rebels. That would also include 
preparatory measures for specific operations even if temporary and geographically 
distant from them such as equipment, instruction, and transport of personnel; 
gathering of intelligence; and preparation, transport, and positioning of weapons and 
equipment.281 
 
The third requirement to be satisfied for a specific act to constitute direct 
participation in hostilities is that it must be undertaken in support of a party to an 
armed conflict and to the detriment of another.282 The resolution 2098 leaves no 
doubt that “neutralization” of rebel armed groups through the Brigade is authorised 
in support of the authorities of the DRC, and it is to be conducted either unilaterally 
or jointly with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: 
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)) to the obvious 
detriment of those armed groups. 
 
If all these conditions are met, the actions of the Intervention Brigade will amount to 
direct participation in hostilities and deprive its members of civilian protection. By 
virtue of the fulfilment of their mandate, which has a firm legal basis in the 
resolution of the Security Council, the members of the Brigade will lose protection 
from direct targeting. While the casus of the Intervention Brigade is particularly 
illustrative, the same conclusion can be reached for other missions operating under 
robust and protective mandates. Let us take the example of MONUSCO.  
 
MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation 
MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) on 1 July 2010. It was authorised to use all necessary means to carry out its 
mandate relating, inter alia, to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of 
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physical violence and to support the government of the DRC in its stabilisation and 
peace consolidation efforts.283 As discussed in the preceding chapter, the phrase “all 
necessary means” is a shibboleth for the use of force beyond self-defence, and 
depending on the interpretation of the mandated tasks and circumstances on the 
ground it might involve offensive and robust use of such force. Specifically, 
MONUSCO has been mandated within the limits of its capacity and in the areas of 
deployment to: 
 
“Ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights 
defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of 
the parties engaged in the conflict”284 
 
This sufficiently flexible formulation could cover offensive operations aimed at 
destroying military capacity of rebels so to render them incapable of launching 
attacks against the civilian population. Arguably, the protection would only be 
“effective” if the attacks were thwarted in advance and prevented all together. 
However, although the requirements of the threshold of harm and direct causation 
could be met, the belligerent nexus in this specific case is questionable. While such 
operations would be detrimental to one party to the conflict (rebels), they would still 
be primarily undertaken in order to protect the civilian population from abuses and 
only indirectly in support of the DRC government, or more precisely in support of 
the government’s own efforts to protect its citizens.285 A more straightforward 
example relates to MONUSCO’s other mandated task to: 
 
“Support the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to bring the ongoing 
military operations against the FDLR, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed groups, to 
a completion, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and the 
need to protect civilians, including through the support of the FARDC in jointly planned operations, 
as set out in paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 32 of resolution 1906 (2009)”286 
 
Also in this case, the language of the mandate allows for a flexible approach to the 
range of options of how to fulfil this task and might as well include offensive 
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military operations undertaken alongside the governmental forces against the 
organised armed groups. If this option was chosen, such operations would be likely 
to meet all three conditions for direct participation in hostilities, including the 
belligerent nexus as clearly implied in the paragraph cited above. The legal 
qualification of such scenario would therefore be identical to that of the Intervention 
Brigade - the peacekeepers participating in such operations in the fulfilment of their 
mandate would be deprived of their civilian protection. If supporting the government 
is limited to logistics, assisting and training of its armed forces in general, the causal 
link with the harm inflicted on the adversary will normally remain indirect, unless 
where such assistance and training is specifically conducted for the execution of a 
specific military operation as its integral part, it would then qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities.287 
 
These examples demonstrate that Chapter VII robust mandates authorising the 
missions to use force beyond self-defence to protect civilians and to help stabilise 
and extend state authority in an on-going non-international armed conflict are likely 
to involve peacekeeping troops in direct participation in the hostilities and entail their 
loss of protection from attack, even in the absence of any specially established 
intervention brigade. In fact, the involvement of UN peacekeeping missions in the 
offensive military operations against armed groups is not new and has already 
seriously compromised any pretence/claim of impartiality and allowed the use of 
force beyond self-defence.288 That calls into question the utility of these principles as 
parameters defining peacekeeping. It also entails serious consequences for 
peacekeepers under international humanitarian law. Although their actions derive 
their legal authority from the resolution of the Security Council, the fact that they are 
legal under jus ad bellum does not protect peacekeepers from direct attacks under jus 
in bello. Their civilian protection against direct attacks is governed by the same rules 
and standards of the international law of armed conflict that apply to any other 
civilians. As has been proven in proceeding sections of this chapter, IHL is fully and 
equally applicable to peacekeeping troops through their national states and also due 
to customary obligations of the United Nations. As has also been discussed in the 
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previous chapter, the defence of the mandate does not extend this protection since it 
does not qualify as individual self-defence. Under IHL, peacekeeping forces lose the 
protection from direct attacks in the fulfilment of their mandate if and for as long as 
it amounts to direct participation in hostilities. If these conditions are met, such 
attacks will not constitute war crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the 
Rome Statute of International Criminal Court. 
 
Apart from concerns about this unresolved friction between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, which is explored in greater detail in the next section, robust mandates and 
involvement of peacekeeping forces in combat activities give raise to further 
problems under jus in bello. The most serious one concerns the principle of 
distinction and is two-fold. Firstly, the example of the Intervention Brigade and 
maybe generally peacekeeping forces operating under robust mandates involving 
offensive combat operations, seriously undermine the conceptual integrity of the 
categories of persons under international humanitarian law. Such peacekeepers are 
considered civilians who lose protection only for the duration of the specific acts 
constituting direct participation in hostilities, even though it might be argued, at least 
in the case of the Intervention Brigade, that their actions in the fulfilment of their 
mandate to “neutralize and disarm rebel armed groups” amount to assuming a 
continuous combat function. The civilian status provides such military peacekeeping 
personnel with a significant operational advantage over members of organised armed 
groups, who can be attacked on a continuous basis due to their membership. The 
second problem relates to the distinction per se. If the Intervention Brigade is again 
used as an example, the unresolved question is whether and how the members of the 
Brigade should distinguish themselves from the rest of the MONUSCO 
peacekeeping force, who is not tasked with “neutralizing and disarming rebel armed 
groups”, as they wear the same uniforms with the protected UN emblem and operate 
under the same operational control of the UN Force Commander. 
 
4.5. Jus ad bellum v. jus in bello 
 
As it has been conclusively shown, peacekeeping forces do not differ in their legal 
standing from regular national armed forces as far as the application of international 
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humanitarian law is concerned. The fact that peacekeepers act in fulfilment of the 
UN mandate makes their actions legal under jus ad bellum, yet it does not affect or 
otherwise modify the applicability of jus in bello which is determined by the actual 
situation on the ground. These two branches of international law operate 
independently from each other. 
 
The clear separation of jus ad bellum from jus in bello is relatively recent.289 While 
the concepts featured in legal debate for centuries, the terms have been used 
regularly and the conceptual distinction between them has been advocated only since 
World War II.290 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal confirmed the autonomy of 
jus in bello with regard to jus ad bellum by making a distinction between war crimes 
and crimes against peace.291 This distinction was firmly upheld by the practice of 
military tribunals. In the Hostages case (USA v. Wilhelm List et al.) the US Military 
Tribunal V, citing Lassa Oppenheim, ruled that: 
 
“Whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and whether or not the cause be a so-called 
just cause, the same rules of international law are valid as to what must not be done, may be done, and 
must be done by the belligerents themselves in making war against each other, and as between the 
belligerents and neutral states. This is so, even if the declaration of war is ipso facto a violation of 
international law (…).”292 
 
This distinction is the converse of the so-called ‘just war’ theory, which subordinates 
jus in bello to jus ad bellum considerations.293 There are major humanitarian and 
practical reasons for maintaining the distinction between the two regimes. The 
purpose of IHL is to limit the suffering caused by war and to protect and assist all 
victims as far as possible regardless of the reasons for, or legality of, resorting to 
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force.294 The practical considerations are equally compelling. Most belligerents are 
convinced that their cause is just, therefore the only chance that IHL will be 
respected is to apply it irrespective of which party bears responsibility for the 
outbreak of the conflict and only if the same rules apply to all. 295 Not only does IHL 
apply independently of the qualification of the conflict under the law governing the 
use of force,296 the arguments under jus ad bellum may not be used to interpret IHL 
rules.297 What follows is that any military action undertaken within the framework of 
the conflict can only be judged in the light of IHL.298 On this last issue however, the 
International Court of Justice could not decide whether self-defence, the most 
common jus ad bellum argument, could be employed to interpret IHL in the extreme 
case of using nuclear weapons: 
 
“It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular 
the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international 
law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;”299 
 
A consequence of the separation of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello is the equality 
of belligerents under the latter regime. IHL binds all belligerents regardless of who is 
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the aggressor; all have to comply with the same rules.300 With respect to international 
armed conflicts this principle is articulated in Common Articles 1 and 2 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions301 and in the Preamble to the Additional Protocol I. The latter 
treaty is especially explicit: 
 
“Reaffirming further that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this 
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those 
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on 
the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict (…).”302 
 
The principle that all belligerents are bound by international humanitarian norms is 
upheld also in non-international armed conflicts.303 Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions stipulates that “each Party” to such conflict has to apply its provisions. 
Although the Additional Protocol II does not contain such express provision, its 
Article 1 provides that the application of the Protocol II is dependent only on 
material circumstances linked to the nature of the military operations - the exercise of 
de facto control of part of the territory and the ability of the insurgent party to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. If 
these conditions are met, the treaty applies regardless of the cause of the conflict. 
While there is no symmetry between the warring parties in non-international armed 
conflict due to the lack of the combatant immunity which results in unequal 
treatment under domestic law, obligations of the parties with regard to the conduct of 
hostilities as well as certain protections apply equally. The ICRC IHL Customary 
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Study corroborates that the obligation to respect and ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law applies to each party in international as well as non-international 
armed conflicts.304 
 
The principle of equal application of IHL also holds true for UN military operations, 
whether in enforcement or peacekeeping mode, and this has been confirmed by the 
UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin.305 If UN forces engage in armed conflict, they are 
bound by international law in the normal way and regardless of whether their 
mandate authorises “the use of all necessary means” or is a traditional peacekeeping 
one; IHL applies according to the actual situation on the ground.306 What it all comes 
down to is that peacekeepers, not originally meant to take part in combat, may 
become lawful targets by virtue of fulfilling their mandate. The fact that they “defend 
their mandate/mission” does not grant them any immunity. The emergence of the 
concept of the defence of the mandate has proven helpful in maintaining the 
conceptual/theoretical distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement as it 
explains the use of force beyond self-defence without deconstructing the trinity of 
peacekeeping principles. Beyond maintaining semantic coherence, “the defence of 
the mandate” does not extend the protection of peacekeepers under international 
humanitarian law. What is more, the practice of robust protective mandates 
additionally exposes them to the risk of becoming directly involved in hostilities and 
losing civilian protection. This inevitably raises concerns as to whether the adherence 
to the principles of international humanitarian law interferes with the Organization’s 
ability to maintain or restore the international peace and security.  
 
It also seems that Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute are 
redundant since peacekeeping personnel are equally protected by a general 
prohibition to intentionally direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects in 
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Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and 8(2)(e)(i).307 Singling out the particular group of 
persons and objects under separate provisions of the Rome Statute creates a promise 
of special protection of peacekeeping missions operating under complex robust 
mandates in service of the international community, which is not fulfilled. 
 
In connection with special protection, some scholars have advocated the idea of 
selective applicability of IHL to UN forces or even granting forces acting under the 
authority of the United Nations immunity from attack in all circumstances. One of 
the earliest proposals pointing at the distinctive nature of UN military operations 
came from the American Society of International Law’s Committee on the Study of 
the Legal Problems of the United Nations in the 1950s as part of a general debate on 
the applicability of IHL to the UN. Without reaching any definite conclusion on the 
question of applicability, the Committee noted: 
 
“The Committee agrees that the use of force by the United Nations to restrain aggression is of a 
different nature from war-making by a state. The purposes for which the laws of war were instituted 
are not entirely the same as the purposes of regulating the use of force by the United Nations. This we 
may say without deciding whether United Nations enforcement action is war, police enforcement of 
criminal law, or sui generis. In the present circumstances, then, the proper answer would seem to be, 
for the time being, that the United Nations should not feel bound by all the laws of war, but should 
select such of the laws of war as may seem to fit its purposes (e.g., prisoners of war, belligerent 
occupation), adding such others as may be needed, and rejecting those which seem incompatible with 
its purposes. We think it beyond doubt that the United Nations, representing practically all the nations 
of the earth, has the right to make such decisions.”308 
 
Sharp went even further when criticising the UN Safety Convention for its limited 
scope, he proposed a draft additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions that would 
have established a total immunity of personnel participating in any operation 
authorised by the competent organ of the UN.309 Tittamore also discussed the 
possibility of exempting UN forces from some or all IHL norms and pointed at the 
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mechanism of derogation clauses similar to those utilised in human rights treaties 
and Article 103 of the UN Charter. Article 103 provides: 
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail. 
 
Shall the Security Council support the idea of enhancing the protection of 
peacekeeping forces from direct attacks this provision of the Charter gives it such 
power to override certain obligations/rules flowing from IHL treaties. The Security 
Council has already used its power to give precedence to the provisions of its binding 
resolutions over other international obligations.310 For instance, it granted a general 
exemption of limited duration from investigation and prosecution by the ICC to 
personnel from troop contributing states, who are non-parties to the Rome Statute, 
taking part in any UN-established or authorised operation;311 it also modified the law 
of occupation in respect to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003.312 So 
far it has not extended the protection of peacekeeping forces from direct attacks 
beyond what is prescribed by law. In resolution establishing the MONUSCO 
Intervention Brigade, the Security Council reiterated “its condemnation of any and 
all attacks against peacekeepers, emphasizing that those responsible for such attacks 
must be held accountable” and at the same time it prescribed that targeted offensive 
operations carried out through the Intervention Brigade are “in strict compliance with 
international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights 
due diligence policy”, thereby leaving the tension unresolved. 
 
Without going into a discussion as to whether the scope of Article 103 of the UN 
Charter extends only over “international agreements” in the sense of treaties and 
contracts, or also over customary international law, it is uncontroversial that it does 
not cover obligations flowing from peremptory norms of general international law 
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(jus cogens).313 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty is void if, at 
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. It defines a jus cogens norm as “a norm accepted and recognised 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted”. A Security Council resolution granting peacekeeping 
personnel who defend their mandate total immunity from attacks, even when they 
take direct part in hostilities, would clash with one of the fundamental principles of 
IHL – the principle of distinction. Since this principle is considered to be a 
peremptory norm and as declared by the International Court of Justice an 
“intransgressible principle of customary law”314 it is doubtful it could be disregarded. 
Article 53 of the VCLT further provides that a peremptory norm “can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character” 
while Article 64 adds that if a new peremptory norm of general international law 
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with it becomes void and terminates. 
What follows from this is that a new peremptory norm modifying the principle of 
distinction would have to emerge to grant peacekeepers immunity from attack in all 
circumstances. 
 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusions 
!
This Chapter was focused on the applicability of international humanitarian law to 
peacekeeping operations. Firstly, it examined the command and control arrangements 
in UN-led peacekeeping operations and concluded that the UN and troop 
contributing countries exercise various degrees of authority over the troops 
participating in the mission. This multi-layered authority structure results in certain 
operational limits placed on national contingents as well as determining the law 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel. In this connection it should also be 
remarked that any statements about the UN exercising “exclusive command and 
control” over peacekeeping forces are largely inaccurate. National states retain full as 
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well as tactical command and control over their contributed forces while contingents 
remain bound by national laws and treaty obligations of their national states, as well 
as national ROE. The UN exercises operational control over contributed troops, 
which is unified and centralised, and the chain of command runs from the Security 
Council to the Secretary-General and then to the Head of Mission. States retain 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over their contingents, which are bound by IHL 
through the obligations of their national states. With regard to the question as to 
whether the UN is also bound by international humanitarian law, the principle of 
functionality that determines the scope of law applicable to activities carried out by 
international organisations was recalled. According to this principle, the United 
Nations is bound by norms of international humanitarian law. Although it cannot 
become a party to IHL treaties, it is bound by customary law. Additionally, the 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the observance of international humanitarian law 
binds members of UN-led operations. 
Having established full applicability of IHL to peacekeeping forces their formal 
status under IHL was examined. It was concluded that peacekeeping personnel are 
civilians since they do not belong to the armed forces of any party to the conflict. 
The law of neutrality as well as peacekeeping constitutional principles proved helpful 
in determining the civilian status of peacekeeping forces. As in case of all civilians 
and in line with the principle of distinction, their protection from direct attacks would 
cease “for such time as they take direct part in hostilities”. By applying the definition 
of combatants we conclude that personnel participating in peacekeeping missions do 
not meet the conditions to qualify as combatants; they therefore must be civilians. 
This determination constitutes an alternative approach to the one taken by 
international courts which simply assumed that on the basis of peacekeepers 
involvement in a mission. Similarly, the status of objects involved in a peacekeeping 
mission should be determined by reference to the definition of military objectives. If 
and for such time as such objects do not meet the two-prong test of Article 52(2) of 
the Additional Protocol I, they are civilian objects protected from direct attacks. 
Next, the issue of direct participation in hostilities was examined to determine the 
circumstances in which peacekeeping personnel could lose protection from targeting. 
Since there is no legal definition of this concept, the ICRC Interpretative Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
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Humanitarian Law was examined and applied in a peacekeeping context. By using 
the example of the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade it was demonstrated that certain 
actions undertaken in the defence of the mandate in the situation of an armed conflict 
could qualify as direct participation in hostilities and deprive peacekeepers of 
protection from direct attacks. For as long as their engagement amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities, attacks against them do not constitute war crimes under 
Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute of International Criminal 
Court. 
This conclusion creates certain tensions with regard to peacekeeping practice. 
Although peacekeeping actions undertaken in defence of the mandate are legal under 
jus ad bellum, they might entail serious consequences for peacekeepers under jus in 
bello. While it is not a contradiction, such a result somehow misses the point of 
protecting peacekeepers whilst on international duty. The chapter ended with a brief 
overview of options at the disposal of the United Nations to remedy this conundrum 
and concluded that since the principle of distinction has the status of jus cogens norm 
such options are not readily available. 
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5. Conclusions 
!
This concluding chapter provides an overview of the thesis, summarises the main 
findings of the undertaken research and provides the answer to the principal research 
question. It also reports on the contribution to knowledge that the thesis sought to 
achieve.  
 
The study was concerned with the anatomy of the war crime of attacking 
peacekeeping personnel and objects as this crime is coined in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. The Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome 
Statute criminalise, in international and non-international armed conflicts 
respectively: 
 
“(…) intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units 
or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict”. 
 
The central research question posed was whether or not the war crime of attacking 
personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations is compatible with the system of international law. As 
it was noted at the very outset, this crime is a conceptual construct of three different 
branches of international law: international criminal law, international humanitarian 
law and UN law. As a criminal offence it must comply with the principles of 
criminal law especially with the principles of legality and specificity. As a war crime 
it must satisfy the conditions prescribed by the norms of international humanitarian 
law. The category of persons and objects protected links it to the legal regime of the 
United Nations, especially with regard to the interpretation of a phrase “a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” and 
principles governing the activities of peacekeeping operations. The overlap of the 
legal regimes does not necessarily have to be problematic in itself; however, in the 
case of this particular war crime the objectives and principles of these specialised 
branches of law as well as different meanings they ascribe to the same concepts 
! 244 
create certain tensions. The first problematic issue identified is the lack of a single 
definition of peacekeeping. The concept seems to be increasingly flexible, fluid and 
readily adaptable to the changing parameters of international peace and security, 
which suits well the political nature and functions of the United Nations but 
contradicts the criminal law principle of specificity. The principle of specificity 
requires that criminal rules should be precise and specific as a criminal conviction 
should never be based upon a norm which does not make it sufficiently clear what 
conduct engages criminal responsibility. The second problem concerns the exact 
scope of application of the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions. In 
particular, the controversies relate to the applicability of international humanitarian 
law with regard to the status of peacekeeping personnel and objects and 
qualifications of their actions undertaken in the fulfilment of their mandate, 
especially those involving the use of force. The Rome Statute grants to peacekeeping 
personnel and objects immunity from direct attacks for as long as they are entitled to 
the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under international humanitarian 
law, which accordingly means, for as long as they do not take direct part in 
hostilities. The use of force in self-defence does not qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities and does not entail loss of protection. However, the concept of self-
defence in a peacekeeping context is said to have been extended to cover not only 
individual self-defence of peacekeeping personnel but also defence of the mandate. 
Such broad understanding of self-defence differs from its usual meaning in criminal 
law and international humanitarian law and it is disputable what standards should be 
applied to peacekeepers.  
 
The overlap of these legal regimes was recognised within the wider context of the 
fragmentation of international law. It was noted that this fragmentation is an inherent 
quality of the international legal system, which is a consequence of it being 
composed of specialised and relatively independent rule-complexes, legal institutions 
and fields of legal practice. Geographic and functional differentiation of international 
law that has lead to substantive and institutional fragmentation is additionally 
intensified by a predominantly horizontal structure of international law. 
Nevertheless, international law is still a legal system and any normative conflict 
should be resolved in favour of establishing meaningful relationships between the 
norms. Resting on this presumption the thesis aimed to analyse critically the 
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substance of the war crime of attacking UN peacekeeping missions in order either to 
challenge its theoretical underpinning as being incompatible with the system of 
international law or to provide more clarification of its applicable scope in relation to 
the overlapping legal regimes. The theoretical framework applied for this thesis 
builds upon the concepts of modern legal positivism and International Legal Process. 
Within this framework, the thesis utilised traditional legal interpretative tools and 
legal techniques for dealing with normative clashes. It also recognised the evolving 
dynamics of international law and importance of the context in which legal rules 
operate. It noted international legal practice and processes and their role in drawing 
the boundaries of law and determining the content of legal rules, filling normative 
gaps and managing conflicts. 
 
In order to answer the central research question with the use of the chosen 
methodology, four core clusters of research sub-questions were considered. The 
analyses of the issues that they related to were grouped thematically in chapters 2 - 4. 
 
Chapter 2 addressed the personal scope of legal protection under Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) 
and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. The primary aim of that chapter was to 
investigate the meaning of “a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations”. To achieve this it discussed the changing character of 
peacekeeping operations, the emergence and development of basic norms governing 
peacekeeping and some legal, political and military difficulties of the application of 
these norms. It demonstrated that peace operations do not constitute a homogenous 
category nor is there an official definition of the phenomenon. Peacekeeping is a 
flexible and evolving concept. However, international law has recognised the 
existence of generic terms with their contents changing over time, responsively to the 
continuous application and development of law. Therefore, it is accepted that the 
functional meaning of peacekeeping or a peacekeeping mission could be determined 
by courts on a case-by-case basis following the evolution of law and legal practice at 
any given time. Additionally, the lack of a precise definition can be remedied by a 
reference to the constitutional principles of peacekeeping and these are the principles 
of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence, which also 
constitute a conceptual distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement. These 
principles originated from the experiences of the first traditional observer missions 
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and they continue to apply despite the evolution and transformation of peacekeeping. 
However, they have also been reinterpreted to include in the category of 
peacekeeping operations “robust” missions, which use force at the tactical level to 
defend a peacekeeping mandate. This creates certain tensions which in the long run 
might require the United Nation to reconsider their meaning and utility.  
 
With regard to the phrase “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, the 
systemic interpretation of it leads to the conclusion that it stands for the requirement 
of the compatibility with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations in 
general, not just narrowly defined conformity with specified powers or procedures. 
In this light it encompasses not only missions established and operated by the UN in 
line with the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly, but also 
other peacekeeping missions set up and run by regional organisations provided that 
they are compatible with the law of the UN Charter. Furthermore, by reference to the 
preparatory work of the Rome Conference it was established that the 1994 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel should not be 
used to interpret the scope of protection under Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the peacekeeping principle of non-use of force except in self-
defence. It demonstrated that this principle was redefined on the political and 
doctrinal level to include the defence of a peacekeeping mandate. The emergence of 
the new right to use force in defence of the mandate extended the category of 
peacekeeping operations but it did not impact on the legal meaning and limits of the 
individual right to self-defence. While the exercise of these two rights might be 
increasingly interwoven in the operational environment, they rest on two different 
legal bases. Self-defence is an inherent right of every human being and does not 
require any authorisation although its limits are prescribed by national law. The use 
of force to defend the mandate must be seen as a distinct right deriving its legal force 
from the resolution of the UN Security Council. However, the defence of the 
mandate has remained problematic as it still has not been properly operationalised 
and entails a risk of drawing peacekeeping forces into hostilities, especially if the 
mission is authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use “all available 
means”. The chapter concluded that no extension of the right to individual self-
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defence has occurred under UN law, hence there is no normative conflict between 
UN law and criminal law on that issue. What has also been noted in the course of the 
analysis is the interrupted flow of legal authority from the strategic level of the 
Security Council binding decision to the tactical level of the performance of tasks by 
peacekeeping forces on the ground. Although there is no doubt about the binding 
force of the Security Council resolutions at the international level, giving effect to 
them by states happens only through application of their national laws and in 
accordance with their international obligations, which necessarily constrains the will 
of the Security Council. The positivist perspective on international law does not fully 
capture the dynamics of the political and institutional environment of peacekeeping. 
 
Since the defence of the mandate is distinct from self-defence, that has a critical 
impact on the scope of protection of peacekeepers under international humanitarian 
law and consequently under the Rome Statute. If, in the situation of armed conflict, 
they use force beyond self-defence to defend their mandate, such actions might 
deprive them of civilian protection and make them legitimate targets. This issue was 
examined in the last chapter. 
 
Accordingly, Chapter 4 focused on the applicability of IHL to peacekeeping 
operations. Firstly, it examined the command and control arrangements in UN-led 
peacekeeping operations and concluded that the UN and troop contributing countries 
exercise various degrees of authority over the troops participating in a peacekeeping 
mission. This multi-layered authority structure results in certain operational limits 
placed on national contingents and well as determining the law applicable to the 
conduct of military personnel. In this connection it should also be remarked that any 
statements about the UN exercising “exclusive command and control” over 
peacekeeping forces are largely inaccurate. National states retain full as well as 
tactical command and control over their contributed forces while contingents remain 
bound by national laws, national ROE and the treaty obligations of their national 
states, including IHL. Only one level of control – operational control, yet not always 
command, is delegated to the United Nations.   
 
With regard to the status of peacekeeping personnel and objects under international 
humanitarian law it was concluded that peacekeepers are civilians since they do not 
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belong to the armed forces of any party to a conflict. The peacekeeping constitutive 
principles as well as the law of neutrality in war proved helpful in determining their 
civilian status. As in the case of all civilians and in line with the principle of 
distinction, their protection from direct attacks would cease “for such time as they 
take direct part in hostilities”. Similarly, the status of objects involved in a 
peacekeeping mission was determined by reference to the definition of military 
objectives. If and for such time as such objects do not meet the two-prong test of 
Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I, they are civilian objects protected from 
direct attacks. 
 
The next issue examined in the last chapter was direct participation in hostilities and 
the circumstances in which peacekeeping personnel could lose protection from 
targeting. In this connection, the ICRC Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law was 
examined and applied. By using the example of the MONUSCO Intervention 
Brigade it was demonstrated that certain actions undertaken in the defence of a 
peacekeeping mandate in the situation of an armed conflict could qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities and deprive peacekeepers of protection from direct attacks. 
For as long as their engagement amounts to direct participation in hostilities, attacks 
against them do not constitute war crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of 
the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court.   
 
Based on the findings in chapters 2-4 and in the light of the adopted methodology the 
answer to the central research question of this thesis, namely whether or not the war 
crime of attacking personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is compatible with the system of 
international law, is affirmative. Despite the appearance of normative conflict, 
different legal regimes brought into play by Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can be reconciled in a manner that 
does not undermine the legitimacy of this war crime. However, certain tensions 
remain, especially the expectation of protection that should be afforded to those who 
risk their lives in the service of the international community. 
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The contribution to knowledge that this thesis offers relates to critical studies on 
international criminal law, international humanitarian law and the United Nations 
system. The thesis clarifies the scope of the application of the war crime of attacking 
personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations as this war crime is coined in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. This is the first comprehensive analysis of the overlap 
of legal regimes with respect to this war crime, which can assist courts in application 
of the rules relating to the protection of peacekeeping missions. 
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